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ABSTRACT

During the 1990s and early 2000s, a number of domestic social actors mobilized for
peace in several African countries. They did so under unfavorable political conditions. Some of
them went further and pursued their objective for peace at the level of formal negotiations. This
particularizing inquiry sought to understand the process leading to their engagement with formal
negotiations. To achieve this, inquiry focused on two questions: what about the conditions and
contexts prevailing in the 1990s to early 2000s accounted for social actor’s engagement with
formal negotiation processes and how civic groups went about doing so. The main argument was
that certain opportunities within the unfavorable political conditions and social actors’
understanding of war accounted for the pursuit of peace objectives at the level of formal
negotiations. A combination of specific and configurational history strategies were employed to
reconstruct the process of engagement and the conditions under which it unfolded. This
reconstruction relied on intrinsic and extrinsic analyses of ten peace campaigns led by religious
leaders and women organizations that occurred between 1990 and 2005 in Angola, Burundi,
Liberia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Sudan and Somalia. Data on these campaigns was collected
through archival research and face to face interviews. The resulting account suggests that the
failure of social actor’s humanitarian activities to mitigate the social and economic suffering
caused by the war and the failure of formal negotiations to secure a lasting peace led to social
actors’ pursuit for an end to war. However, to engage with political actors with political, military
and economic leverage, social actors had to deploy their social resources creatively to pursue
their demands for peace.
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Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION
In 1984, the Council of Churches of Mozambique created a Commission on Peace and
Reconciliation. At the time, the government of Mozambique was at war with the Resistência
Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO), a group that emerged in the 1970s in opposition to the
government’s Leninist-Marxist policies. By the early 1980s, the war had reached a destructive
and brutal phase. Vital social infrastructure was destroyed. The economy was devastated. Large
numbers of civilians died or were forcefully displaced and enduring harsh conditions. The
objective of the Commission on Peace and Reconciliation was to persuade the government and
the RENAMO to end the war through peaceful means—internal dialogue. The Mozambican
government had started negotiations in 1983 with South Africa a regional ally of the RENAMO,
resulting in the Nkomati Accord (1984). South Africa provided military support to the
RENAMO as part of its policy of destabilizing neighboring states that were allied with the
African National Congress and its struggle against apartheid. Under pressure from the United
States, the Mozambican government began talks with the RENAMO. However, these broke
down and the RENAMO launched new attacks in the country that were more brutal and
predatory.
The Mozambican church leaders’ objective of persuading the government to end the war
through dialogue was at odds with a government determined to pursue a military solution and not
negotiations with a group it did not recognize as a political party. Yet, this did not seem to deter
church leaders. Their main concern was the destructive nature of the war, particularly the great
suffering it caused for the people (McVeigh 1999, 183, 189). From 1984 until 1992, the year that
the government and RENAMO signed an agreement ending war, the Council of Churches of
Mozambique and the Catholic Church leaders who had joined them persisted in calling for an
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end to war and its peaceful resolution. The clergy also formed the Contact Group that sought to
facilitate communication between the government and RENAMO. In addition, a member of the
Contact Group, Catholic Bishop Gonçalves, became a member of the mediation team that
brokered the Mozambican peace talks. From the late 1980s onwards, similar initiatives by social
actors are evident in a number of African countries affected by war, for example, Angola,
Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Sudan. Examples of civic groups that sought an end to war
through peaceful means include the New Sudan Council of Churches, Inter-Faith Mediation
Committee in Liberia, Liberian Women’s Initiative (LWI), Inter-Religious Council of Sierra
Leone, Inter-Ecclesiastical Committee for Peace in Angola, and Save Somali Women and
Children. In addition to calling for an end to violent political conflict, some of these social actors
went further in pursuing this objective at the level of the formal negotiations processes. This
study focuses on this aspect of civic groups’ peace activism—the engagement with formal
negotiations to end internal wars.
Background to Social Actors’ Engagement with Formal Negotiations
The conditions under which social actors sought to engage in formal negotiations are
crucial to understanding this engagement. It was a domestic response to the nature of internal
conflicts that escalated from the late 1980s and continued into the early 2000s when political
transitions in a number of sub-Saharan countries turned violent. Whereas internal conflicts such
as those in Liberia and Sierra Leone were outcomes of violent political transitions of the 1990s,
those in Angola, Mozambique, and Sudan were a continuation of armed struggles for political
power that dated back to the early years of independence and were influenced by Cold War
politics. However, the political competition that accompanied political reforms of the 1990s did
not resolve these longstanding conflicts. Instead, this triggered new cycles of conflict in a
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changed domestic context. With the end of the Cold War and shift in donor aid policy,
governments were under international donor pressure to institute political reforms and adopt
market-based economies. Whether older or newer, the large scale conflicts in Angola, Burundi,
Liberia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and Somalia form the context in which civic groups
organized to end war.
Intractable conflicts are persistent, destructive, and resistant to resolution (Coleman 2006,
534). Understanding these features of intractable conflicts and how social actors experience them
is important in understanding, as well, social actors’ engagement with formal negotiations. The
military policies that armed groups and government forces pursued destabilized economic and
social life. Acts of economic sabotage by armed groups included the destruction of public
infrastructure—water and electricity supply, roads, bridges, and schools and hospitals. Armed
groups also destabilized civilians’ livelihoods by looting villagers’ crops and livestock, burning
farms and mining areas frequented by civilians. Thousands of civilians fled their homes for safer
areas within or outside the country. Government counterinsurgent policies such as forceful
evacuation of civilians, their resettlement in villages surrounded by government forces, and
burning forests considered rebel bases, disrupted civilian life considerably. These war strategies
denied civilians access to basic services, forcing them to abandon their livelihoods. Large-scale
displacement, for instance, disrupted agricultural production or led to its demise. The economic
destabilization and its disruption of agricultural activities impoverished populations that were
economically self-sufficient. It led to mass starvation and famine. The protracted nature of the
violent conflicts and their recurring cycles of violence overwhelmed coping mechanisms
civilians resorted to in times of distress, such as drought periods. Populations became dependent

4

on humanitarian relief provided by churches, women’s organizations, and international
humanitarian relief organizations.
The fragmentation of armed groups into rival factions, as well as the proliferation of
weapons and their unregulated use, created cultures of violence. The traumatic and socially
destabilizing consequences of these cultures of violence are visible in the deliberate targeting of
civilians and the level of brutality. War repertoire included brutal and violent attacks, massacres,
mutilation, and sexual abuse of women. Forceful recruitment of combatants and workers was
done through abduction of children and youth. These brutal encounters with armed groups and
government forces caused a lot of confusion, fear, hostility, suspicion, and bitter resentment
among the affected population. An example is the 1991 “Bor massacre” of Dinka civilians by a
faction of the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) (Amnesty International
[AI] Report 1992, 17).
Similar to economic destabilizing policies, the brutal repertoire of war sparked largescale displacement of populations, disrupting family and social relations. An example is the Siad
Barre government’s brutal repression of the Isaaq Somali suspected of supporting the Somali
National Movement (SNM). Over 300,000 Isaaq Somali fled from the north to neighboring
Ethiopia due to the intense artillery and aerial bombardment of cities and towns by government
forces and attacks by government-sponsored militia (Bradbury 2008, 53–75; Omar 1993). The
brutal attacks also provoked armed resistance by civilians who organized militia to protect
themselves. In Mozambique, for example, the Naprama religious warriors mobilized to counter
the RENAMO (Chingono 1996, 53–54). Similar attempts by civilians have been documented in
Sierra Leone and South Sudan. These armed responses from below added to the cycles of
violence. They contributed to a militarization of society. Civilians found it difficult to pursue
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their livelihoods with the breakdown of social order and increasing conditions of insecurity and
uncertainty.
These internal conflicts also altered social relations, including gender and generation
relations. Women became heads of households as men either joined the military, were killed, or
abandoned the family. Women took on the tasks of providing for the family under very difficult
conditions and often without the protection of husbands or male relatives. They were vulnerable
to attacks by armed groups and undisciplined government forces. Large numbers of children and
youths were orphaned or separated from families. With no adult protection many joined the
military for survival (Peters 2004, 30–31). With the breakdown of social order, elders could not
discipline the large number of youth with weapons. Few armed groups could discipline their
troops or control their activities. The government lacked the capacity to protect civilians from the
armed groups and roaming bands of armed youth.
Intractable Conflict and Intervention.
The intractable conflicts posed a number of challenges to humanitarian interventions
aimed at alleviating the suffering of civilians and to the diplomatic efforts aimed at ending them.
These challenges are also crucial to understanding social actors’ engagement with formal
negotiations. First, there is the humanitarian challenge. The economic and social destabilization
caused by the processes of war resulted in complex humanitarian crises—profound social crises
induced by war or natural disaster (Binder 2009, 332). People’s strategies for surviving proved
very difficult under the conditions of war. Thus complex humanitarian crises attracted
international attention as large sections of the population urgently needed assistance. However,
international humanitarian actors were confronted with difficult conditions of providing
assistance to populations in need.
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Briefly, the humanitarian challenge had to do with access to populations in need of
assistance, especially those outside urban areas. The destruction of public infrastructure made
access very difficult. Also and most importantly, the armed groups’ attacks on, threats toward,
and intimidation of international humanitarian relief agencies and looting of relief aid raised the
problem of safety and security of humanitarian relief staff. International humanitarian agencies
withdrew, as they did in Somalia, or were reluctant to intervene under conditions of insecurity, as
in the first Liberian Civil War.
The task of providing humanitarian relief in such situations fell to domestic social actors
since governments and armed groups lacked the capacity or will. The churches were one such
domestic social actor with a long history of charity and with a national reach that in some cases
rivaled that of government social service provision. Women’s self-help groups feature in
accounts of domestic social actors’ attempts to address the war at the local level. These two
groups of actors relied on social resources acquired through international networks of religious
organizations and partnerships with international humanitarian agencies such as the International
Red Cross and Red Crescent (ICRC) to address the humanitarian needs created by the war. Some
of the actors, especially women, mobilized resources locally. Yet, even domestic social actors
met similar challenges in providing relief as the international humanitarian organizations. They
faced intimidation and had to negotiate access or find ways of bypassing rebel control of
communication lines.
With this kind of challenge, humanitarian relief providers could not make the difference
actors expected. For actors like the churches, the humanitarian crises created by the violent
political conflict needed urgent attention. During one of their early visits to President Samora
Machel, the Protestant and Catholic bishops called attention to the immense suffering the war
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caused for the people and proposed the pursuit of a peaceful resolution through dialogue. In a
public statement to the government and the National Union for the Total Independence of
Angola (UNITA), Angola’s Roman Catholic bishops called the civil war “a twice-deadly
organization—it kills with weapons and kills with hunger” (Human Rights Watch 1999). Peace
activists in other countries expressed similar views. Liberian women, represented by the Liberian
Women’s Initiative, said that they were tired of the war and suffering they endured. Peace
activists in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Somalia organized protests, demonstrations, and marches
against continued fighting. Addressing the humanitarian crisis—the people’s suffering—
effectively required addressing its cause: the violent political conflict and socioeconomically
destabilizing conditions it created. Only in this way would humanitarian assistance make a
difference. Instead, as Catholic Bishop Parade Taban of the Diocese of Torit (South Sudan) put
it, providing humanitarian assistance under such difficult conditions of war was like “fattening a
cow for slaughter.”
However, those able to make a difference, the conflicting parties, seemed reluctant or
disinterested in the humanitarian impact of war, the suffering of the people. This raised a second
political challenge: continuation of war despite several attempts to end it through dialogue, in
particular formal negotiations convened by the international community. The formal negotiations
seemed unable to end war and resolve the political crises. Mediating agents were not the only
ones concerned by this. The proliferation of armed groups in the course of negotiations, each
seeking political representation; frequent postponement of talks; frequent violations of cease-fire
agreements; and breaches of negotiated agreements frustrated war-weary populations. They also
cast doubt on the integrity of negotiation as a tool for ending war despite peace activists calling
for its use as a peaceful means. The conflicting parties’ delaying tactics and apparent disregard
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for formal negotiations seemed to signal a lack of commitment on their part to negotiate for
peace. The long, drawn-out processes stretched the patience of the affected population and the
international community. Conflicting parties’ spoiler strategies alienated them from the people
they claimed to represent—their political constituency. Thus, for some of the peace activists, it
was not enough to demand an end to war. They sought to engage directly in formal negotiations,
a form of the dialogue they promoted. Social actors’ engagement with formal negotiations
varied. The Liberian Women’s Initiative lobbied to be allowed into the Accra (1994) and Abuja
(1995–96) talks. Burundi women peace activists from the Collectif des Assocations Féminines et
ONG du Burundi (CAFOB) also lobbied to be included in the Arusha negotiations (1998–2000).
Other social actors, such as church leaders in Mozambique and Sierra Leone, were invited into
the negotiations. In some instances, provisions were made for the participation of civil society
actors. The Somali negotiations beginning with the Djibouti talks (2000) is an example.
Statement of the Problem
Social actors’ engagement with formal negotiations took place under unfavorable
conditions. Civic groups acted during periods of war or unstable peace. The political contexts in
which they operated had a history of violent repression of political dissent that created a culture
of fear. Their pursuit of an end to war through peaceful means was at odds with governments and
armed groups’ preference for a military solution. They faced the problem of being seen as
political threats to conflicting parties. In addition, formal negotiations are high-level political
processes with participation exclusive to conflicting parties with the political, military, and
economic leverage to alter the situation for peace. Social actors such as the Contact Group in
Mozambique and the Liberian Women’s Initiative do not qualify as parties to the conflict. They
do not have the status of political representative, nor the military and economic leverage
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considered necessary for altering the situation for peace. Civic groups thus engaged with the
formal negotiations from a weak position. Despite these unfavorable political conditions, some
social actors persisted in engaging directly with the formal negotiations. The purpose of this
particularizing inquiry is to understand the process of social actors’ engagement with formal
negotiations to end intractable conflict that escalated in a number of African countries during the
1990s. Social actors’ engagement here refers to civic groups’ pursuit of peace objectives in the
formal negotiation process.
Research Question and Main Argument
This study sought to find out: What about the context and conditions accounts for civic
groups’ engagement with formal negotiation processes? What specific conditions in the broader
political context and among the civic groups accounts for this? How did the civic groups go
about engaging with the formal negotiations? Two arguments are made in answer to this
questions.
First, certain opportunities existed within the risky political conditions of war and in the
formal negotiation processes that civic groups used to directly engage with the formal
negotiations. These had to do with conditions related to social actors, for example the
humanitarian resources they had that allowed them to play an important role locally and among
affected populations. Other conditions are external to social actors, such as the international
community’s frustration with spoiler strategies conflicting parties used to delay, derail, or
abandon talks. This created an opening for social actors to act in support of advancing the
negotiation process.
The second argument is that social actors’ understanding of the violent internal conflict
as “suffering” and “not the voice of the people” motivated their demand for an end to war and its
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peaceful resolution. More importantly, the frustration ordinary people felt over conflicting
parties’ failure to end war—“people’s suffering”—led civic groups to pursue their objective for
peace by directly engaging with the formal negotiations.
Research Objectives
The research tasks of the study were to:
a) identify the conditions that made it possible for social actors to act for a peaceful
resolution to the intractable conflicts.
b) reconstruct the sequence of events linking these conditions to civic groups’ different
ways of engaging with the formal negotiations.
Conceptual Framework
Concepts from the dynamics of contention (DOC) framework (McAdam, Tarrow, and
Tilly 2001; Tilly and Tarrow 2007) were used to organize an overall account of plot
development from the conditions that made social actors’ engagement possible to how these led
to their engagement with the formal negotiations. The narrative analysis begins with a
description of broad social change processes resulting from violent political transitions and war.
This description highlights the key transformative moments that had an effect on peace activists
such as the complex humanitarian crises that overwhelmed their coping strategies.
The narrative analysis then shifts towards elaborating on the link between these
conditions and the process leading to social actors’ engagement. The process begins with social
actors’ collective attribution of the social consequences of war and their experience of it to an
unbearable “suffering.” This process involves a few individuals doing something to end the
suffering. Through mechanisms of encounter and conversations, they lead the process of
collective attribution of the war and its resolution. They also disseminate the resulting shared
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story or new theory of war to conflicting parties, the public, and external actors (governments,
international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations). Dissemination involved the
appropriation of existing social bases and their resources, creation of new vehicles of
coordination to coordinate their pursuit of an end to war, and later engagement with formal
negotiations. In the course of collective contention for peace social actors activated sociocultural
or religious identities such as mothers, prophets, or princes of peace to define themselves.
Social actors’ interactions with conflicting parties, the public, and external actors
combined with mechanisms of opening their activity into the broader political context led to
different forms of engagement. Groups like the Liberia Women’s Initiative and Burundi women
members of the Collectif des Assocations Féminines et ONG du Burundi (CAFOB) sought entry
into formal negotiations. Provisions were made for them to participate in formal negotiation
processes, as in the example of the Somali women’s organizations. The religious leaders’
engagement shows they were invited as a result of their roles in brokering communication
between conflicting parties.
Definition of Terms
Social actors are civic groups that organized to pursue an end to intractable conflicts. In
this study these are groups led by religious leaders and women’s organizations. They are also
referred to as noncombatant groups. Although they are nonstate actors like the armed groups
opposed to the government, unlike the latter, noncombatant groups used nonviolent means to
pursue their objectives for an end to violent political conflict.
Social actors’ engagement in formal negotiations refers to civic groups’ pursuit of peace
objectives in formal negotiation processes.
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Scope and Limitations of the Study
This study is limited to the analysis of two groups of social actors, religious leaders and
women’s organizations. Ten peace campaigns led by religious leaders and women’s
organizations were identified in seven sub-Saharan African countries where intractable wars
escalated between 1990 and 2005 when political transitions turned violent (Appendix 1). These
countries are Angola, Burundi, Liberia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Sudan. Since
this is a particularizing inquiry employing strategies of specific and configurational history, the
findings are limited to the specific contexts and actors studied and are not intended to be
generalizable to other periods and contexts.
Significance of the Study
The social actors’ pursuit of their peace objectives at the level of formal negotiations is a
fairly recent and under-studied phenomenon. This study tells the little-known story of these
noncombatant mobilizations for peace in sub-Saharan Africa during the 1990s and early 2000s.
Even less is known about attempts by some of the peace activists to engage directly in formal
negotiations. Analyses of formal negotiations to end the wars of the 1990s in countries such as
Angola, Somalia, Burundi, Liberia, and Sierra Leone persistently stress the difficulties mediators
faced and the daunting challenges presented by conflicting parties with little interest in pursuing
a peaceful resolution or committing to one. The role of civic groups such as noncombatant
groups is discussed in terms of their relevance to the mediator or conflicting parties. Thus, civic
groups appear as auxiliaries to the mediation or as constituents of one or more of the conflicting
parties. Rarely do they exercise agency in the negotiations themselves. Conflicting parties and
mediating agents are key actors. Civic groups and ordinary citizens are depicted as having no
political agency in the direction the war takes. This study highlights the political agency of civic
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groups in peacemaking and what allowed them to exercise this agency despite the odds against
them.
Outline of the Study
The study is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 examines how literature on social movements and management of intractable
conflict addresses the question of social actors’ engagement in formal negotiations. Chapter 3
describes the nature of the study, research process, analytical frame, and constraints encountered.
Chapter 4 presents the setting of social actors’ engagement with formal negotiations. It highlights
the conditions leading to social actors’ engagement. Chapters 5 and 6 account for the process
leading to social actors’ pursuit of a peaceful resolution to war. Chapter 5 focuses on peace
actions led by religious leaders, whereas Chapter 6 focuses on those led by women’s
organizations. Chapter 7 focuses on how social actors engaged in formal negotiations. The study
ends with conclusions and recommendations in Chapter 8.
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Chapter 2. LITERATURE REVIEW
Why do social actors mobilized against war engage directly in formal negotiations? What
are the contexts and conditions that account for this engagement? How do they go about
engaging in the formal negotiation process? This chapter discusses how scholarly work on
nonviolent social movements, conflict resolution, and conflict management addresses these
questions. Analysis focuses first on how the literature accounts for nonviolent civic resistance to
war, relating these earlier discussions to social actors’ mobilization to end war in sub-Saharan
African countries during the 1990s and early 2000s. This is followed by a consideration of how
scholars approach social actors’ engagement in formal negotiations. This discussion is directed
toward contexts and conditions that make nonviolent resistance to internal war possible.
2.1. Nonviolent Resistance to War
War resistance movements are a type of peace movement. Both are new phenomena in
history (Carter 1992, xiii; Cortright 2008, 155–156). Antiwar and peace movements are also
classified as well-known forms of social movements. Hence they can be defined as “collectivities
acting with some degree of organization and continuity outside of institutional or organizational
channels for the purpose of challenging or defending extant authority, whether it is institutionally
or culturally based, in the group, organization, society, culture, or world order of which they are
a part” (Snow, Soule, and Kriesi 2004, 11). Similarly, a study of African social movements
defines these movements as a “broad crystallization of group activity autonomous of the state”
(Mamdani 1995, 7). Social actors’ peace campaigns fit these descriptions. They were led by
religious leaders’ and/or women’s organizations that coordinated peace action autonomously,
outside of political institutional channels. Their actions challenged conflicting parties’ use of
military means to settle conflict. They supported a peaceful resolution to the war including the
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use of formal negotiations. Mamdani and Wamba argue that their perspective on social
movements is reflective of “concrete social processes” on the African continent. First, it captures
the diverse organizational forms that make up social movements. They point out that worker
movements, as an example, include older groups such as burial societies. In other words, social
movements in Africa have both old and new forms of self-organization and so defy new social
movement definitions that differentiate between older class-based movements and new
community-based movements. Second, this broad perspective focuses on all internal forces,
whether elite or popular, that are autonomous of the state. Third, social movements in Africa
may include initiatives by apolitical nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) as well as
initiatives that are antigovernment and political. Given the realities of the African continent, the
new social movement orientation restricts inquiry by imposing Western-based definitions on the
African context. These features apply to the peace campaigns led by religious leaders and
women’s organizations. They organized in the form of networks bringing together older groups
like professional associations, labor organizations, students, elites, ordinary people, traditional
organizations, community-based women’s groups, and NGOs.
War resistance movements, according to Cortright, are particular reactions to processes
of militarization or “responses to specific, unjust military actions that are deemed unacceptable
by large numbers of people.” Antiwar movements are considered examples of pragmatic or
conditional pacifism. Activists’ perspectives on violence may range from complete rejection of
military violence to acceptance of limited use of force for self-defense, justice, and protecting the
innocent (Cortright 2008, 14). Antiwar movements often follow a single objective of preventing
or ending war. They oppose particular wars or military policies (Carter 1992, 18). They are thus
distinct from those that engage in mutual understanding and transnational cooperation.
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Historically they have included “traditional peace organizations,” and people from diverse
backgrounds who are committed to ending war. Movement participants are also committed to the
use of nonviolent methods to pursue their objectives. An exact differentiation of antiwar
movements is difficult. The movements bring together groups and individuals that support an
end to war in addition to other objectives such as social change or justice. The campaigns led by
religious leaders and women’s organizations qualify as war resistance movements as they were
reactions against the unprecedented violence and its traumatic effects in society. They brought
together groups and individuals opposed to conflicting parties’ pursuit of a military solution to
settle their conflicts. Their main objective was ending war peacefully. Unlike antiwar movements
in the West, they did not have “traditional peace organizations,” although they may have been
supported by external actors who qualify as such, for instance, Quaker peace organizations.
Social actors did not outrightly reject violence. Although it is difficult to establish conclusively
whether social actors completely rejected use of violence or force, some, like the Liberian peace
activists, supported international military intervention to prevent escalation of war.
2.1.1 Nonviolent War Resistance in Postcolonial Africa. Unlike the extensive scholarship
on violent resistance in postcolonial Africa, very little scholarly work is devoted to nonviolent
resistance in the same geographic region. The earliest documented nonviolent antiwar activism
in Africa is the transnational protest against French nuclear testing in the Sahara (Carter 1992;
Cortright 2008, 136; Herb 2005, 355; Sutherland and Meyer 2000, 36–42). This protest took
place during the 1950s and 1960s, the period of the antinuclear movement. Western public fear
of the effects of nuclear tests and weapons motivated widespread movements against the
production and testing of nuclear weapons. Ghanian President Kwame Nkrumah fully supported
the 1959 protests against French nuclear testing in the Sahara that were organized by the
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Committee for Nonviolent Action (CNVA). The protests were not covered by the French press
or other Western media compared to those of Western antinuclear movements. Herb (2005, 355)
states that despite this, the Sahara Protests led to the establishment of the World Peace Brigade
and to a training center for nonviolent action in Tanzania in 1961. Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia
requested the World Peace Brigade’s support in training and coordinating mass action for the
independence of Northern Rhodesia (present day Zambia, Malawi, and Zimbabwe). Julius
Nyerere of Tanzania offered to host the World Peace Brigade Africa headquarters in Dar-esSalaam. Inspired by the Sahara protests, these two nationalists wanted the same nonviolent
methods applied to the liberation struggle in their countries and region (Sutherland and Meyer
2000, 62).
Elsewhere in Africa, evidence of peace movements included civic groups in South Africa
that mobilized against the militarization of society by the apartheid regime’s violent repression
of the black struggle for liberation during the 1980s (Cherry 2011; Conway 2008; Gidron, Katz,
and Hasenfeld 2002, 73–74). Groups like the women’s human rights group Black Sash,
Christian-based youth groups, and the End Conscription Campaign (ECC) in South Africa, led
by white South African conscientious objectors, pursued a variety of objectives under an overall
goal of ending state violence against black South Africans. In the 1990s, civic groups mobilized
for a peaceful transition from apartheid to a democratic state. The apartheid government chose to
undertake political reforms under great international pressure. Then-president F. W. de Klerk
initiated negotiations with resistance movements as part of a political strategy aimed at
dismantling the apartheid state and establishing a democratic system. The negotiation process
was very difficult. In a number of instances violence seemed to derail the process. Civic groups
stepped in to mobilize for peace in society.
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African peace movements rarely get mention in studies of peace movements. When they
do, the mobilizations for peace in South Africa are often used as an example. Yet, during the
1990s, news reports of public demonstrations, protests, and marches included references to
peace. These also mentioned the nonviolent (e.g., peaceful) nature of the demonstrations or
marches. During the same period, there were regional and international conferences focusing on
peace. In these and other conferences civic groups reported their peace activism. These were
responses to the violent political transitions from authoritarian rule that escalated into civil wars
in some countries, such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Somalia.
Reasons given for the absence of African antiwar protests in the literature on peace
movements include problems of action going undocumented or ignored by media or receiving
less publicity, western bias in the literature, and African people’s primary interest in social
justice and not (nuclear) disarmament (Herb 2005; Sutherland and Meyer 2000). Other reasons,
such as those given by Herb (2005), do not reflect the complex reality. For instance, she claims
that most current wars in the South are civil wars and that the population is sharply divided along
ideological lines. This implies that peace movements are unlikely to emerge in such a context,
since an important ingredient is the need for face-to-face contact to establish relationships of
trust. This is not always the case. The women’s campaigns in Liberia and Somalia, for instance,
emerged despite ideological differences. These differences did not necessarily go away. Women
had to face the challenge of how to overcome them.
A second claim is the lack of civilian institutions and democratic structures in many
developing countries. This claim assumes peace movements can only emerge in contexts similar
to that of the liberal western democratic state, where freedom of assembly and expression are
universally granted rights. Again, the reality in Africa challenges this. As Mamdani and Wamba-
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dia-Wamba (1995, 7) have argued, Herb seems to apply a western lens to her examination of
social or peace movements to the Southern context. With regard to the African social context,
this prevents her from noticing the variety of organizational forms, traditional and new, that
already exist and that people in Africa often use to make demands on the state or political elite.
A group of Somali women, for instance, not only structured their women’s organizations on
western NGO models but also relied on traditional self-help forms of organizations and networks
of kin ties to make their case for an end to war. Also, during the period of transition from
authoritarian regimes, a number of governments repealed laws restricting civil and political
rights. This study contributes evidence of peace action in countries other than South Africa so as
to fill the gap in the peace movement literature on antiwar action in postcolonial Africa.
2.2 Context and Conditions of Civic Groups Mobilized against War and for Its Peaceful
Resolution
Collective action in opposition to war is a political act that places the challengers in a
threatening position. It may cost lives and lead to retaliation from the government and from
political actors who believe the pursuit of war is a justifiable policy option in the interest of the
nation or objectives of political transformation. Civic groups engaged in collective action take a
position that could be perceived as a threat by the political actors they challenge. So why would
civic groups bother to collectively act for an end to the use of the military in these conflicts and
demand that political actors pursue peaceful resolution? What about the contexts and conditions
makes this possible?
The peace movement literature focuses on peace actions by social actors in Western
Europe, North America, and Japan (Carter 1992; Cortright 2008; Kaltefleiter and Pfaltgraff
1988; Nepstad 2008; Rochon 1988). These antiwar movements were a reaction to World War I,
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the antinuclear and nuclear disarmament movements in the late 1950s, early 1960s, and 1980s,
and the protests against the US war in Vietnam. They occured in mostly liberal democratic
regimes and in a global context characterized by two major wars (WWI and II) that involved
most European countries and a Cold (ideological) War between the United States and the former
Soviet Union and their allies.
The predominance of peace activity in Europe (United Kingdom) and the United States is
attributed to factors in these countries that enabled the flourishing of peace societies such as
Quaker-influenced groups: Protestant Christianity, political liberalism, and the free market
economy (Carter 1992, 4). This is a kind of structural argument based on cultural, political, and
economic conditions that is often invoked to explain the rise of the western liberal democratic
state; in this context, it explains the emergence of peace action and its ability to sustain itself
over several years. Some scholars point to social actors’ concern for the “horrors of war,” the
brutal nature of Nazi and fascist regimes, the danger of atomic and nuclear bombs, the cost to
society of the arms race, and the unjust nature of wars as motivating factors toward organizing
against war and militarism. On the other hand, factors that constrain peace action may include a
“rigid and intolerant political climate” such as the anticommunist and intolerant political climate
in the United States during the 1950s, diviseness and sectarianism within the movement, political
backlash created by the movement’s emergence, and the credibility and viability of claims and
alternative solutions (Cortright 2008, 127–155). These claims show the drivers of peace action to
be factors internal to peace actors and to an environment restrictive for political action. They
imply that social actors may act on the basis of beliefs they have about war, yet this action may
be constrained by a hostile political environment. Most of these factors could apply beyond
western political contexts to non-Western contexts and are of interest to this study. They
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combine a structural and agency perspective to accounting for peace action. Other scholars point
to features of advanced industrial societies, for instance the crisis in the political system, actors’
accumulation of resources necessary for launching peace actions, and the political openings
created by intense competition between rival political elites (Rochon 1988, 16–19). These
answers show also that scholars search for conditions that make peace movements possible in
these movements’ external or internal environments. Thus, accounts of what leads to peace
movements reflect theories of social movements. Social movement research suggests answers
that highlight structural factors, agency, and a combination of both.
2.2.1 Structures and Movement Emergence. The dominant structural account of the
emergence of collective action is the political process theory and its variants (Goodwin and
Jasper 2004, 3–8). The model focuses on three components that account for the emergence of
collective action (Morris 2004, 234–237): mobilization structures, political opportunity
structures, and cultural framing. Mobilizing structures are the informal and formal vehicles of
collective action. These include informal networks, existing institutional structures, and formal
organizations. Collective action emerges when organizations engage in recruitment, acquisition
of resources, and coordination of collective action.
Political opportunity structures are the dimensions of a given political environment, such
as the nature of elite relations (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; Tarrow 2011; Tilly and
Tarrow 2007), that allow for the emergence of collective action. Examples include divisions
among political elites, the emergence of new external allies, or the opening of political space.
Changes in the structure of this political environment create openings that benefit challengers.
Challengers exploit these changes to mobilize. Expansion or opening up of opportunities thus
leads to collective action. This happens through mechanisms in the environment such as
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attribution of opportunities or threats, availability of potential allies, formation of coalitions, and
framing of contention (Tarrow 2011, 163).
Collective cultural frames are “action-oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire
and legitimate the activities and campaigns of a social movement organization” (Benford and
Snow 2000, 614–615). Cultural framing processes are interactive in the sense that they involve
actors negotiating their shared meanings for a problem they face and how to respond. The task
involves identifying the problem and its attributions (“diagonostic framing,” “prognostic
framing,” and “motivational framing”). These tasks allow for the consensus necessary for people
to engage in collective action to mobilize. In other words people make sense of a problem facing
them in terms that suggest a way out and motivate them to do something about the problem.
These political process theories were directly relevant to this study’s questions. First, they
shared with this study a focus on political context and conditions of social actors’ pursuit of
peace action. Since the political opportunity structure directs attention to political conditions in
which social movements mobilize, it was useful for identifying and describing the specific
political factors that led to collective action against war and for entry into formal negotiations.
Political dimensions of a given peace environment are particularly important in this study. Peace
movements’ rejection of war centers them in the political arena because decisions about military
policy are considered the sole preserve of the state and not that of civic groups. They may find
themselves in the kind of hostile environment describe by Cortright (2008). Second, the political
process models focus on mobilizing structures and cultural framing, directing attention toward
conditions among social actors that drive them to engage in peace actions. Inquiry in this study is
approached from the perspective of social actors’ experiences. Therefore, an important question
related to cultural frames and mobilizing structures concerns what these actors had in hand and
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whether it allowed them to act despite politically threatening conditions or even resistance from
within.
Variants of political process models give different emphases on each of these components
and have been critiqued for their “structural bias and determinism.” The dynamics of contention
(DOC) framework is an attempt to address this criticism by focusing on relational dynamics
between the three components (Kriesi 2004, 77–79). This directs analysis toward the interactive
context and accounts for social actors’ peace actions in terms of mechanisms and processes that
show how interaction between social movement actors and political actors they oppose
contribute to changes in the larger political context. The DOC framework has a conceptual
toolkit that emphasizes the dynamic interaction between the three components of political
process models. It highlights not only the structural conditions but also agency and action of
social actors. Although the DOC has been applied largely in studying Western peace and social
movements, proponents have called for its use in systematic analysis of non-Western peace and
social movements. This particularizing study does not employ the framework concepts with the
aim of testing theory. However, the study used the mechanisms to construct an intrinsic and
extrinsic analysis of the politically restrictive conditions for factors that led to social actors’
peace actions.
2.2.2 Agency. Structural variables account in part for what makes social actors’ peace
action possible. The other part of the story is concerned with the question of human agency. It
arises from observations such as Einwoher’s that collective action is driven not only by
environmental factors and conditions external to movement actors. Political openings may exist,
and mobilizing structures may be available, or people may have an understanding of the
situation, yet no collective action occurs. This means we have to look for conditions within
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actors that account for why they bother to do something about their situation. This directs
attention to the role of human agency. Whereas Morris (2004, 235–37) acknowledges that
structural accounts of political process models do make room for human agency—for example,
social movement agency is attributed to a political elite—it is framed as a factor external to
movement actors, leaving us with little understanding of their agency. He gives the example of
how the political opportunity structure allows for agency by suggesting that groups collectively
act if they make use of the favorable conditions created by a new political opening. Even though
the political opportunity structure approach centers the interaction between political elite (state
agents) and challengers, more emphasis is given to the former. This neglect of social movement
actors’ agency prevents us from seeing how challengers are able to generate and sustain
movements. This argument is similar to Einwohner’s (2003). Her studies of Jewish resistance in
Poland show that civic groups resisted despite severely restricted opportunities for collective
action (2003). They went ahead and planned their resistance fully aware that they lacked
opportunities or that their situation was hopeless. What made their resistance possible was the
way they framed it as a way to display honor and dignity. The appeal to values or moral beliefs is
evident in African social actors’ peace actions. South African antiwar activists launched their
resistance at the peak of the antiapartheid regime’s repression of black uprisings.
Morris argues that political process theorists’ assumption of a strong relationship between
external political opportunities and collective action restricts understanding of how the
mobilization capacity of social actors leads to collective action. Political process theorists
assume that external political opportunities first become available before challengers take action.
This characterizes social actors as merely reacting to their external environment when they have
the potential to take action that shapes it. He considers the collective action a result, too, of the
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capacity of challenging groups (2004, 236). Therefore, social actors’ peace action happens
through a reciprocal interaction between mobilizing capacity of social actors and external
political opportunities. He argues that this more closely reflects empirical evidence than political
process theories of how external political opportunities make social movements happen.
To fill this gap in the literature on what generates collective action, Morris focuses on
“how mobilization capacities generate collective action.” Mobilization capacities refer to
challenging groups’ agency-laden institutions and frame lifting, leadership configurations,
tactical solutions, protest histories, and transformative events. He notes that these are movement
dynamics and not independent triggers of collective action. Agency-laden institutions, such as
the African American church, are institutions developed by potential challengers. They are
“configurations of cultural beliefs and practices that permeate and shape their social networks.”
These institutions contain cultural and organizational resources that potential challengers can use
to launch collective action. In frame lifting, leaders shape their collective action to fit an
institutional frame. So the collective action fits in with (2004, 236) “cultural, emotional schemata
of actors embedded in relevant social networks.”
Morris’s argument about human agency contributes to work on leadership and its role in
social movements. Nepstad and Bob (2006) argue that leaders matter at crucial moments such as
the emergence of social movements. They possess leadership capital, that is, cultural, social, and
symbolic capital. This capital allows them to read and respond to structural conditions and
changes in opportunities. Leadership capital is crucial for the emergence of social movements
because it compensates for a lack of material resources, political opportunities, and
organizational structures. Ganz (2005, 211) explains in a related argument how actors with fewer
resources can defeat those with more resources. According to him, strategic capacity—that is, the
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conditions of a leadership team that facilitate effective strategy—is a crucial condition for the
emergence of collective action.
Einwohner adds to this debate on agency and leadership by showing how authority work
matters in the emergence of collective action. Authority work is “those efforts made by leaders to
establish their authority in the eyes of potential followers” (2007, 1321). She argues that for
collective action to emerge, actions leaders take (authority work) must convince people to obey
them voluntarily. The type of authority work leaders choose varies according to settings, existing
cultural understandings, and leaders’ perceptions of what resonates with followers. Authority
work focuses on leaders establishing their credibility and authority.
Although the recent work on agency centers on the role of movement actors, structural
factors are not dismissed. The emerging theme therefore is the reciprocal relationship between
structure and agency. Structural accounts tell part of the story of why civic groups collectively
act. Collective action requires agency and “conscious awareness” and involves choices about
initiating one action and not another (Jasper 2004, 2). Structural conditions may be favorable yet
potential challengers can still lack leadership capital or strategic capacity or could fail to do the
authority work required to attract followers. These insights on agency resonate with this study’s
concern with what social actors had that led to their engagement in formal negotiations. This
question not only considers external but also internal conditions. They direct inquiry to leaders of
civic groups that organized for peace. This permits a fuller and more balanced account of what
makes social actors’ engagement of formal negotiations possible. However, accessing
information that would provide a rich description of social actors’ mobilizing capacity toward
participating in formal negotiations proved a research challenge. This challenge applies not only
to the present study but also to studies relying on such sources of information; systematic inquiry
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requires collection of primary data especially for social actors whose actions have not been
extensively recorded or are under-studied, such as peace activists in sub-Saharan Africa. This
study used DOC framework as a first step to further research that would incorporate the insights
of agency social movement literature. The DOC permits for agency of social actors, and concepts
from this framework were used to identify specific external conditions and those pertaining to
social actors that led to their engagement in formal negotiations and how this happened.
2.3 Structure, Agency, and Civic Groups Mobilized to Seek Entry into Formal Negotiations
There is hardly any mention in peace movement literature of peace activists pursuing
their antiwar objectives at the level of formal negotiations. However, Carter notes three
tendencies in peace movements’ positions on negotiations based on her observation of Western
antinuclear movements. They tend to a) exert pressure on conflicting parties to achieve success
or promote a particular negotiating position; b) urge unilateral measures of restraint; and c) call
for negotiations. The question of engaging in formal negotiations arises in her claim that “in
challenging military policies peace campaigns have raised key questions about the accountability
of governments to Parliament and public in this sphere, and about the right of the public defense
decisions directly” (1992, 23–24). These have relevance for civic groups’ mobilization in Africa.
Literature on peacebuilding and conflict resolution addresses civic groups’ engagement in
formal negotiations. The general consensus is that civil society actors have an important role in
building a peaceful society. This is attributed to the complex nature of internal wars in the postCold war period. A more comprehensive and broad definition of the internal wars and their
resolution expands options for responding to them at the state and societal levels (Jones 2001, 9–
10; Sisk 2001). These wars affected ordinary people’s lives and livelihoods in profound ways.
The social impact accentuated issues that mattered, such as suffering, survival (e.g., lives and
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livelihoods), and values (e.g., predominant use of violence to pursue political goals). These
human needs issues at the heart of intractable conflicts became as important as concerns with
political stability and security. Since the state and state elite-oriented traditional diplomatic
approaches proved inadequate in finding lasting peace, policy makers increasingly relied on the
support of international and domestic nonstate actors. This is evident in the dominant role
international NGOs and their local partners play in addressing complex humanitarian and social
crises created by internal conflicts (Natsios 1997, 338). Similar to the peace activists in this
study, a number of international and domestic civil society actors became involved in peace
efforts as a result of their humanitarian work (Dunn and Kriesberg 2002, 195).
Wanis-St. John and Kew (2008, 16) note that there is stronger agreement on an important
role for civic groups in postconflict than in violent conflict and negotiation phases. Whether civic
groups have an important role to play as peace agents throughout conflict and negotiation
remains a contested issue mainly because of concerns that the violence severely restricts groups’
options and opportunities. They are vulnerable to intimidation, harassment, or threats to their
lives from conflicting parties or from sections of society opposed to their demands for peace.
Heightened insecurity and societal tensions keep them from reaching groups across dividing
lines or traveling to areas outside their operational bases, thereby preventing peace action from
spreading beyond its site of origin. The religious leaders and women’s peace activists in this
study faced similar restrictive conditions. Nevertheless, as Nepstad has argued (2008, 5), there
are instances where peace activists chose to act regardless of a restrictive war opportunity
structure. This study examines what conditions and contexts make them do so.
With regard to the negotiation phase, the contention in conflict management and
resolution literature is over whether civic groups can be mediators or direct participants. Some
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scholars reject a formal mediator (“track one”) role for civic groups because they lack the
leverage of a political mediator in terms of authority and resources required to see the
negotiation process through to a political settlement and its implementation (Aall 1997, 434;
Dunn and Kriesberg 2002; Westas 1988, 58, 60). Although nongovernmental organizations such
as the Sant’ Egidio (Mozambique), International Alert (Sierra Leone), and the former Tanzanian
president’s Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation (Burundi) increasingly engaged in political mediation
after the post-Cold War, they relied on the assistance of governments and the international
community to see the processes through to completion. The nearest that a domestic influential
social actor took to a political mediation role is when Mozambican Archbishop Gonçalves joined
the mediation team that included the Sant’ Egidio, a northern nongovernmental organization.
This study is concerned with how this happened. What conditions led to his participation at this
level? One answer that is useful for this study is that civic groups participate in formal
negotiations as a result of their humanitarian work (Dunn and Kriesberg 2002, 195).
A second view considers unofficial intermediary roles as more appropriate for social
actors and within the limits of what they can do. These “track two” roles complement, support,
or link to the official (track one) peace process through a process of transference. They include
informal intermediary efforts such as opening up opportunities for communication, facilitating
communication between conflicting parties and informal mediation, use of good offices, and
supporting proposals and efforts towards peaceful resolution of the conflict. In performing these
informal intermediary roles, domestic civil society actors “set the table” for formal negotiations
(Jessop, Aljets, and Chacko 2008, 94). Their proposals may be adopted by an international
mediator.
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As for direct participation in formal peace processes, studies of political negotiation
processes conceptualize this peacemaking role as the preserve of incumbent governments’ armed
groups and political parties because they have the political, military, and economic leverage to
alter the situation (Zartman 1995, 3). Proponents for inclusive political negotiations argue that
civil society does have a role to play in formal negotiations (Wanis-St. John and Kew 2008, 18).
Their inclusion would permit public ownership of the peace agreements and contribute to
sustainable peace (Barnes 2002; Rehn and Sirleaf 2002, 80–82). However, skeptics caution that
opening up political negotiations to public participation may jeopardize their integrity and
undermine their progress. Conflicting parties would question the participation of ordinary
citizens with no clearly identified political constituency (Goulding, 2002). Similar to the
traditional formal negotiations approaches, skeptics consider the exclusive participation of
governments and armed groups crucial to a negotiated settlement. Nonstate actors may
participate as mediators or as constituents of conflicting parties (Pruitt 1981, 201–217; Rubin,
Pruitt, and Kim 1994, 196–215; Zartman 1995).
In conclusion, social movements literature focuses on peace campaigns in the West.
Much is known about these campaigns yet little is known about peace movements in Africa. Not
much is known about the political context and conditions driving domestic social actors’ pursuit
of peace objectives at formal negotiations. The idea of civic groups’ engagement with formal
negotiations still seems new despite acknowledgement of the need for new approaches to
mediating or negotiating intractable conflicts that take into consideration concerns other than
power interests of belligerents. Human security and welfare needs have gained importance
because of the complex humanitarian crises and economic devastation caused by intractable
wars. The conflict resolution literature seems more concerned with an appropriate role for social
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actors that fit in with traditional approaches to formal negotiations than with learning from what
it meant to have social actors at the formal negotiations. Systematic study of the different social
actors’ engagement of formal negotiations is crucial yet lacking. It would shed light on how
sections of society often conceptualized as constituents of belligerents understand the formal
negotiation process. This knowledge is important for mediating agents who have to consider not
only facilitating negotiations between belligerents but gauge public support for the final accord
and its implementation. It would also shed more light on the challenge of connecting peace
action from below with action from above so that negotiated settlements are adhered to by
conflicting parties. Studies of formal negotiations pay very little attention to social actors’
engagement and treat it as unimportant. When one mediating agent was asked to give his view of
the inclusion of women at a formal negotiation process, he replied that they were doing nothing
at the talks. Dismissive remarks or attitudes do not advance learning on a process that is yet to
overcome challenges that intractable conflicts present. The examples of Syria, Iraq, Central
African Republic, and South Sudan show that these challenges are not lessening or getting easier.
The above analysis of the literature points to gaps in knowledge of social actors’
engagement with peace negotiations in postcolonial Africa. The little research and
undocumented peace actions in African countries does not help advance knowledge of African
social actors’ agency on matters of peaceful resolution of war. Much needs to be done in
recording these actions. Although it is encouraging to read memoirs by peace activists such as
Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Leymah Gbowee, these are few compared to numerous activists who
engaged in peace action during the 1990s and 2000s. International and domestic NGOs have
documented peace actions. However these are oriented toward best practices of mainly peace
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building and not the peace action that included direct engagement with political actors as social
actors did at negotiation venues.
This study fills the knowledge gap by undertaking a specific history of social actors’
engagement with formal negotiations. A specific history enabled the reconstruction of conditions
in the external environment and among social actors that led to such engagement. This
highlighted the structural conditions of their engagement and their peace agency role. Instead of
identifying a role for social actors, the study constructed one based on social actors’
understanding of war and their own contribution to its resolution. Intrinsic and extrinsic narrative
analyses were employed to connect to account for what made civic groups mobilize to enter into
formal negotiations. The dynamics of contention framework, a political process model, was used
as a narrative frame to guide plot development connecting conditions to social actors’
engagement with formal negotiations.
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Chapter 3. METHODS
The purpose of this particularizing inquiry was to understand how specific social actors
mobilized for peace came to engage with formal negotiation processes that sought an end to
intractable conflicts in specific sub-Saharan African countries during the 1990s and early 2000s.
According to Hall (1999, 3, 177), a particularizing inquiry is directed more toward a
“comprehensive analysis” of a single phenomenon than the analysis of this phenomenon as a
special case of a general theory or law. In light of this explanation, this study sought to
reconstruct the sequence of events leading to the different forms of engagement rather than
analyze the social actors’ engagement with formal negotiations as cases of a general theory. The
aim was not to generalize beyond particular instances of social actors’ engagement with formal
negotiations. The concern was with what social actors in specific contexts of war did to pursue
their objectives of peace at formal negotiation processes. Thus the conclusions are limited to the
particular time frame and locations of social actors’ engagement: the 1990s and early 2000s, in
the political contexts of specific sub-Saharan African countries.
3.1 Nature of the Study
The study examined what made it possible for social actors mobilized for peace to pursue
this objective further at formal negotiation processes and how they went about it. These two
questions guided inquiry. The questions suggested an approach to examining social actors’
engagement with formal negotiations from their perspective and an analysis of the conditions in
which their engagement unfolds. This approach is in line with two particularizing strategies (Hall
1999, 210–220), specific developmental history and configurational history. Practices of these
two strategies were used in combination to reconstruct social actors’ engagement with the formal
negotiations and conditions that seemed unfavorable to such action. Specific developmental
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history seeks to understand a sociohistorical phenomenon, that is, a set of events, sequences,
patterns, or outcomes that are meaningful to actors involved. With regard to this study, the
strategy of specific history was useful in understanding how social actors went about engaging
with the formal negotiation process by analyzing this process in terms meaningful to them. In
other words the reconstruction of the process relied on social actors’ invocation of events and
what these events meant for them. Configurational history, on the other hand, relies on existing
theoretical frame or template to account for how events unfold in historical time. In relation to
this study, the overall account of the engagement with formal negotiations follows the Dynamic
of Contention (DOC) framework, a political process model that directs attention to the
interaction between structural conditions and agency of social actors. The concepts from this
framework were useful for describing the key features of the political context and conditions, for
breaking these into a series of components that were combined to explain how social actors came
to pursue their objectives for peace at formal negotiation processes. Configurational history was
employed where there was not enough evidence to construct a specific history. Thus this study’s
overall narrative is ordered by theoretical frame of the process of social actors’ contention that
accounts for unique events in terms of general processes and mechanisms under specific
conditions (Hall 1999, 213).
3.2 Research Process
3.2.1 Sources of Information. The sources of information on social actors’ engagement
with formal negotiations and the conditions under which this unfolded were archival material,
members of civic groups that engaged with formal negotiations, and individuals who observed
civic groups’ actions for peace.
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Archival Material. This consisted of primary and secondary sources. Primary sources
contain social actors’ firsthand accounts of what they did and what actions they took to pursue
their objective for peace at formal negotiations. These were in books, memoirs, narratives, and
articles by members of civic groups that engaged in peace activism. Other accounts were in grant
proposals and reports to donor organizations. Secondary sources included:
1. Memoirs and published interviews of mediators. Mediating agents’ accounts of their
mediation experiences contain information on the presence of noncombatant groups, what they
did, and how the mediator regarded them.
2. Organizational documents of nongovernmental and international organizations
supporting peace and security initiatives. Organizational newsletters, grant proposals, annual
reports, documentation of best practices, and reports of meetings that covered issues of women
and peace contain stories of civic groups’ achievements. Examples are the IGAD newsletters and
publications by organizations that supported women’s peace efforts, such as Femme Africa
Solidarité (FAS) and UNIFEM (now UN Women). Other sources include reports on mediation or
negotiation processes by think tanks such as International Crisis Group.
3. Press reports of noncombatant groups’ protests, petitions, claims, speeches, and other
activities. I identified two types of sources, mainstream and alternative press. Mainstream press
include: news agency reports (e.g., Agence France Presse, Associated Press, Xinhua Agency, and
AllAfrica) and transcripts of radio and television news broadcasts (e.g., CNN, BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts). I accessed these through the LexisNexis Academic database. I used
keywords to search for news reports on peace protests by civic groups in Africa covering the
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period 1989–2005. Alternative news sources I relied on include: Africa Focus,1 PeaceWomen,2
United Nations Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN), and the Inter-Press Service.
These alternative news sources reported on peace activities of nongovernmental organizations
and other civic groups in countries affected by war. During the period examined (1990s–2005),
they also reported on Northern civic groups that supported the peace activism of African civic
groups.
4. Feature articles on domestic actors’ peace efforts. I accessed these through the
LexisNexis Academic and other databases.
5. Audiovisual documentaries on social actors’ peace actions.
6. Published research on civic groups mobilized for peace in peer-reviewed journals. I
accessed these from Peace Research Abstracts, PAIS, and JSTOR.
Interviews. A second source of information was face-to-face and telephone interviews of
members of the peace campaigns, organizations that supported them (e.g., donors, allies), and
mediating agents. Semistructured interviews were used to access information unavailable in
published accounts. This instrument allows participants to share insights on what they did and
focus discussion on variables of interest to the study (Leech 2002). Interviews of peace activists,
their allies, and other individuals who witnessed their peace actions were considered important

1

For online archives of the Peace Monitor, a monthly publication covering peace activism in various

African countries during the 1990s (www.africafocus.org).
2

A project of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom that monitors and shares

information on women’s roles in conflict prevention (www.peacewomen.org).
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means of verifying information in published accounts, in addition to providing information
crucial for tracing the peace mobilization process (Tansey 2007).
Selection of interview participants was done purposefully and on the basis of the
following criteria:
a) direct participation in peace actions as leaders or members of civic groups identified in
accounts of these actions. These are individuals who were present at and/or participated in
formal negotiation processes. They had firsthand knowledge about the campaigns they
organized, their organizations’ goals, and their engagement in the formal negotiations to end
civil war. This knowledge was gained as a result of organizing and leading the campaigns and
participating in the negotiations as delegates, observers, representatives of civil society groups,
or intermediaries assisting the mediation team/facilitator. Such individuals (also considered
elites) have extensive experience, and the historical and contextual knowledge they have was
useful for the study (Berry 2002; Rivera 2002).
b) direct support to peace activists. These participants included donors and other civil
society organizations that supported the campaigns.
c) actors who were present at and who participated in the formal negotiations and
interacted with civic groups. These were members of the mediation team, representatives of
organizations that supported the noncombatant groups’ peace campaigns, and other civic groups
mobilized for peace.
Interview participants were identified by reading archival material on peace action by
civic groups in Africa. Published accounts of civic groups’ experiences in peace building were
especially useful (Tongeren, Brenk, Helema, and Verhoeven 2005). Another method was use of
professional networks of contacts from my previous work in peace building and development to
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suggest names of potential interview participants. Interview participants were also asked to
recommend other leaders of the organization as well as third-party participants who might have
information useful to the study (Goldstein 2002, 669–672). Conferences on peace were important
venues for identifying interview participants. Of the 24 interview participants invited to
participate in the study, eight individuals responded and six were interviewed. Two individuals
who observed civic groups’ engagement with a particular peace process agreed to be interviewed
at a later stage in the study.
3.2.2 Data Collection and Organization. Data collection took place between 2007 and
2011. Archival sources of information were examined for information on the identity of citizen
groups claiming to participate in official negotiations, formation and development of such groups
(e.g., date formed, reasons for formation, type of organization, membership, activities, resource
base), claims for the use of and support for negotiations, demands to participate in formal
negotiations, evidence of participation in specific negotiations, mobilization activities and dates
(e.g., peace protests, demonstrations, petitions, speeches, and prayer vigils), mobilization
outcomes and reasons they give for seeking participation, and their relationship with other
political actors. This information was organized into a catalogue of events listing noncombatant
group actions in chronological order from 1989 to 2005. This contained information on specific
mobilization activities and the dates (protest, petition, speech, meeting, etc.), identity of the
group associated with the mobilization activities, claims made by noncombatant groups, target
(who the claim was addressed to), opponents (actors opposed to the mobilization activities and
claims), outcome of the act, and claim made (whether it resulted in a specific action on the part
of the target, opponent, or other stakeholder). Information on whether or not noncombatant
groups gained entry into the formal negotiations and the nature of their participation was also
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recorded. The catalogue of events allowed for a process tracing events from engagement with
formal negotiations back to political conditions and vice versa.
Information on the domestic political context was gathered from published research,
press reports, and published contemporary histories of the countries in which the mobilizations
for peace unfolded. Analyses of political transitions during the late 1980s and early 1990s were
an important source of information on the prevailing domestic political context in which the civic
group actions occurred and on the internal wars that resulted from contentious political transition
processes. This information was organized according to the prevailing regime, conflict and
negotiation phase, and key political actors involved in each situation. This was repeated for
regional and international contexts, since the civic groups’ engagement went beyond the
domestic context to subregional arenas of formal negotiation processes. The data was useful for
identifying key prevailing domestic and international conditions in which civic groups mobilized
to engage with formal negotiation processes. A combination of specific and configuration history
procedures were used to select cases, identify the specific conditions of social actors’ peace
actions, and elaborate the sequence of events linking initial conditions to social actors’
engagement with formal negotiations.
3.3 Case Selection
The construction of historical objects of inquiry (selection of cases), the social actors
(civic groups), and their engagement with formal negotiations was done intrinsically (Hall 1999,
210–11, 236). This is a specific history strategy that is based on “an observer’s lifeworldly
orientation to historical social actors’ convergent invocation of events,” and on the meanings that
events and situations had for historical actors. An events catalogue developed to organize
information on social actors’ peace actions was used to identify ten campaigns whose trajectories
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I could trace broadly from beginning to end. Also, key social actors were identified with these
peace campaigns (see Appendix 1). Religious leaders and women’s organizations featured
prominently; thus, this study focuses on them. Although civic groups without a clear religious or
gendered identity may have participated in peace actions, there was less information on them in
archival sources. It was inadequate for tracing peace actions over time. However, other civic
groups seemed to join in with peace actions led by women and religious leaders. The study is
therefore focused on social actors identified as religious leaders and women’s organizations that
engaged in peace actions.
Selection of social actors’ peace actions was also done through “colligation,” that is, on
the basis of “a criterion of relevance that delimits a particular specific history and not another.”
For example, the catalogue of events was examined for a time frame beyond which social actors’
peace actions were recorded. This helped identify a cycle of peace actions and its duration in the
1990s and early 2000s. These peace actions by social actors fall within the period after the end of
the Cold War (from 1989) and before or around the September 2001 terrorist attack on the World
Trade Center. The study is limited to this period. The wars that escalated during this period were
an outcome of political transitions from authoritarian rule that turned violent. They were not
influenced directly by the Cold War rivalry as the postcolonial wars of the 1970s had been. With
the end of the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union withdrew military support to
African allies.
During this period there was a proliferation of civil society organizations as a result of
new legislation providing for their registration and autonomous operation. Many of the civil
society actors, especially NGOs and religious institutions, filled the gap in social service and
welfare provision created when African governments suddenly implemented economic austerity
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measures the International Monetary Fund (IMF)/World Bank (WB) prescribed to address
domestic debt. These measures, implemented in the 1980s, drastically reduced the government
public welfare budget. Economic prescriptions were also made conditional on governments
implementing political reforms, in particular those concerning democratization of political
institutions and participation. Thus, civic groups’ peace actions unfolded in a politically turbulent
period of transition to a market economy and democratic political institutions without much
preparation within the population.
In general, the intrinsic identification of social actors yielded ten peace campaigns in
seven sub-Saharan contexts of war. These campaigns had two dimensions: a) the demand for an
end to war and for the use of formal negotiation to settle the conflict peacefully and b) direct
engagement with or demands to participate in formal negotiations. This study focuses on the
second dimension of the campaign, the engagement with formal negotiation processes. Not all
social actors, religious leaders, and women’s organizations identified in the ten peace campaigns
listed in Appendix 1 engaged with formal negotiations. Appendix 2 shows formal negotiation
processes with which social actors engaged.
For purposes of analysis, concepts from the dynamics of contention (DOC) framework
were used to characterize social actors and peace actions as political (McAdam, Tarrow, and
Tilly 2001). The religious leaders and women’s mobilization to end war were considered a form
of contentious politics (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; Tilly and Tarrow 2007, 202–3). These
social actors struggled with armed nonstate actors and incumbent governments over the most
suitable strategy to settle political conflict. Accordingly, their campaigns to end war were framed
as an example of contentious politics, defined as “interactions in which actors make claims
bearing on someone else’s interests, leading to coordinated efforts on behalf of shared interests
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or programs, in which governments are involved as targets, initiators of claims, or third parties.
Social actors were involved in contention, that is “making claims that bear on someone else’s
interest” (Tilly and Tarrow 2007, 4 ) when they urged armed groups and the incumbent
government to abandon the military option and pursue dialogue to end the war. They acted
collectively, coming together as different individuals and organizations and coordinating actions
on behalf of a shared interest in ending the war through peaceful means. This placed them
squarely in the political arena where they interacted directly with government agents and with
armed groups opposed to the state and engaged in activities related to a) government rights,
regulations, and interests and b) armed groups’ interests (Tilly and Tarrow 2007, 5). Thus social
actors previously preoccupied with nonpolitical activities became political actors. They were
known by collective names they gave themselves—such as Contact Group (Mozambique), InterReligious Council of Sierra Leone, Inter-Faith Mediation Council or New Sudan Council of
Churches, Women in Peacebuilding Network–Liberia, Liberia Women’s Peace Initiative—or
labels that other people gave them—such as “Burundi women” or “Somali women” or “Church
leaders.” They acted as challengers (Tilly and Tarrow 2007, 2, 4, 5, 9).
3.4 Analysis of Social Actors’ Engagement with Formal Negotiations
This study used intrinsic and extrinsic narrative to account for what made social actors’
engagement possible and how this led to social actors’ engagement with formal negotiations.
Narrative is the dominant formative discourse in specific history. As such, narrative orders
analysis by balancing theory, contingent explanation, and interpretation (Hall 1999, 212). The
first use of narrative was to show the specific conditions that made social actors’ peace actions
possible. This description was done intrinsically, using social actors’ invocation of events
meaningful to them, and extrinsically, using an objective (theoretical) frame of reference (Hall
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1999, 210–211, 219). For instance, in accounting for what about social actors (conditions among
them) led to actions for peace, answers were sought in their descriptions of the war and their
experiences of it. These definitions of war (e.g., “deadly weapon,” “unbearable,” “suffering”)
were connected to traumatic events that occurred about the time they chose to take action (e.g.,
massacres and mass starvation from war-induced drought).
The resort to extrinsic analysis was due to the fragmented nature of the historical record
of social actors’ peace actions in Africa and dearth of systematic research. The shift in narrative
to extrinsic analysis reflects a move from specific towards configurational history. Existing
archival sources rarely described in detail the specific ways in which campaign initiators came to
realize they needed to do something to end the war, how they proceeded from this realization to
mobilizing the support of others, or how campaign initiators crossed political, religious, social,
and ethnic divides to build widespread support for a peaceful resolution to the war. Social
memory was weak since most of the key individuals involved have not recorded their actions and
analysis. The few interviews did not generate information that was comprehensive enough to
identify events that were critical to social actors’ engagement.
The gap in artifactual evidence and social memory (Hall 1999, 87) was addressed by
using concepts from the dynamics of contention framework, Tilly’s ideas of political opportunity
structure (conceptual maps of regimes and contentious politics) and trust networks (McAdam,
Tarrow, and Tilly 2001, 45; Tilly 2005b; Tilly 2006). Tilly’s regime typology (2006, 21–28) was
used to describe the regime context of the peace campaigns in terms of the regime’s democracy
and capacity to provide for its citizens. These regimes in which the peace campaigns unfolded
exhibited features characteristic of nondemocratic, low capacity regimes. They were
authoritarian military or civilian governments whose relations with established political actors

44

and challengers (such as civil society organizations including opposition political parties) were
marked by a combination of coercion, capital, and commitment. During the war, both
governments’ and armed groups’ relations with some sections of the population were based on
strategies of predation.
Tilly’s concept of trust networks (2005b, 12), “ramified interpersonal connections,
consisting mainly of strong ties, within which people set valued, consequential, long-term
resources and enterprises at risk to the malfeance, mistakes, or failures of others,” permitted a
theoretically guided (extrinsic) description of relations between conflicting parties and social
actors. These relations occurred in the form of particularistic ties, evasive conformity, brokered
autonomy, and patronage systems (2005b, 30–36). The idea of the structure of opportunity in
low-capacity, low-democracy regimes permitted a description of the room within which social
actors collectively acted to end the war. A combination of mechanisms and processes related to
the violent political transition, the war, and post-Cold War international political developments
created a fluctuating, unstable political structure that yielded “tight corners” (Londsdale 2000),
room for political action that was restricted by conditions of war and potential threats or
intimidation from conflicting parties.
The narrative analysis connected political developments and actions (e.g., violent
political transition, war, failure of humanitarian and political interventions), social consequences
of these events (humanitarian and political crises), actions of domestic political actors (e.g.,
socially and economically destabilizing war strategies), and social experience of war. The
resulting description of extrinsically and intrinsically defined conditions leading to the
emergence of social actors mobilized for peace and their engagement with formal negotiations is
contained in Chapter 4. It is oriented largely toward what directly concerned social actors. As a
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result, the description highlights the social consequences and experiences of violent political
transitions and war.
A second use of narrative is to account for how social actors engaged with formal
negotiations. The sequence of events linking initial conditions to social actors’ engagement with
formal negotiations was elaborated using the Dynamics of Contention (DOC) framework as a
template that subsumed intrinsic and extrinsic narrative (Hall 1999, 86). Intrinsic narrative made
connections between “specific action conduits”—that is, peace actions or events—meaningful to
social actors and their observers. For instance, analysis of civic groups’ interpretation of their
experience of war, especially severe conditions such as mass starvation, mass displacement,
impoverishment, or unprecedented violence, yielded a general interpretation of war as suffering
and a particular gendered interpretation of this suffering from the perspective of women peace
activists.
Extrinsic narrative analysis invoked concepts from the dynamics of contention
framework, a political process model, to account for how social actors came to engage with
formal negotiations (Hall 1999, 213). The dynamics of contention framework focuses on the
interaction context defined as the level of mechanisms linking structures and configurations
(conditions specific to the social actors’ context of action) to agency and action (conditions
specific to social actors) (Kriesi 2004, 77–79). Specific mechanisms and processes involving
social actors, the targets of their peace actions (conflicting parties, armed groups, and external
actors), and third parties like the media and the public are combined in sequences of interaction
that drive contention toward engagement with formal negotiations.
The DOC framework provided concepts that I used to construct an account of plot
development that highlighted what was common across the different social actors’ peace actions

46

and what was particular to specific peace activists. For instance, narrative analysis is used to
show how similar mechanisms of violent political transition and war combine to a) make social
actors want to do something to end the war and b) produce the campaign trajectory. The religious
leaders and women’s organizations’ interpretations of war are described in terms of the operation
of mechanisms of attribution that produce an alternative theory or story of war and its resolution.
However, this alternative story of war differs for women’s organization. Their interpretation of
war as suffering is gendered. It is framed in terms of their specific experience as women. Thus,
the character of contention varied depending on the prevailing political conditions, the resources
social actors had available to them, and the way they use these resources to pursue their peace
objectives. This result is a narrative explanation that connects intrinsic and extrinsic accounts and
highlights regularities and variations in processes of engagement (Tilly and Tarrow 2007, 5, 11,
28). This yields an account that is particular to the social actors studied and is not meant to be
generalizable to similar actors in different contexts.
3.5 Narrative Frame
Narrative analysis begins in Chapter 4 with the broad social changes generated by violent
political transitions and historical developments leading to the emergence of social actors such as
the religious women and the peace campaigns they launched. An example is the sudden
withdrawal of the state from welfare provision when governments adopted market-based policies
in the 1980s. Numerous civil society organizations emerged to provide social welfare services.
The intractable conflicts created an overwhelming demand for these services as shown by the
complex and challenging nature of humanitarian crises. With regard to social actors’ peace
actions, specific socially transformative events in the political transition and wars are identified
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that led to their engagement with formal negotiations. These include atrocious acts such as
massacres or mass starvation from war-induced famine.
In Chapters 5 and 6, the narrative shifts to elaborating on the process leading to social
actors’ engagement with formal negotiations by first accounting for what makes them take action
for peace and how. In these chapters, narrative is used to show how the general mechanisms of
attribution operate in the specific social actors’ understandings of these key events and the wars.
Specifically, the intrinsic reconstruction of social actors’ interpretations of these events and the
connection of this interpretation to an extrinsic interpretation process (attribution mechanism)
yields social actors’ theorizations of war and its resolution (Tilly 2005b, 64–65, 213). Social
actors consider war as a “suffering” and their role as “peace agents.” The religious leaders and
women activists disseminated this theory of war and its resolution to build a shared
understanding among supporters within their social bases. They also disseminated it to the public
and conflicting parties to elicit support for an end to war. Dissemination took place through
interaction mechanisms of encounter and conversations (Tilly 2005b, 138–140). Other
mechanisms included the creation of new vehicles to coordinate dissemination campaigns at the
national level and to engage conflicting parties. With regard to resources, social actors
appropriated religious and cultural rituals and practices and their networks of personal relations.
These were employed to disseminate their theory of the war and its resolution to conflicting
parties, external stakeholders such as mediating agents, and external allies. In deploying their
networks of personal relations in pursuit of an end to war, religious leaders and women activists
placed their most valuable resources at the risk of mistakes or malfeance of others (Tilly 2005,
12). The demand they were making for an end to war and their theorization of war could be
interpreted as politically threatening or even a betrayal at the level of interpersonal relations. My
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narrative ends in Chapter 7 with social actors’ different paths to engaging with formal
negotiations.
3.6 Research Constraints
3.6.1 Archival Research. A constraint in data collection was the highly fragmented nature
of information on civic groups mobilized for peace in Africa. It is scattered across a variety of
the sources mentioned earlier. Also, domestic civic groups that acted during the period the study
was limited to (1990s to 2000s) rarely documented their activities, as they lacked the resources to
do so systematically and keep a public record. In addition, given the conditions of insecurity,
civic groups were not sure that their records would be protected. When they did, their reports
showcase achievements. There was very little detailed description of actions they took,
challenges they faced, failed attempts at acting for peace, and the reasons for these failures.
Access to international nongovernment organization documents was difficult. Requests
for access to organization documents were met with silence or promises to call back that were
never fulfilled even after seeking support through personal contacts at the organization. One
reason could be that organizations do not have the staff, time, and resources to catalogue official
documents in a way that is easily accessible to researchers or other interested members of the
public. The costs of doing so are high. Also, organizations tend to be cautious, understandably,
about giving access to files, especially if they have little control over the final use of research
findings or consider information to be confidential.
3.6.2 Interview Process and Outcome. Attempts to secure interview appointments proved
difficult in the early phase of the research because of the time and resource constraints.
Appointments for face-to face interviews with participants identified were difficult to secure
because they had changed jobs, traveled frequently, or had busy work schedules. Although some
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interview participants agreed to participate in the study, finding time to conduct the actual
interview was quite a challenge for this group of people who are busy and highly mobile. Others,
for instance, three key peace activists, were suffering from age-related illnesses and could not be
interviewed. These difficulties in obtaining firsthand accounts from elite interview participants
are not new.
3.6.3 Nature of Evidence I Worked With. Due to the difficulty of obtaining firsthand oral
accounts of why and how religious leaders and women’s networks mobilized to end war in
politically risky conditions, this study relied mostly on archival sources of information on peace
activism in sub-Saharan African countries. Accounts of peace actions vary in the level of detail
in descriptions of specific events, processes, and social actors leading these campaigns. For
instance, there was more information on the religious leaders’ peace actions in Mozambique,
South Sudan, Angola, and Sierra Leone and the women’s campaigns in Liberia, Somaliland, and
Sierra Leone than on women’s campaigns in Burundi and South Somalia. Accounts of peace
actions by religious leaders varied. There was more information on the religious leaders’
campaigns in Mozambique, South Sudan, Angola, and Sierra Leone compared to the campaign
in Liberia. Although Liberian clergy’s peace actions were reported in the media there is little
documentation of their actions. Liberian clerics at the center of the campaign have no memoirs of
their experience, or if they do, these are not easily available to a wider audience. There was little
written about the late Bishop Michael Francis, who was a key participant in social actors’ calls
for peace. Unfortunately, he has passed on with a lot of knowledge that would have been
valuable in understanding why and how social actors mobilize for peace in situations of war.
Fortunately, campaign initiators in Mozambique, South Sudan, and Sierra Leone have written
their story. Peace actions by women’s organizations in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Burundi, and North
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Somalia (Somaliland) are fairly well documented compared to the South Sudanese and South
Somali women’s campaigns. Of these, the Liberian and Burundi accounts offered more insights
into the process of engagement. A few key peace activists have written memoirs, including
Bishop Sengulane and Gonçalves (Mozambique), Nobel Prize laureate Leymah Gbowee
(Liberia), and Alimamy Koroma (Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone).
Peace action by social actors in sub-Saharan Africa is under-studied. Social actors’ peace
efforts in South Africa are often cited in references to mobilization for peace in Africa. Yet from
the end of the apartheid regime in 1994 and into the 2000s, domestic actors in a number of
African countries engaged in nonviolent action against war. Examples are peace action by
Liberian women and religious leaders, women’s organizations in Somalia, and religious leaders
in Mozambique. There is also little systematic study of the mediation of African civil wars.
Existing studies do not consider domestic social actors worth serious attention. In general,
studies of peace action in sub-Saharan Africa focus on the peace efforts of northern transnational
NGOs and mediating agents. Given the lack of a rich and extensive written record of peace
action by domestic social actors, most of the knowledge remains in the memory of key activists.
Many of their stories are undocumented. A number have since passed on and with them very
important insights and lessons on the role civil society organizations can play in transformation
of conflict. Others have moved on to other activities.
For the most part, the accounts offer general descriptions of events and their outcomes.
The level of detail in descriptions of a particular event depended on whether that event was
important to the narrator. For example, UNIFEM accounts of women’s peace actions highlight
these as best practices in line with their organizational interest of promoting women’s
participation in peace and security. In descriptions of their peace actions at the 1995 ECOWAS
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summits on the Liberian war, members of the Liberian Women’s Initiative detailed what
happened when they were at the venue. Descriptions of events leading to their actions at this
particular venue were left out or summarized even though they may be important. There was
little or no information on the number of requests women made for invitation to the ECOWAS
meeting, how they made those requests, who they wrote to, what they wrote (copy of the letter),
the series of actions leading to their decision to invite themselves, and how they found their way
to the venue of the Heads of State summit. Some of this information was found in news coverage
of the negotiations. However, interviews would have been a much better source of information
on these questions.
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Chapter 4. NONCOMBATANT GROUPS AND THE MOBILIZATION TO
END WAR IN AFRICA
This chapter sets the context for the examination of why and how noncombatant groups
in Africa mobilized to end war in the 1990s and the early part of the 2000s. An important part of
the setting was the violent political transitions of the 1990s. These occurred in the midst of two
major developments. The first is the set of economic austerity measures governments and market
based approaches adopted in the 1980s to manage their economic crises. The second is the shift
in international intervention and development policy resulting from the global economic crisis of
the 1980s and the demise of the communist state in Eastern Europe.
The main focus is on the violent turn the political transitions took in African countries,
especially the escalation of civil wars. A key part of this violent political transition setting was
the social transformation resulting from the wars. This is crucial to understanding social actors’
mobilization for peace. The description of the violent political transition and resulting wars is
from the perspective of the influence these developments had on society. I turn to examine the
nature of international intervention in relation to the emergence of the noncombatant groups who
engaged with formal negotiations.
4.1 Violent Political Transitions
The early- to mid-1990s was a politically turbulent period for states in Africa. A trend
analysis of regime types in Africa shows that half of the autocratic regimes in Africa fell between
1990 and 1992 as a result of popular struggles for political change and major foreign policy
changes sparked by the end of the Cold War (Marshall and Gurr 2005, 42). Seddon and Zeilig
observe that “in a four-year period, from 1990–1994, a total of thirty-five regimes had been
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swept away by a combination of street demonstrations, mass strikes and other forms of protest,
and by presidential and legislative elections that were often the first held for a generation” (2005,
19).
The nondemocratic regimes in Angola, Burundi, Mozambique, Liberia, Sierra Leone,
Somalia, and Sudan resisted democratization or implemented political reforms in ways that
ensured they remained in power. The authoritarian civilian and military ruling elite feared their
political fortunes would no longer be certain under new political arrangements that created new
opportunities for political opponents and greater autonomy for citizens in determining their
political fate. To secure their position, ruling elites pursued strategies of prevention and delayed
implementation, including repressing, frustrating, and undermining political opposition parties,
delaying elections and constitutional review processes (Ake 2000, 51–52). For instance, leaders
such as President Siad Barre in Somalia resisted reforms and rejected consultation with political
participants. In some cases, incumbent regimes such as the FRELIMO in Mozambique and the
Islamist military regime in Sudan unilaterally defined the terms of political participation.
Governments such as those in Liberia and Sudan undermined legislation providing for the
registration, freedom of assembly, and association of political parties by restricting registration
and activities of political parties considered a threat. Also, sections of ruling elites disregarded
outcomes of public consultations, referendums, or elections. They overthrew democratically
elected governments, as the military in Burundi and Sierra Leone, or they manipulated the
electoral process in their favor, as was the case in Liberia and Sudan (Abrahamsen 2004; Arnold
2008, 249–250; Azevedo, Nnadozie and João 2003, xxxii-xxxiii; Fyle 2006, xlviii; Idris 2005,
53–56; James 2004, xxxiii; Lyons 1998, 229; Mohamoud 2000, 126–134; Ofcansky 1998, B369370).
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In general, ruling elites did not tolerate groups they considered a threat such as political
parties, armed groups, civic groups calling for political change, and ethnic or religious groups
they perceived as opponents. The intimidation and arrests of government critics, violent
repression of political opposition, and killing of ethnic communities considered opposition
supporters point to a general lack of protection of political participants from arbitrary action by
government agents. The autocratic rulers’ strategies of anticipatory and responsive repression
undermined public trust and participation in the democratization process. Political actors adopted
strategies of predation in the absence of credible processes or institutions for renegotiating the
terms of new political and economic arrangements. Armed groups emerged to counter violent
repression by ruling elites (Tilly 2005b, 30–35).
For example, in Somalia, Siad Barre’s violent repression of political opponents and
members of their clans led to the formation of armed political opposition groups that aimed to
remove him from power. In Burundi, the military assassination of the first Hutu president in a
failed coup attempt in 1993 sparked a cycle of killings and revenge killings and created a
political crisis that ended in a military coup in 1996. It also led to the Hutu rebellion. A section
of the Hutu political elite, grieved by the Tutsi military elite’s overthrow of a democratically
elected government and assassination of the first Hutu elected President, formed armed
movements against the military regime. The emergence of armed groups in society set in motion
a cycle of violence that spiraled into widespread civil wars in Burundi, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and
Somalia. In Angola, Mozambique, and Sudan, rulers’ strategies of repression intensified wars
dating back to the Cold War period.
At the beginning of the peace campaigns, the governments in Angola, Burundi,
Mozambique, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Sudan had failed to contain the armed groups.
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Military victory was not certain anymore. The governments had limited capacity to affect the
character and distribution of populations, activities, and resources within their territories. First,
they lacked the capital, the economic resources, to do so. Governments were in the midst of an
economic crisis when the wars of the 1990s escalated. Most had a weak revenue base and huge
national debts and were highly dependent on external aid. To qualify for further external aid,
governments implemented austerity measures prescribed by the International Monetary Fund and
World Bank. They also adopt market-based approaches to managing the economy in line with
new Western donor development policies aimed at reducing the size of the state and giving a
greater role to the private sector and civil society. The new aid policies were contingent on
implementation of political reforms providing for multiparty democracy, competitive elections,
and respect of human rights. Ruling elites lacked the capital to buy out political opponents or
contain the internal rebellion. Furthermore, they could no longer count on the military assistance
of Western allies to stamp out internal rebellion. With the end of the Cold War and collapse of
the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union and United States withdrew military aid to former allies in
African countries (Birmingham 2002, 170; Bradbury 1994, 10; Mohamoud 2000, 15, 119–120).
Also, the optimistic thinking about an emergent new world order in the 1990s emphasized a
greater role for the UN and regional organizations like the Africa Union (then Organization of
African Unity) in promoting global peace and security. International actors promoted the
resolution of wars through peaceful means.
Second, at the time of political transition, few regimes had functioning civil
administrative structures extending throughout the territory and capable of providing services
and adequate security to populations. Thus, vast areas with little or no government presence were
open to the activities of armed groups. In Angola, Mozambique, and Sudan, vast areas were
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under the control of armed groups that had emerged to fight the government long before the
political and economic transition. Governments could not provide services to populations there.
Instead, government revenue was diverted towards military operations against the armed groups.
In Burundi, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Somalia, government capacity to provide services and
security was weak or nonexistent outside of capital cities and major towns. Armed groups that
emerged in response to failed transitions established themselves in these areas of weak
government control. Also, because of the economic destabilizing policies of armed groups and
government counterinsurgent policies, government services were limited to cities and major
towns. Nonstate actors like churches and international humanitarian relief agencies provided
services where government presence was absent or very weak. As in Angola, Mozambique, and
Sudan, churches and international humanitarian aid agencies provided health, education, food
relief, and other social services that government ceased to offer throughout the wars.
Third, the pre-eminent diversity of shared languages, ethnic/regional ties, religion, and
traditional cultural systems over cultural, political, economic, and organizational uniformity
posed a challenge to governing through use of mainly commitment. Most governments
established control through a combination of mostly coercion, capital, and commitment. For
instance, rulers in Angola and Mozambique experimented with coercive integration of a diverse
population into a Marxist-Leninist state. In Burundi, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Somalia, rulers
combined coercion, capital, and commitment to build patronage systems and particularistic ties
to control the population. When the Nationalist Islamist Front seized power in Sudan, it resorted
to coercive integration of the population into an Islamist state (Tilly 2005b, 30–31). The use of
government resources to forcefully impose an Islamic state and a policy of Arabization in the
South shows the use of capital and coercion to control the population through particularistic ties
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of religious and ethnic identity (Ali 2010). The strategy aimed at putting down resistance from
secular political parties in the north, the Southern Sudanese Liberation Movement, and organized
civic groups in both the north and the south.
By the time the peace campaigns emerged in the 1990s, political conflict over the nature
of transition had escalated into violence or gone through some cycles of violence. With external
military aid no longer guaranteed, ruling elites looked within for new strategies of countering the
armed rebellions. They combined commitment and coercion with capital depending on whether
the government had domestic resources. The FRELIMO government in Mozambique resorted to
a strategy of brokered autonomy with the churches. Government diversion of national resources
to the war effort devastated the national economies and livelihoods of people to where the war
became unaffordable. Government failure to respond to the economic devastation and mass
starvation from the combined effects of the war and the 1990 drought eroded the population’s
confidence in its ability to end the war or mitigate war-related social and economic crises.
Restoring religious freedom of worship dealt with the legitimacy problem. Churches provided
the much-needed humanitarian relief and social services the government lacked the capacity to
supply. More importantly, allying with the church gave the incumbent regime credibility it had
lost in the war (Chan and Venâncio 1998, 19–20; Morier-Genoud 1996b, 1–3). In Chapter 5, I
show how churches seized openings such as this one to demand a peaceful resolution to the war.
Countries like Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Sudan relied on alternative sources of
revenue such as minerals (oil and diamonds) and natural resources (timber). Although control of
natural resources shifted between government and armed groups, revenue generated was
reinvested in countering the armed groups and not in improving the socioeconomic conditions of
the people. Groups such as the UNITA in Angola, RUF in Sierra Leone, and Charles Taylor’s
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NPFL controlled areas with natural resources that they used to finance their operations
(Birmingham 2002, 182–183; Ellis 2007, 164–170; Reno 2000, 326–327). In Somalia, groups
vied for control of lucrative trade such as qat, a narcotic leaf popular in Somalia and elsewhere in
Eastern Africa (Waal 1996, 11). Like the incumbent governments, these armed groups rebels did
not use revenue from these natural resources to establish civilian administration in areas under
their control. Just like the governments they opposed, rebel commanders invested the profits in
themselves and their armed movements (Orogun 2003, 291). Where government forces lacked
the capacity to operate in areas under control of armed groups, they recruited alternative forces to
supplement the government army. For instance, the Government of Sierra Leone contracted
international mercenaries like the Executive Outcomes. Sudan sponsored militia to fight
alongside government forces. Ruling elites in Burundi used this strategy to intimidate opponents.
In Somalia, the Siad Barre government armed clans supportive of his regime to fight against
clans perceived to be supporters of political opponents. The Sudanese government also took
advantage of factional rivalries among the armed groups to win over some of the groups onto its
side.
These top-down strategies of coercion and commitment in the form of particularistic ties
(shared ethnic or religious ties) and the bottom-up strategies of predation that armed groups used
to counter government repression created acute political crises and cycles of violence in Burundi,
Liberia, and Sierra Leone. In Liberia, Somalia, and Sudan the wars threatened to tear countries
apart. This eventually happened in Somalia where the central government in Somalia collapsed
and no armed group emerged with the capability of gaining a military victory and establishing a
central government. The cycles of violence pitting armed groups against the state elite set in
motion processes that destroyed lives and livelihoods of the people.
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4.2 War and the Transformation of Society
Studies of post-Cold War violent conflict in Africa address in detail the nature, dynamics,
and variation among these conflicts in terms of who the armed opponents are, when and how
they emerge, political agendas, and how they recruit, conduct war, and mobilize resources to
sustain their armed operations (Allen 1999; Clapham 1998; Ellis 2007; Kaldor 1999; Kalyvas
2001; Mkandawire 2002; Reno 1998; Richards 2005; Weinstein 2007). My concern, however, is
with the civilian experience of the conflict between government and armed forces opposed to it,
as this is crucial for understanding civic groups’ mobilizations to end war.
The armed groups and government forces pursued war strategies that destabilized
economic and social life in the country. Armed groups’ frequent acts of economic destabilization
included the destruction of government installations, public facilities (water, gas, and electricity
supply), communication lines (roads, bridges, and railways), and social institutions (government
and church schools and hospitals). They extended this destabilization policy to the civilian
population by looting villagers’ crops and livestock, burning farms, and planting landmines in
farms, along paths and roads. Economic sabotage was a common practice of older groups such as
the Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO) in Mozambique and the União Nacional
para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) in Angola, and of newer transition-related
armed groups in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Somalia (Chingono 1996, 50–52; Hayward and
Kandeh 2000, B165; Malaquias 2001, 523; Newitt 1995, 564; Waal 1996, 13).
Incumbent governments’ counterinsurgent policies were just as disruptive of economic
life as armed groups’ attacks. The forceful evacuation of communities considered rebel
sympathizers from areas under government control (Burundi, South Sudan), the forceful
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reorganization of civilians into settlements under control of the army to cut rebels’ access to
villagers for supplies, scorched earth policies aimed at destroying rebel bases in dense forests,
and looting of peasants’ crops and livestock by government forces destabilized populations
economically.
The economically destabilizing military policies of the armed groups and government
forces impoverished once economically self-sufficient populations by denying the population
access to basic services and forcing civilians to abandon their livelihoods (farming, employment,
trade, and other economic activities). The large-scale displacement of populations within and
outside national borders disrupted agricultural production or led to its demise in Angola,
Mozambique, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and South Sudan (IRIN 2003). Large numbers of people
fled to cities leading to a sudden increase in urban populations that greatly stressed public
facilities and created social crises in Angola, Mozambique, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. Those
who could not make it into cities or refugee camps in neighboring countries were cut off from
the rest of the country and were forced to fend for themselves.
The protracted nature of the wars overwhelmed well-known coping strategies civilians
used to survive in drought-prone areas of eastern and southern Africa and in fertile areas where
intense fighting prevented agricultural activities for very long periods. Civilians thus suffered
twice, first from the direct effects of the war and second from the interaction between the effects
of economic destabilization and mass involuntary displacement and the effects of natural
disasters (droughts, floods). The combination of drought and sabotage produced mass starvation
and diseases in Angola, Mozambique, and Somalia (Chingono 1996, 52–53; Gberie 1995a;
1995b; Hilhorst and Serrano 2010, 186–189; Ofcansky 2000, B396; Roque 2008, 380; Simon
2001, 505–506, 512). It is significant that armed groups seemed unconcerned about the mass
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starvation the populations experienced and did little to address it. Also, governments lacked the
capacity to prevent or mitigate starvation even in areas under their control. With no alternative
livelihoods and ineffective coping strategies the population became dependent on humanitarian
relief provided by the churches, women organized at the community level (Somalia), and
international NGOs. Yet, as in the case of Somalia and South Sudan, armed groups extended
their acts of sabotage to the distribution of humanitarian relief by looting or restricting access to
affected populations. This necessitated negotiating access to affected populations even though
this did not guarantee that the delivery of humanitarian relief would be protected.
The violent transition wars destabilized society in addition to the economy. At the social
level, civilian encounters with the fighting forces of the government and opposition armed
groups were violent and brutal. The wars’ frontlines extended into civilian spaces. Indiscriminate
attacks, massacres, and mutilations of civilians, sexual abuse of women, abduction of children,
and the use of civilian populations as human shields characterize these encounters (Chan and
Venâncio 1998, 11–13; Chingono 1996, 51, 57; Ellis 2007, 111–120; Hayward and Kandeh
2001, B178–179; Hilhorst and Serrano 2010, 186; Inter-Press Service, 12 December 1996; Kieh
2008; Litherland 1995; Malaquias 2001, 531–2; Newitt, 1995, 564, 146; NSCC 2002, 29;
Ratnasabapathy 1995; Xinhua News Agency, 15 November 1995). Government forces lacked
capacity to protect civilians as their counterinsurgent operations resembled revenge attacks
against populations suspected of being sympathizers or ethnic kin of the armed groups. Civilians
were caught between armed forces. They became tools of war as shown by the sexual abuse of
women, mutilations, and abduction of children and villagers for use as soldiers, workers, and
human shields.
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The confusion, fear, hostility, suspicion and bitter resentment resulting from these violent
and brutal encounters aggravated social tensions along ethnic, gender, and generation identity
lines. In some of the wars, ethnic, religious, and clan tensions triggered cycles of revenge and
counterrevenge attacks that polarized previously heterogeneous communities. This process of
polarization fixed politicized ethnic identities geographically through a spatial reordering of
populations into ethnic enclaves. The large-scale displacement of civilians within and outside
national borders split families, friendships, and other relationships that cut across various
identities. It also displaced large numbers of people out of their homes to internal camps within
the country or refugee camps outside the country (Alao, Mackinlay, and Olonisakin 1999, 47–51;
Litherland 1995; Lubabu 1999b, 31; Ofcansky 2000, B396; 2001, B414; Ratnsabapathy 1995).
Polarization processes that created ethnic enclaves are evident in all the civil war contexts under
study here. They differed only in terms of the combination of ethnic, regional, and religious
identities and the extent of polarization along territorial lines.
The indiscriminate nature of the brutal encounters show that armed groups did not
necessarily select their targets on the basis of ethnic identity. The armed groups often did not
care who they attacked. Women, children, and the elderly fell victim to their brutal attacks. Some
villages would be attacked and others left untouched. It seemed like the ultimate decision
regarding who would be attacked lay with armed combatants or with roving criminal bands that
emerged to profit from the confusion and high level of uncertainty. This created great confusion
and anxiety in society. These reprehensible and brutal attacks breached indigenous laws of war.
In some instances, civilians resisted these brutal and violent attacks by mobilizing their own
militias since government forces lacked the capacity to protect them. The Naprama religious
warriors mobilized to resist the RENAMO who were fighting against the Front for the Liberation
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of Mozambique (FRELIMO) government in Mozambique (Chingono 1996, 53–54; Newitt 1995,
573). The Kamajor, Tamaboro, Kapras, and Donsos vigilante groups in Sierra Leone emerged to
defend local populations against the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and sobels renegade
soldiers of the Sierra Leone Army who collaborated with the RUF (Hayward and Kandeh 2000,
B170–173; Muana 1997). Across these conflicts, the proliferation of weapons and their
unregulated use created cultures of violence that had a traumatic effect on family and other social
relations. It also led to the militarization of society characterized by local mobilization of civilian
militia, fragmentation of armed groups into factions, and the emergence of roaming bands of
armed youth, such as the White Army in South Sudan, with no political allegiance to the
government or armed opposition (Alden, Thakur, and Arnold 2011, 65–66, 68–70).
The gender and generation dimensions of the brutal civilian-military encounter merit
attention. Concerning gender relations, women became heads of households as men joined the
military, were killed in attacks, or abandoned the family. In addition to their traditional
household roles, women took on the tasks of providing for the family under very difficult
conditions. Doing so required engaging in income-generating activities that took them away
from the home. Without the protection of their husbands and other relatives, women also became
vulnerable to armed group attacks. The generational effects of the war can be observed in the
large numbers of children and teenagers who became orphaned or separated from their parents.
Without adult protection, many were vulnerable to recruitment into military for survival, some
for protection or revenge (Peters 2004, 30–31). The recruitment of large numbers of youth into
armies altered relations between generations. Armed groups forced child soldiers to attack and
kill members of their own family and community as part of their initiation. This severed their ties
with families and communities who saw these atrocious acts as a great betrayal and ensured that
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the child soldiers would remain loyal to the armed group. Also, a large number of children and
teenagers possessed arms that they used to threaten or intimidate community members regardless
of their gender or seniority. Traditional elders found it difficult or impossible to discipline armed
children and youth, as in Sierra Leone and in South Sudan. The powerlessness of elders to
control and discipline an increasingly militarized generation of youth eroded the legitimacy of
patriarchal traditional authority structures. With traditional authority structures in doubt,
discipline at the family and community levels became difficult to maintain. Overall, the
governments’ inability to protect its civilians and the traditional authorities’ weakening control
of the younger generation resulted in a breakdown of order at national and local levels.
It is difficult to see how the armed groups could have mobilized and sustained
widespread popular support by brutal attacks. During initial phases of the war the population
may have initially welcomed armed opposition as “liberators” from the regime of the day.
However, as the wars stretched on without end, armed oppositions split into rival factions that
resorted to indiscriminate, brutal, and predatory methods. Popular support dwindled. Instead,
people experienced the destruction of their lives and livelihoods. The deterioration in quality of
life created what humanitarian policies and studies refer to as complex political emergencies—
profound social crises induced by war or natural disaster (Binder 2009, 332).
4.3 International Intervention
The political and humanitarian crises resulting from these wars and the security threat
they posed to neighboring countries compelled regional and international intervention to contain
the conflict. The flight of thousands of people to neighboring countries and their settlement in
border regions outside of government reach and control created insecurity. Armed groups took
advantage of government inability to secure these regions and established bases from which to
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attack. Sometimes, neighboring countries became involved as shown by the way the Liberian
wars spilled over into Sierra Leone and Guinea Conakry, threatening to destabilize the region.
Also, when the Khartoum government attacks on South Sudan armed groups extended beyond its
border with Uganda, the latter retaliated.
The protracted nature of the wars and the complex humanitarian crises they created posed
two main challenges to intervention by domestic civic groups, international nongovernmental
organizations, and the United Nations. The first challenge concerned how to provide emergency
assistance (food, water, medical care) to affected civilians under conditions of insecurity and
impaired transport infrastructure. The second challenge involved finding the best means of
transforming the lethal conflicts to constructive ones.
4.3.1 Civil War and the Challenge to Humanitarian Intervention. High levels of insecurity
and destruction of roads and railways made it very difficult for international humanitarian
organizations to locate and access affected populations, adequately assess the humanitarian
problems, and ensure timely provision of relief supplies and health services. During the first
Liberian civil war (1990–96), humanitarian assistance was confined to cities or regions deemed
relatively secure. In South Sudan and Somalia, international humanitarian agencies had to
negotiate with armed groups for safe passage although this was not always guaranteed.
International aid agencies operating in Burundi, Somalia, and Liberia withdrew because of
threats or armed attacks on relief convoys, abductions and killings of international aid workers,
and lootings of relief agency premises and property (Stoddard, Harmer, and Haver 2006; United
Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 1997).
In the absence of international humanitarian assistance or limited intervention by external
actors, concerned individuals within communities mobilized residents and whatever resources
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they could to address the suffering and humanitarian needs. In Liberia, professional women in
Monrovia worked with women traders who traveled between the city and the interior, to ensure
continued food supplies to the city despite the fighting between armed factions (Africa Women
and Peace Support Group 2004, 9–14). Zarah Ugas Farah, a Somali woman who lived through
the civil war in Mogadishu, recounts how she organized meetings with other women to discuss
ways of working together to meet the survival needs of families and victims of war, especially
the provision of food and medicine. These discussions led to the formation of the Family
Economy and Rehabilitation Organization (FERO) in 1992 (Dyck 2003, 9–13).
A few domestic groups, aware of the importance of collaborating with others inside and
outside the country, partnered with international actors such as the UN or nongovernment
organizations. The World Food Program–Somali appointed the local women’s organization
FERO to lead food distribution (Dyck 2003, 13). Dahabo Isse, a Somali woman in Mogadishu,
came together with other women in Mogadishu to provide food for hungry children. She later
directed 140 kitchens in south Mogadishu for the International Committee of the Red Cross
(Lorch 1992, 1). The Church played an important role in the provision of humanitarian relief.
Compared to women and other civil society organizations, churches have a greater outreach and
longer history of charitable work in the country. In Angola, Liberia, Mozambique, and Sudan,
church infrastructure served as alternative mechanisms for humanitarian relief. The church also
addressed the psychological trauma and suffering resulting from the war (Beaudet 2001, 647;
Fouke 1991, 853–858).
Humanitarian support to domestic providers of humanitarian relief was intermittent or
short-lived. International donors or partners feared the security risks of operating in conditions of
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war. According to Zarah Ugas Farah, founder of a local Somali NGO, the Family Economy
Rehabilitation Organization (FERO):
We don’t get much support from donors because some areas in Somalia are not safe. It’s
the local NGOs that are working inside Somalia. The international donors, UN agencies,
and international organizations mostly have offices in Nairobi [capital city of Kenya] for
security reasons and their support to Somalia is limited. The problem is escalating and
our needs are so big; the support from the donors, international communities, and UN
agencies is very little. (Dyck 2003, 15)
Also, domestic religious organizations, women groups, and other domestic actors carried
out their humanitarian relief operations under threat of attack and looting of property and at great
risk to their lives. Even though they may have had the advantage of being indigenous to the area,
they faced the same security threats as the international organizations. For example, Dahabo
Isse’s uncle ordered her at gunpoint to divert food aid from the ICRC kitchens she managed to
relatives. She refused to do so (Lorch 1992, 1). Armed groups also attacked, looted, and burned
down churches (Fouke 1991, 854).
As with international organizations, churches, women’s organizations, and other civil
society organizations faced the challenge of persuading armed groups to allow safe passage of
humanitarian supplies and resumption of social services. In Angola and Sudan, the church and
other civil society actors called for the creation of humanitarian corridors for safe access to
suffering populations (Africa Women and Peace Support Group 2004; Gidley-Kitchin 1992
Kibble and Vines 2001, 542; Lean 1996). The deteriorating social conditions and cycles of lethal
conflict constrained limited domestic efforts to respond to the suffering. Provision of
humanitarian assistance, a short-term measure, morphed into a long-term activity due to the
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protracted nature of the wars. This was not sustainable. In Chapters 6 and 7 I show how the
challenges lethal conflicts posed to local and international humanitarian intervention compelled
domestic civil organizations to consider an end to war.
4.3.2 Civil War and the Challenge of Conflict Management. The United Nations, the
Commonwealth and Organization of African Unity (now the Africa Union), and subregional
organizations (Economic Community of West African States, Inter-Governmental Authority on
Development, and the Southern African Development Community) attempted numerous
mediation efforts to resolve the wars of the 1990s. International nongovernmental organizations
(Negotiations Network, Sant’ Egidio) and African ones (All Africa Conference of Churches,
Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation) also mediated in a number of the formal negotiation processes.
This study focuses on mediation processes that peace networks I study supported and sought to
participate in (see Appendix Table 2).
Regional and international mediation of the 1990s civil wars proved a formidable
challenge to mediating agents and guarantors of the peace process. Perhaps the biggest challenge
was overcoming their intractable nature. The proliferation of armed groups in the course of the
negotiations constrained progress on substantive issues or threatened to derail the negotiation
process. New entrants required a reformulation of existing terms of negotiations to accommodate
them. The resulting stalemates or frequent postponement of talks frustrated hopes civilians had
for an end to war. They also sent a signal to civilian populations that armed groups were not
necessarily interested in ending war (Burgess and Burgess 2006, 178–180; Elnur 2009, 127;
Foaleng 2008; International Crisis Group 2002).
Since armed groups wanted to keep the military option open even as they pursued a
negotiated settlement, the talks were often disrupted by displays of military power, for instance,
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in the SPLM/A-Garang attack and capture of Torit during the IGAD-led negotiations (Waihenya
2006, 97). Frequent violations of ceasefires such as this frustrated mediators’ efforts to move the
negotiation process forward. This cast doubt on the integrity of the negotiations and commitment
of parties to the peace process since they seemed keen on pursuing absolute power through war
as shown in the Liberian, Burundi, and Somali wars (Aboagye 1999, 63, 127; Bentley and
Southall 2005, 6; Mohamoud 2000).
The apparent alienation of the political elite from the civilian population they claimed to
represent presented a political problem. In addition to the hostile relations conflicting parties had
with civilians whose interests they claimed to represent, both parties lacked political visions that
appealed to broader sections of the population. Malaquias observes that:
new internal wars in Africa are no longer fought at the military level to achieve political
objectives. War is no longer viewed as part of a broader contest for political loyalty and
legitimacy that involves, first and foremost, winning “the hearts and minds” of the
people. In fact, now people are regarded as burdens, if not obstacles, whose removal by
military means is justified. By removing people from, say, diamond producing areas,
UNITA rebels can enrich themselves without the political and administrative costs of
governing. (2001, 531)
Few, if any, of the armed opposition in the 1990s carried out political education
campaigns that communicated a clearly understood and unifying political agenda to win the
support of the civilian population or even established civilian administrations in liberated areas.
This departed radically from the armed resistance model characteristic of the Ugandan,
Ethiopian, and Eritrean armed resistances in the late 1980s (Chan and Venâncio 1998, 12;
Clapham 1998; Kasfir 2005; Mkandawire 2002; Weinstein 2007). Resolving conflicts of this
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kind is a daunting task indeed for any mediator. It was made even more difficult by the
reluctance of the international community and limited capacity of regional organizations to
enforce peace, as was the case in Liberia, Burundi, and Somalia. In some of the cases, armed
groups (e.g., Taylor’s NPFL, Somali warlords) or sections of the ruling elite (Burundi) opposed
external intervention.
In sum, the negotiations took place in contexts in which the general population did not
necessarily consider the negotiating parties credible leaders, much as they desired an end to war.
Indeed, in some cases, civilians rejected the notion of armed factions forming a democratic
government. This happened in Sierra Leone where the population rejected the Revolutionary
United Front at the polls during the 2002 general elections, marking the end of the transition
government. Although the armed group transformed itself into a party, the Revolutionary United
Front Party, it received less than 2% of the vote (Gberie 2005, 193–194). Alternatively, civilians
were resigned to the expedient even if unacceptable assumption of power by armed groups. This
occurred in Liberia where Liberians voted for Charles Taylor and the National Patriotic Front of
Liberia (NPFL) because they feared he would return the country to war if he lost. Charles Taylor
won 75.3% of the vote in the July 1997 postaccord elections (Adebajo 2002, 156, 222–23). Thus
the mediator and conflicting parties face the challenge of persuading the general population that
a negotiated agreement will guarantee an end to war and ensure a new political dispensation.
4.4 Conclusion
This chapter set the context for the noncombatant groups’ mobilization to end the civil
wars in the 1990s and early 2000s—the violent political transition to democracy. I highlighted
the key domestic and international developments relevant to the emergence of the peace
networks and their mobilization for a peaceful resolution of the civil war. The expansion of civil
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and political liberties provided the legal openings for the registration and autonomous operation
of a variety of civil society organizations, including the peace networks described here. The
return to multiparty politics and general elections in some countries provided new opportunities
for interaction among civil society organizations, including newly formed political parties.
Unfortunately, elite struggle for power under new political institutions took on a violent
turn in countries where leaders reluctantly implemented political reforms or prevented this from
happening despite popular demand. Thus the contention for peace took place in adverse and
highly risky conditions of war in addition to incomplete or manipulated transitions to democratic
rule. The brutal conduct of war and its devastating effect on society is closely associated with
initiatives for peace. These domestic conditions alone do not account for the emergence of
noncombatant groups identified here. I noted the way external regional and international
developments impacted the contention for peace, specifically the limits of international
humanitarian intervention in the face of the kind of intractable conflict that unfolded and the
challenges external mediating agents faced. Also, the failure of numerous formal negotiations to
deliver peace despite the adverse social consequences of war forms the negotiation context in
which some of the social actors described here contend to participate in formal negotiations. This
setting is crucial to understanding the contemporary historical conditions of the campaigns to end
war and the seemingly prominent role of women and religious leaders.
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Chapter 5. RELIGIOUS LEADERS’ MOBILIZATION FOR AN END TO
WAR THROUGH DIALOGUE
Why and how did the religious leaders and women’s networks mobilize for an end to war
through dialogue despite the political risks involved? I argue that certain key moments, sudden
transformative events in society caused by the war or the threat of war, compelled a few religious
leaders and women leaders to reconsider whether the roles they played in society were relevant. I
described these events in Chapter 4 and their impact on society. Here I show that these warrelated socially transformative events were not sufficient for collective action. The religious
leaders’ and women’s interpretation of war as a threat motivated them to do something to end it
through collective action. I show how they did this by reconstructing processes of collective
attribution using evidence from accounts of the processes leading to the peace campaign written
by religious leaders and women involved, the organizations supporting them, from position
statements and pastoral letters.
I sketch the process of attribution as follows: A few individuals (religious leaders and
women) proposed the need to address the root causes of the conflict. They constructed an
alternative understanding of the wars and their resolution—a shared story about the futility of
war and the possibility of its resolution peacefully through the participation of all as peace
agents. The story formed the basis for their demand that conflicting parties end the war
peacefully through use of dialogue. The story also offered targets (warring parties) and subjects
(the public) the promise of peace through inclusive participation that addressed the roots of the
conflict. The construction of the story occurred during encounters and conversations with other
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religious leaders and women so as to secure widespread participation within religious institutions
and among women for collective action to end the war.
In answer to how the religious leaders and women mobilized to end the wars, I argue that
they diffused the shared story to the warring parties and the public through a number of
mechanisms aimed at changing their thinking and behavior towards war. I reconstruct the
process of mobilization by elaborating on the key mechanisms of mobilization across the ten
campaigns for an end to war. These include the diffusion of the shared story about war and its
resolution to build solidarity and reinforce commitment for the peace campaigns and the joint
coordination of action at different sites, i.e., the conflicting parties, the public, and international
stakeholders.
I begin my analysis with the key moments in the wars or the political transitions that
served as a wake up call to the women and religious leaders to do something about their
situations. After this, my analysis shifts to the religious leaders’ and women’s attribution of
threat and opportunity, the actual campaign for an end to war, and the outcomes. I present my
analysis in two parts. This chapter focuses on the five religious leaders’ campaigns and their
outcomes. In the next chapter (Chapter 6), I address the five women’s peace campaigns and their
outcomes and conclude with a comparison of the religious leaders’ and women’s campaigns and
outcomes.
5.1. Key Moments and the Motivation to Collectively Act for an End to War
Certain key moments, atrocious acts committed by either of the conflicting parties,
disturbed a few religious leaders enough to do something to end the war. These include incidents
such as the Homoine massacre of 380 peasants (mainly women, children, and the elderly) by the
RENAMO in 1987, the Liberian government’s brutal counterinsurgency campaign in 1990
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targeting civilians in areas where NPFL launched its attacks, and the vicious interethnic factional
fighting accompanying the SPLM/A elite split in 1991 Sudan. Also included are the violence
accompanying the political elite’s refusal to submit to electoral processes, for example, the 1997
military coup in Sierra Leone that ousted a democratically elected civilian government and
provoked civilian outrage, setting off a new cycle of violence, and the brutal and destructive
violence of the 1992 postelections war and the post-Lusaka accords3 war (1998–2002) between
the government and the UNITA in Angola. In all these incidents, the unprecedented violence
cost thousands of lives, altered social relations by polarizing communities and families, broke
traditional, cultural, and moral values, and made it difficult for churches to operate in the
affected areas. Religious leaders were concerned with the insensitivity of fighting forces toward
the plight of civilian populations and the heavy moral toll the war had on society.
They were also concerned that the violence impoverished the people and the country. The
policies of economic sabotage and destabilization cost the people their livelihoods and
devastated the national economy. The loss of livelihoods created conditions of mass starvation in
Mozambique (1983–85), famine in Bahr el Ghazal in South Sudan (Bahr el Ghazal 1998–99),
and in Angola. Although the churches provided humanitarian relief to internally displaced
populations and refuges, they were frustrated by the futility of providing humanitarian relief on a
near-permanent basis. The Sudanese Catholic Bishop Parade Taban of the Diocese of Torit
likened the provision of humanitarian relief alone to “fattening a cow for slaughter,” and
Alimamy Koroma of the Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone saw it as “simply reacting to
the war” ( Koroma 2007, 287; NSCC 2002, 12). They and other religious leaders wanted to go
3

The Angolan government and UNITA signed the Lusaka Protocol on November 1994. After a contentious

implementation process, the UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi resumed war and called for fresh negotiations.
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beyond merely relieving the symptoms of the war (disease, hunger, famine, displacement) to
addressing the causes of war.
Within the religious organizations, the process of collective attribution of threat and
opportunity began with a few high-ranking clergy who initiated conversations about the need to
end the war and the suffering it caused the population. A few church leaders in Southern Sudan,
motivated by the need for a better way to serve their people, proposed the establishment of an
ecumenical body that would work for unity, justice, and peace as long-term solutions to the civil
war (NSCC 2002, 12). Some religious leaders, like the Roman Catholic clergy in Mozambique
(D. Jaime Gonçalves, Archbishop of Beira, and Bishop Alexandre dos Santos) and Liberia
(Archbishop Michael Francis and Lutheran Bishop Ronald Diggs), took individual stands against
the war and its excesses. They publicly called on conflicting parties to end it through dialogue.
Others, like the Protestant clergy in Mozambique (Anglican Bishop Dinis Sengulane, Bishop of
Libombo, Pastor Jeremias Mucache, President of the Christian Council of Mozambique) and
Sierra Leone (Alimamy Koroma) and Protestant and Catholic clergy in Angola, initially engaged
fellow church leaders and conflicting parties in private conversations before making public calls
for dialogue to end the war. Whether outspoken or cautious, these key individuals opened debate
on the politically sensitive question of war and its resolution.
The clergy interpreted war as a senseless threat to human dignity and to the moral, social,
and economic order. The Christian Council of Mozambique (CCM) claimed that the civil war
was “devastating,” it benefitted no one, and it caused suffering of the people (McVeigh 1999,
183–185; Sengulane and Gonçalves 1998, 33). In Angola, Catholic Bishops called the war a
“twice deadly organization—it kills with weapons and kills with hunger” (Vines et al. 2005, 27).
Liberian clerics protested the lack of military discipline among troops. When the civil war
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escalated a second time, they claimed, “Liberians cannot withstand another round of warfare”
(Agence France Presse, 1999). The religious leaders considered dialogue the only viable option,
given the failure of war to secure a permanent peace. They committed to promoting its use by the
conflicting parties.
For the religious leaders across the five campaigns, collective action for an end to war
and the use of dialogue gave the church an opportunity to play a more relevant role in society.
More importantly, it gave the church an opportunity to be recognized as credible peace brokers
with the capacity to make a difference in society by facilitating the kind of relationships that
would end war peacefully and ensure social stability. According to Bishop Sengulane, when the
CCM became involved in the search for peace, it was looking for “an appropriate role for the
church in the larger society.” He adds that “we considered reconciliation to be the vocation of the
church” and that this role was driven by “gospel tenets” (Sengulane and Gonçalves 1996, 192,
197, 198). For churches in South Sudan, playing an appropriate role meant being “a voice of the
voiceless,” a credible facilitator of peace and reconciliation capable of dealing with the root
causes of war and poverty and creating a just, stable future for the peoples of Sudan. They
regarded their peacemaking role as “an obligation for the Church to be in the midst of and care
for the suffering” and believed that it involved bringing together the South Sudanese people,
leaders, and members of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and the National Council of
Churches (NSCC 2002, 10, 13).
Like the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC), the Inter-Faith Mediation Committee
in Liberia (IFMC) conceived their role as mediators and advocates of the voiceless (PanAfrican
News Agency [PANA], 2 September, 1999). Alimamy Koroma of the Inter-Religious Council of
Sierra Leone stated that the religious leaders needed to be more proactive in addressing the
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causes of the political crisis facing the country in addition to the coordination of social services.
In doing so they took on a variety of roles. They brokered communication between the
government of Sierra Leone and the RUF. They bridged relations between the RUF and a public
hostile to the armed group. They advocated dialogue, and they acted as a voice for all Sierra
Leonians. Koroma notes that in adopting a proactive role, they emulated religious leaders in
Liberia (Koroma 2007, 287; Pham 2004, 58; Pomeroy 1999; Turay 2000, 51; Winter 2000). For
the churches in Angola, being peace brokers and prophets was an opportunity to restore the
credibility, respect, and authority they had lost due to their close affiliation with either the
colonial or postcolonial governments (IRIN 2003).
This role of peace broker fit quite well with the peace and reconciliation mission of the
church and with society’s expectation of them. The churches’ adoption of their peace-brokering
role activated two identities that feature in the biblical tradition: the reconciler and the prophet.
As reconcilers, religious institutions would be identified with facilitating social relations that
allow for dialogue and an end to war. As prophets, they would be identified with the voiceless,
speaking out against the injustices in society. Although the religious leaders do not state this in
their accounts, the identities the churches activated were political, as they intended to engage
directly with the state and armed groups even as they mobilized support within society. Their
prophetic role in particular elicited sharp response from incumbent governments and attacks by
armed groups. In Chapter 8, I analyze the political threats the churches faced, especially the
threat of violent intimidation and how they navigated the political minefield nonviolently.
The process of eliciting agreement on the churches’ promotion of dialogue as a means to
end the war varied. Encounters took place at the level of individual churches and councils of
churches within the Protestant churches and at the level of senior bishops within the Roman
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Catholic Church. In Mozambique, the first conversation among the Protestant Churches took
place in the October 1982 Synod meeting of the Anglican Diocese of Libombo. This Synod
decided to request the CCM to meet with the FRELIMO government and discuss abolition of the
death penalty. Few churches were willing to do so. In 1984, the CCM created a Commission on
Peace and Reconciliation and then wrote a letter in 1985 informing member churches of its
formation and its task of peace and reconciliation (McVeigh 1999, 182–83; Sengulane and
Gonçalves 1996, 196; 1998, 28–29). The Protestant churches in Angola endorsed the need to
engage politically at the 1984 Conference of the Council of Christian Churches in Angola
(CICA) and again at the 1995 first meeting of the Protestant and Evangelical churches in Angola
(EDICA). The Roman Catholic Bishops in Angola did so through consensus-building at the level
of senior bishops, members of the Episcopal Conference of Angola and São Tomé (CEAST)
(Comerford 2007, 492, 494, 509). In southern Sudan, widespread agreement among Protestant
and Catholic leaders led to the formation of the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC) in
1990. Member churches agreed, at the first General Assembly (1991), that the church would act
as an advocate and prophet of southern Sudanese peoples, broker relationships and cooperation
between the churches on the basis of ecumenical principles, and build the capacity and programs
of churches to fulfill their roles (New Sudan Council of Churches 2002, 12).
The construction and diffusion of the shared story about religious institutions’ role in
promoting peace was a difficult process. Accounts of the peace processes provide few details
concerning the difficulties in getting widespread agreement. In his own account of the InterReligious Leaders Council of Sierra Leone (IRLCS), Alimamy Koroma observes that, while
leaders of Christian and Muslim traditions came together and found agreement over issues that
united them (no violence, peace and reconciliation), the exercise was not easy (Koroma 2007,
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279). Accounts of the Angolan process indicate that building consensus among Roman Catholic
Bishops required overcoming political affiliations and divisions among them that reflected
Angolan society (Comerford 2007, 492; Chatham House 2005, 13).
Member churches’ response to the 1982 Synod (Anglican Diocese of Libombo) request
to engage the government over the death penalty reveals great reluctance. According to Bishop
Sengulane, then Bishop of the Diocese of Libombo:
One church declined to answer, saying the subject was too complex politically. Another
replied that it needed more time to consider the proposal. The head of one church
reported to the secret police, although this was considered confidential. The CCM never
officially dealt with the issue, in spite of requests from the originating synod for a
decision.
It took two years of ad hoc committee work on the issue of peace before the CCM
established a Commission of Peace and Reconciliation in 1984. Bishop Sengulane also observes
that Mozambican churches’ intention to promote use of dialogue to end the war was not well
received by churches during their tour of the United States. He notes that, “Our hosts [the
National Council of Churches in the USA], who had not been aware of their visitors’ intentions
regarding RENAMO, turned out to be adamantly opposed to the idea. Their feeling was so
strong that some felt they had been betrayed” (Sengulane and Gonçalves 1996, 196–197; 1998,
29). Bishop Sengulane elaborates further on the nature of resistance they encountered in the
United States, “on one side our hosts put so much pressure on us to use non-conciliatory
language, condemning one side; while among those who came to hear what we had to say, there
were persons who wanted us to condemn the other side” (cited in McViegh 1999, 185). Clearly,
church supporters in the United States rejected the Mozambican churches’ decision to adopt a
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peacemaking role. This contrasts with the Catholic Church’s support from its networks in Rome
and the Vatican.
Accounts of the participation of Muslim clerics in the Liberian and Sierra Leonean peace
campaigns provide little information on how Muslim clerics participated in the construction of
the shared story. Gifford (1995, 282) observes in his analysis of the churches’ role in politics in
Liberia that statements on church positions were in a Christian language, and cooperation was on
Christian terms with no attempt to draw on Islamic peace tradition or language. This observation
is applicable to the dominance of Christian discourse and tradition in the Sierra Leone campaign.
Accounts point out the positive participation of the Muslim religious leaders and organizations
but are silent on their specific contribution to the framing of the shared definition of peace
through dialogue.
Overall, it is not surprising that the construction and diffusion of the religious leaders’
peacemaking role met with resistance within the church. Most churches had been perceived as
supporters of either the colonial or oppressive postcolonial regimes. Also, promoting peaceful
resolution of the war, especially the prophetic role of engaging the conflicting parties publicly,
was political activity. Not all religious leaders were used to this role because it represented a
break from previous ones of abstaining from political participation.
5.2 From Suffering to Mobilization: Religious Leaders’ Campaign for Peace
Initially, religious leaders appropriated their churches’ national leadership structures to
launch their campaigns for peace separately as Protestant and Roman Catholic Churches and
Muslims. For instance, Protestant Churches used the national councils of churches and alliances
of evangelical churches. The Roman Catholic Church issued statements through their Episcopal
Conferences of Bishops, whereas Muslim clerics made claims in the name of National Muslim
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Councils. Thus, the Council of Churches in Mozambique, the Liberian Council of Churches, the
National Muslim Council of Liberia, the Council of Christian Churches in Angola, the Angolan
Evangelical Alliance, the Sudan Council of Churches, the New Sudan Council of Churches, and
the Conference of Bishops in Mozambique, Liberia, Angola, and Sudan were the initial
organizational bases from which religious leaders made their public call for an end to war,
pursued dialogue, and mobilized congregations’ support for peace.
Some churches created new vehicles to coordinate activities promoting their claims for
the use of dialogue to end the war. The mainstream protestant churches’ Council of Churches in
Mozambique established a Commission on Peace and Reconciliation and appointed Bishop
Denis Sengulane to lead it (McVeigh 1999, 183). The Roman Catholic Churches in Sudan
established diocesan, regional, and national commissions to address peace and justice issues
(Diocese of Rumbek 2001, 39). The Roman Catholic Church’s Justice and Peace Commission in
Liberia was also actively involved in campaigns for peace in addition to human rights
monitoring.
Religious leaders also created organizations to jointly coordinate their separate
campaigns for peace nationally and internationally. These ecumenical vehicles varied in
membership. The Contact Group/Task Force combined the resources and activities of the
CCM/Commission on Peace and Reconciliation and the Roman Catholic Church in
Mozambique. In Angola, the Episcopal Conference of Angola and Sao Tome, the Council of
Christian Churches in Angola, and the Angolan Evangelical Alliance formed the COIEPA. The
Liberian Council of Churches, the National Muslim Council of Liberia, and the Roman Catholic
Church formed the Inter-Faith Mediation Committee (IFMC), which later became the InterReligious Council of Liberia (IRCL), a national affiliate of the Religions for Peace (Lampman
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1999; PR Newswire, 1999; Woods 1996, 25). Major Christian and Muslim organizations in
Sierra Leone, including women’s religious organizations, formed the Interreligious Council of
Sierra Leone to advocate for an end to war. This council in turn formed a Sensitization
Committee that broadcast messages encouraging the need for conflict resolution over the radio
and television and a working group tasked with resolving the conflict (Pomeroy 1999). The
Sudan Ecumenical Forum (SEF) brought together Sudanese churches and their international
partners, such as the World Council of Churches, the All Africa Conference of Churches, and the
Caritas Network, to lobby for peace at the international level (Kur 2008).
The joint coordination of separate activities crucial to mobilization differed among the
religious leaders’ campaigns. In Angola, church leaders took longer to combine their efforts and
forge an ecumenical vision for peace. In Mozambique, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, the various
religious organizations overcame whatever may have divided them to engage in ecumenical
initiatives for peace. In Sudan, the ecumenism evident among the Protestant and Roman Catholic
Christians was absent among Christians and Muslims. Although other civic groups launched
their campaigns and also participated in public campaigns led by the Inter-Faith Mediation
Committee (Liberia), the Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone, and the COIEPA (Angola),
my analysis focuses on the campaigns led by the religious leaders as they (and the women’s
networks I examine in Chapter 6) emerged as leading actors in the struggle for peace.
Through churches they appropriated, the new vehicles they created, and alliances with
other civic and political actors in society, religious leaders launched peace campaigns that
diffused a shared story about the war. They called on conflicting parties, the public, and
international actors to promote an end to war through dialogue. This story offered an alternative
interpretation of the violent conflict as a threat to social peace, especially to human dignity,
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because of its senseless and devastating impact on moral, social, and economic order. Where war
had failed to settle political conflict, as in Mozambique and South Sudan, they called for
peaceful dialogue and reconciliation in society as alternatives to military victory and intervened
to broker communication between fighting parties. Where formal negotiations and agreements
failed to end the war, as in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Angola, they called on conflicting parties
to adhere to negotiated settlements, attempted to reestablish broken communication lines
between conflicting parties, and called on mediating agents and the international community to
enforce peace agreements by conflicting parties. Religious leaders communicated these demands
through a variety of performances aimed at persuading conflicting parties and the public that
dialogue was an opportunity to be agents of peace instead of agents of war. My examination of
these performances highlights the key mechanisms of mobilization operating in the religious
leaders’ diffusion of their story to conflicting parties and the public.
Ecumenical vehicles were particularly important for coordinating religious leaders’
separate and joint actions to persuade conflicting parties to settle their disputes through
negotiations. They portrayed the religious leaders as autonomous nonpartisan actors united in
their pursuit of peaceful resolution to the conflict. The religious leaders in the campaigns I
examined first established contacts with leaders of conflicting parties through personal networks
and written requests for meetings. At these meetings, religious leaders communicated the need
for the government and the armed groups to end the war, persuaded both sides to enter talks with
the other, and offered to facilitate these talks. In Mozambique and South Sudan, where
conflicting parties had not engaged in direct talks, the religious leaders persuaded conflicting
parties to see the opportunity that dialogue offered for being agents of peace and unity who
ended the suffering of the people. By offering conflicting parties an inclusive way of framing
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political identities, as citizens, religious leaders created a face-saving opportunity for both sides
to shift the basis of their interactions from mutually exclusive political identity boundaries
(whether ideological or ethnic) to inclusive citizenship identity. The Mozambican religious
leaders, for instance, argued it was possible for conflicting parties to seek peace and appreciate
each other if they saw themselves as Mozambicans. They called on both sides to see dialogue as
an opportunity for Mozambicans to be reconcilers, committed to peace and not to winning or
defeating the other (Sengulane and Gonçalves 1996, 198). The New Sudan Council of Churches
saw dialogue and reconciliation among the armed factions as an opportunity for them to forge
the unity and peace required for the development of stable and productive communities and to
prevent the Khartoum government’s manipulation of the southern Sudanese people. In Liberia,
Sierra Leone, and Angola, where the conflicting parties had already entered into talks, religious
leaders emphasized the opportunity that dialogue provided for them to be credible agents of
peace and reconciliation and concerned about the interests of the people. Members of the InterFaith Mediation Committee, especially the outspoken Roman Catholic Archbishop Michael
Francis, emphasized the opportunity to be peacemakers committed to protecting the human
rights and physical security of the people. The Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone
encouraged the parties to see peacemaking as an opportunity to cooperate in ending violence in
the country. Religious leaders in Angola saw in the government’s stronger position the
opportunity to be peacemaker and saw peacemaking as an opportunity for leaders of the Popular
Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the Union for the Total Independence of
Angola (UNITA) to create a basis for democratic practice, a culture of peace, and new social and
political relations, and for restoring the dignity of Angolans (Kirkwood 2001). In general the
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religious leaders appealed to an inclusive national identity and need for national integration when
persuading conflicting parties to enter into talks and settle differences peacefully.
The Liberia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, and Sudan cases show that the religious leaders’
shift to communication brokers depended on positive responses from the armed groups and
governments. The Inter-Faith Mediation Committee convened and mediated the first talks in
Freetown, Sierra Leone, aimed at preventing a full-scale war between the National Patriotic
Liberation Front and the Liberian government under President Doe. After getting agreement
from President Chissano, the Contact Group of religious leaders in Mozambique initiated contact
with the RENAMO leaders and persuaded them to enter into talks with the FRELIMO
government. This led to a series of separate encounters with RENAMO and President Chissano
in which the Contact Group acted as emissaries for both sides, passing on positions and
responses to them. The Contact Group members also acted as advocates for peace, pressuring
both sides to enter into talks as the only viable alternative. The churches’ efforts led to both sides
agreeing to face-to-face talks mediated by the Sant’ Egidio community in Rome. The InterReligious Council of Sierra Leone’s direct engagement with the government and the RUF
followed a pattern similar to that of the Contact Group of Mozambique and the Inter-Faith
Mediation Committee in Liberia. The council reinitiated face-to-face talks between the RUF and
the government of Sierra Leone during the second civil war after receiving agreement from both
sides to do so (Pham 2004, 60). At the historic Yei Dialogue between the New Sudan Council of
Churches and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) in July 1997, the
churches resolved differences with the movement and gained the mandate to pursue their
peacemaking work among the different political military groupings and the population (NSCC
1997, 10; 2002, 48–51).

86

The Sudan and Angolan campaigns show religious leaders more active in mobilizing for
peace in society than in engaging with political elites, unlike their counterparts in Mozambique,
Liberia, and Sierra Leone, who engaged both conflicting parties and the public. The Angolan
government rejected completely the religious leaders’ call for peace through dialogue and their
offers to facilitate talks between it and UNITA even though the latter responded positively. The
COIEPA campaign focused its efforts on speaking out against the war publicly and mobilizing
people’s support for peace and reconciliation. Brokering agreements to negotiate among the
military factions proved difficult in South Sudan because some military leaders were reluctant.
Yet most did not prevent the New Sudan Council of Churches from mobilizing the people for
peace and reconciliation. While the Angolan example shows outright rejection of the churches’
offer to broker peace, in South Sudan the conflicting parties may have rejected the churches’
offers of mediation but did not prevent the same churches from mobilizing the population for
peace.
The Mozambican, Liberian, and Sierra Leone religious leaders relied on regional,
transnational, and international networks of church organizations for assistance in brokering
conflicting parties’ agreements to talk and mobilizing resources for their campaigns. The
religious leaders in Mozambique diffused their call for peace during a tour of churches in the
United States and used the opportunity to establish contacts with RENAMO representatives in
the United States who later put them in contact with representatives in Nairobi. The All Africa
Conference of Churches, World Council of Churches, and National Council of Churches in
Kenya provided support in facilitating the Contact Group’s meetings with RENAMO
representatives in Nairobi and the Kenya government, then an ally of RENAMO. The All Africa
Conference of Churches participated in the Inter-Faith Mediation Committee’s brokerage of
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peace between Liberian factions and also provided training in conflict resolution skills to
religious leaders (Fouke 1991, 851). The Religions for Peace also participated in a similar role in
Sierra Leone (PR Newswire 1999). The Church of the Brethren (USA) assigned two of its clergy
as Peace Officers to the New Sudan Council of Churches to help build the peace program (NSCC
2002, 47). In all the campaigns, the international relief and development programs of churches
(e.g., Lutheran World Relief, Church World Service) and Christian international NGOs
(Christian Aid, World Vision, Caritas, Catholic Relief Services) contributed humanitarian
assistance through the churches during the war and postwar periods. The religious leaders also
went on tours organized by church networks in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom,
and continental Europe, during which they updated congregations on the situation and raised
funds for their peace and humanitarian work. Angolan religious leaders also had secular
organizations as allies (Austin 1999; NSCC 2002, 73; Fouke 1991, 854–59; Frerichs and
Bowman 2001, 8; Winter 2000).
The religious leaders’ mobilization efforts targeted congregations and the general public.
Accounts show that religious leaders borrowed mainly Christian religious practices—prayer,
fasting, vigils, bible studies, sermons, ecumenical services, and pastoral letters—to mobilize their
congregations’ support for an end to war and for efforts aimed at getting conflicting parties to
pursue a negotiated settlement. Evidence of Muslim leaders’ participation in the peace
campaigns in Liberia and Sierra Leone and of traditional leaders in Angola and Southern Sudan
indicates that these two groups may have emulated Islamic and traditional practices in their
peace campaigns. With the exception of the South Sudanese grassroots peace movement, I did
not come across documentation detailing the use of Islamic and traditional religious traditions in
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Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Angola to diffuse the religious leaders’ call for peaceful resolution of
the war.
In my view, religious rituals like prayers, songs, bible studies, and fasting provided
congregants with the opportunity to express their feelings about the war without fear. Together
with sermons and pastoral letters calling for peaceful resolution of the war, the rituals opened
public debate on a politically sensitive issue and created a safe space for discussions. Since the
rituals emphasized religious teachings on peace, forgiveness, and reconciliation, they also
activated new identities and social relations by compelling a change in the way congregants
thought about the war and their relations with groups they considered against them. They
encouraged a shift in identity among congregants by promoting the new identity of congregants
as agents of peace—peacemakers—like their religious leaders. Since participation in church
activities is open to the public, it is likely that the religious performances attracted the
participation of nonmembers.
Beyond their specific congregations, religious leaders mobilized general public support
through pastoral letters, public statements, press conferences, and peace messages published in
print media and also broadcast through radio and television. Religious leaders in Liberia and
Angola staged peace marches and rallies. Peace marches led by the Inter-Faith Mediation
Committee in Liberia often ended in prayers. The rallies and peace marches demonstrated public
support for peace and the people’s outrage at the continuing war. Liberian and Sierra Leonean
clergy also staged stay-home strikes to demonstrate outrage at the unacceptable behavior of
armed groups. The nonviolent civil resistance in Sierra Leone protested the military coup in 1997
by officers in the Sierra Leone army and the latter’s inclusion of the RUF in power in breach of
the 1996 peace agreements and a popularly elected civilian government.
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The Roman Catholic Bishops in Angola, Mozambique, and Liberia wrote pastoral letters
expressing their position on the war and need for peaceful resolution. These and statements by
Protestant Bishops appealing for peace were read at churches, broadcast through the church
radio, and published in the newspapers where there was a relatively independent press like in
Liberia and Sierra Leone. In Sierra Leone, the religious leaders also convened press conferences
to communicate their position or what they were doing to the public. The direct diffusion of
these letters in church and indirectly through the radio and print media opened public debate on
alternative views of the war and its resolution. Accounts of the religious leaders’ campaigns in
Angola, Sierra Leone, and Liberia mention use of radio to disseminate messages of peace. The
Roman Catholic church-owned radio stations in Angola and Liberia were important mediums of
educating the population on human rights, civic education, and other themes of concern. The
Angolan people relied on the radio for connecting with members of the family they had been
separated from as a result of the war. The radio connected religious leaders to congregations and
members of the public beyond their congregations who were scattered by the war. Given
widespread illiteracy, the radio was a key tool for diffusing the shared story, in addition to
updating the population on community events.
In all the campaigns, religious leaders convened several meetings, like the seminars to
prepare people for peace in Mozambique, visioning workshops and training in conflict resolution
in South Sudan, and conferences at which influential members of society discussed peace in
Angola. At these meetings religious leaders mobilized support for peace through conversations
aimed at changing the thinking and behavior of influential individuals and groups in society—
civil society group leaders, politicians, parliamentarians, traditional elders and chiefs,
professional associations, women, and youth—with regard to the war and its resolution. The
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direct diffusion of the religious leaders’ shared story about the war and its peaceful resolution
through presentations and discussions compelled participants to see themselves as agents of
peace and consider how to end the war. The Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone convened
meetings with the President, parliamentarians, paramount chiefs, traditional leaders, UN
officials, and their leaders to mobilize their support for the religious leaders’ efforts at
reestablishing dialogue with the RUF leader Foday Sankoh and his ally President Charles Taylor
of Liberia. These meetings resulted in a Working Group tasked with developing ways for
resolving the conflict and helping the country recover from the war. Different individuals and
groups, some from across lines of division, came together through the itinerant brokerage of
religious leaders. These face-to-face encounters with each other provided opportunities to forge
relationships of trust and confidence required for a united and strong support for peace in society.
They had the potential to alter social relations among groups and create coalitions and alliances
for peace.
The religious leaders’ campaigns also activated new identities and institutions in a way
that elaborated further on the call to the public to be agents of peace. The campaign for
disarmament in Liberia led by the Church and in which women peace activists participated
included activities aimed at providing teenage combatants with occupations. The South Sudanese
peace campaign reached out to youth by training them to be peace monitors. Mozambican
religious leaders held symbolic rituals where children brought war toys, such as guns, to church
and smashed them to symbolize their rejection of tools of war and demonstrate their commitment
to peace and “devotion to the Prince of Peace.” This innovative use of ritual and the activation of
new institutions was aimed at promoting new peacemaker identities among teenagers and youths
who were key targets for recruitment into the armed forces by conflicting parties. The religious
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leaders continued with provision of humanitarian relief even as they engaged in the campaigns
for peace because most people were impoverished by the war and unable to produce food.
Mozambican religious leaders considered this part of the peace process. In their view,
humanitarian assistance demonstrated support for human life and dignity by protecting lives. Yet
the provision of humanitarian assistance by Angolan churches is criticized for constraining
popular mobilizations for peace, as people were more interested in food and other relief items
than in participating in a campaign for peace. The New Sudan Council of Churches seems to
have found a way out, by encouraging communities to contribute to supplies required for the
several peace meetings even as they received support from international aid agencies.
Other than tours to northern countries to mobilize resources for their church activities,
including the peace campaigns, accounts also mention that religious leaders mobilized the
support of actors for their peace campaigns at the transnational and international level. Although
they do not detail the process of doing so, the regional nature of the conflict in South Sudan and
Sierra Leone and the international intervention in the Angolan peace process necessitated
engaging key stakeholders at these levels. The Sudan Ecumenical Forum jointly coordinated the
peace advocacy activities of the Sudan Churches and their international partners at international
fora (Kur 2008, 293). The New Sudan Council of Churches relied on brokerage of regional and
international councils of churches (the National Council of Churches of Kenya, All Africa
Conference of Churches, and World Council of Churches) to broker talks between fighting
factions in the South (Kobia 2008). Angolan churches sent delegations to the United Kingdom to
request the latter’s support in convincing the Angolan government to negotiate an end to war.
The Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone sought meetings with President Charles Taylor to
get his support for peaceful resolution of the war. Through the brokerage of the Religions for
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Peace, the Sierra Leone religious leaders established links with northern governments who could
be potential mediators.
Where armed groups refused to adhere to a negotiated agreement even after the religious
leaders’ attempts to persuade them to do so, the religious leaders demanded international
intervention to enforce peace and save the population from further suffering. The Liberian
Council of Churches and the National Muslim Council of Liberia called for an international
peacekeeping force to supervise a ceasefire agreement by armed groups (Faul 1992). During the
second Liberian civil war, the Roman Catholic Bishop Michael Francis claimed that “the US has
a moral duty to intervene in Liberia because it helped found the state” (Agence France Presse
2003). While on an international speaking tour, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Bahr al Ghazal
(Sudan), Macram Max Gassis, called on the international community to push for peace in Sudan
(Nolen 2001). The Sudan Catholic Bishops published a statement in which they appealed to the
US government to exert pressure on conflicting parties to accept a negotiated settlement (PANA
2002).
The war imposed a geographic constraint on nationwide mobilization of the public.
Campaign activities were more prevalent in cities (Monrovia, Freetown, Luanda) and certain
regions in South Sudan. Interaction between groups across regions under control of armed
factions was not possible in Angola, South Sudan, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. In Angola, for
instance, the religious leaders organized under COIEPA were more active at the international
level and in Luanda, while in the rest of the country individual church denominations or groups
took on coordination of campaign because accessing areas under control of UNITA and MPLA
in the countryside was very difficult. This was done to avoid intimidation or harassment by the
government or UNITA. It is not clear how the individual churches mobilized in their
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communities and whether they did so. The campaigns appear fragmented as connecting local
actors required brokers who could cross warfronts. These were in short supply due to the nature
of the war and to the paucity of resources available to the religious leaders.
5.3 Conclusion
Overall, the Mozambican religious leaders succeeded in brokering communication
between the conflicting parties. This led to formal negotiations and a peace agreement in 1992.
The conflicting parties requested that one of the Contact Group members, Archbishop
Gonçalves, participate in the mediation of the formal talks. Other religious leaders
complemented his role by pressuring parties to continue with talks when they threatened to stall.
They also developed a new constituency for peace at the local level in support of the formal
negotiations and gained credibility as important agents of peace in society. The South Sudan
People-to-People peace process resulted in two peace agreements among communities—the
Wunlit Dinka-Nuer covenant (1999) and Liir agreements. The process could not expand to other
areas because of heavy fighting and militia inability to provide the security required for a
sustained dialogue process. The South-to-South process targeting political and military elites
proved difficult because of the SPLM/A leadership split on whether to enter into talks with
militia affiliated with the Islamist regime in Khartoum. The Angolan campaign broke the culture
of silence and opened debate on politically sensitive issues. Although religious leaders in Sierra
Leone and Liberia brokered communications between fighting parties, this did not avert war. It
took other factors to bring about some peace. In Liberia, the ECOWAS assumed peace brokerage
but relied on the religious leaders’ communication brokerage in the series of negotiations leading
to the 1997 general elections that brought Charles Taylor to power despite widespread
opposition. Taylor’s resignation in 2003 is a result of a combination of factors—outbreak of war,
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formal negotiations, Taylor’s indictment by the Special court in Sierra Leone for crimes against
humanity, and the women’s campaign for peace.
There are a few details of changes in members of the international community the
religious leaders reached out to, e.g., the subregional organizations mediating formal
negotiations like the ECOWAS, the United Nations, and key western donor countries such as the
United States. Yet from the accounts, I observed that in general international actors certified the
religious leaders’ campaign for peace. These actors contributed significantly to the formal peace
process. For the Mozambican religious leaders’ Contact Group, this certification is seen in one of
the members participating in the mediation of the formal talks. The ECOWAS worked with the
religious leaders in Liberia to move the formal negotiation process forward. They were critical in
brokering armed factions and also pressuring them to talk. The United Nations recognized the
Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone as a crucial actor in brokering peace. In South Sudan,
the IGAD invited the religious leaders to participate as observers in the IGAD-led formal
negotiations, but accounts do not show they participated actively as communication brokers in
the same manner as their counterparts in Sierra Leone and Liberia. They did initiate a parallel
process aimed at reconciling the armed factions in the south as a way of securing implementation
of the comprehensive agreement.
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Chapter 6. WOMEN’S CAMPAIGN FOR PEACE
Why and how did the religious leaders and women’s networks mobilize for an end to war
through dialogue despite the political risks involved? In the previous chapter, I argued that the
religious leaders’ motivation to collectively act to end war originates in how they interpreted and
responded to the sudden transformative events in society generated by the 1990s civil wars. In
this chapter I take up this argument in relation to the women’s organizations that campaigned for
peace. I draw on findings from four of the five women’s campaigns (Burundi, Sierra Leone,
Somalia, and Liberia). Accounts of these four campaigns describe how women called for an end
to war through peaceful means. Although South Sudan women are mentioned as being part of the
church led People-to-People peacemaking process, I have left them out because details of the
exact nature of their involvement are few or too general to outline the process of their
mobilization. Accounts of their campaign for peace provide more details on their demand to
participate in formal negotiations. I examine this in Chapter 7 together with the other four
campaigns.
My reconstruction of the women’s mobilization for peace begins with the key events that
made women aware of their need to collectively act against the war. I begin with the process of
collective attribution across the campaigns to show how women moved from this awareness to
eliciting support for collective action. Similar to my account of the religious leaders’ collective
attribution process, I highlight the framing mechanisms involved in the way women attributed
threat to the war and opportunity to their participation in ending it nonviolently. I reconstruct the
mobilization process to show how women campaigned for an end to war. Similar to the religious
leaders’ campaigns, I focus on the key mechanisms of mobilization. I show that women’s
organization diffused the shared story to elicit support. They appropriated social bases and
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created new vehicles to coordinate action at different sites (among women, the general public,
conflicting parties, and key international stakeholders). I conclude the chapter with a comparison
of the religious leaders’ and women’s campaigns to end the war and the outcomes.
6.1 Motivation to Collectively Act for an End to War through Use of Dialogue
Like those of the religious leaders, women’s networks in the ten campaigns I examined
realized that the killings and brutal cycles of violence had to stop and a lasting peace was needed
for the recovery of livelihoods and moral values required for peaceful relationships. Certain
events I refer to as key moments provoked outrage among a few women and led to the need to do
something to end the war. For the Burundian women it was the government and political parties’
inability to stop the cycles of revenge and counterrevenge sparked by the 1993 assassination of
the newly elected President Ndadaye (Interview, July 2009). Liberian women opposed the July
1993 Cotonou agreement for giving armed factions greater control of the new transitional
government than civilians and for letting armed faction leaders assume their positions in the
administration before disarming and demobilizing their troops (Africa Women and Peace
Support Group 2004, 61–62). During the second Liberian war it was then-President Charles
Taylor’s refusal to prevent its escalation in Liberia and regionally to Sierra Leone and GuineaConakry.
Women peace activists in Sierra Leone were disappointed in the failure of the military
government, the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC), to end the war with the
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) despite promises it would do so, and the government’s
inability to protect citizens from RUF and “sobels” (Femmes Africa Solidarité [FAS] 1997, 22–
23). In North Somalia, the outbreak of clan fighting in Burco and Berbera (1992), soon after the
region declared independence from the rest of Somalia, angered women who expected a return to
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peace and reconstruction of the region (Bennett, Bexley, and Warnock 1996, 53–57). Similarly,
women in south Somali were angered by the escalation of clan fighting soon after peace accords
because it disrupted their activities in Mudug, Bosaso, Kismayo, and Mogadishu (Bryden and
Steiner 1998, 55–56, 58, 70).
I argue that these key moments and the outrage they provoked among individual women
and women’s organizations compelled a reconsideration of whether their efforts at ensuring
survival of the family and community made a difference with continued cycles of violence.
Along lines similar to that in the previous chapter, I reconstruct the process of collective
attribution as follows. A few women, outraged by the turns of events in the conflict, proposed the
need to address the root causes of the conflict. I suggest that they came up with an alternative
interpretation of the war as a moral and social threat to society and women’s participation in
ending it as an opportunity for them to be recognized as credible political players with the
capacity to make a difference through peaceful means (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001, 148).
They diffused this story during encounters and conversations with others so as to secure
women’s widespread participation. The women’s shared story of the war and its resolution
formed the basis of their demand that conflicting parties end the war peacefully through the use
of dialogue including formal negotiations.
6.2 Women Should Do Something to End this War—Women’s Shared Story
The process of collective attribution of threat and opportunity among the different peace
campaigns began with a few women who were concerned that their efforts to rebuild the lives
and livelihoods of families and communities seemed pointless with the frequent outbreaks of
war, and something more had to be done. They realized that women’s direct political action to
end the war would perhaps secure their humanitarian activities. This awareness began with
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encounters and conversations where women shared ideas for direct political action. Some of
these encounters and conversations involved individual women like Mary Brownell, Leymah
Gbowee, and Vaiba Kebeh Flomo (from Liberia), who shared their ideas with a few other
women. Other encounters and conversations involved a much larger group like women in
Burundi and those from different regions in Somalia (Somaliland, Mogadishu, Mudug, Boosaso,
Kismayo, and Puntland), or took place at previously planned meetings like the Sierra Leone
women’s meeting to prepare for the 1995 women’s conference (Africa Women and Peace
Support Group 2004, 17; Bryden and Steiner 1998, 55–56; Burke, Klot, and Bunting 2001, 2;
Gardner and el Bushra 2004, 143; Interview, July 2009; Jama 2010, 62–63; Jusu-Sheriff 2000,
46–47; Koenders 2010, 4, 29–33; Ndikumana 1995, 26–275).
The women activists attributed personal, social, and economic problems they experienced
to the wars they deemed “senseless.” The combatants’ humiliating and abusive behavior towards
women posed serious physical threats to women’s dignity. These included rape and other forms
of sexual violence, mutilation, and the indiscriminate killing of women, children, and the elderly
in complete disregard of codes of war. The Burundian women were particularly concerned about
the rapid spread of HIV/AIDS resulting from this. Social threats included the destruction of
families and communities, an increase in child- and women-headed households, mass
displacement, a breakdown of social order, and the militarization of society. According to
women in northern Somalia, the war turned previous relations within and among families,
friends, and neighbors into power struggles that caused great pain (Gardner and el Bushra 2004,
136–137, 162; Warsame 2002, 43). Liberian women activists saw the large number of weapons
in the hands of youth and their use by the latter to intimidate, harass, or kill as a threat to social
order (Africa Women and Peace Support Group 2004, 19). Among the economic threats women
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mentioned are the collapse of the economy and the disruption of trade and agricultural and
livestock production, leading to widespread hunger and famine.
These physical, social, and economic threats made it very difficult, if not impossible, for
women to provide for their families and the community. Their capacity to cope was exhausted.
Across the campaigns, women complained that they were tired of the war. Soon after war
escalated a second time in Liberia, women at a Women’s Peace Network rally said, “Liberian
women are fed up. We want immediate peace…We are tired, the women of Liberia say they are
tired. Women are sick of seeing our children dying” (Jarkloh 2003a). According to women in
Burao, Northern Somalia, “It [intra-clan fighting] serves no purpose” and “adds to the suffering”
(Gardner and el Bushra 2004, 143). They also claimed that “people wanted to rebuild lives.”
Women in South Somalia and also the Sudan expressed similar views. Aisha Haaji Elmi, Vice
Chair of the Civil Society Committee at the Mbagathi peace process, said that the message from
Somali women and children to Inter-Government Authority on Development (IGAD) member
states, the international community, and fellow Somalis is that “they [women and children] are
sick and tired of the ongoing conflict” (IGAD News 2002c).
Given the wars’ adverse impact on individual, social, and economic life, it is not
surprising that women across the five campaigns regarded collective action for an end to war
through peaceful means as an opportunity to do something about the unpleasant conditions of
women, children, and the society as a whole. Women in Burundi saw in collective action an
opportunity to do something about the violence in society sparked by the 1993 assassination of
the first democratically elected Hutu president. This meant facilitating peace and reconciliation.
For the Liberian women it was the opportunity to be advocates of the peace process who drew
attention to the plight of women and children and the welfare needs of all Liberians. Women
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activists in Sierra Leone saw the opportunity to be a pressure group for peace and key political
participants in the return of the country to civilian rule through multiparty elections. According
to Jusu-Sheriff (2000, 49), “Women believed that their hard work in the democratization process
would be rewarded by places at the negotiating table.” Somali women activists saw in collective
action the opportunity to be peace envoys, peace workers, and conciliators with the capacity to
diffuse clan tensions, pressure fighting clans to settle peacefully, and communicate their need for
a secure environment in which to carry out their humanitarian activities. They also saw the
campaigns for peace as an opportunity for women’s organizations to be a platform for women’s
contributions to reconciliation and reconstruction (Jama 2010, 63). Although specific political
circumstances influenced how women conceived of their agency in ending the war, in all the
campaigns, collective action to end the war presented an opportunity for women to be recognized
as credible political actors with the capacity to make a difference.
Women appropriated familiar cultural identities and used them for political action when
they collectively presented themselves as credible peace activists with the capacity to pressure
for an end to war. They appropriated and improvised pacifist roles deriving from sociocultural
identities of mother, caregiver, and nurturer, as well as the international discourse on the
advancement and empowerment of women in political participation to represent themselves as
credible peacemakers. Doing so required encouraging a shift in women’s definitions of their
political identities in terms of divisive political ideological, clan, ethnic, and religious identity
boundaries to a more inclusive identity that emphasized the unifying elements of sociocultural
identities, for instance dual group identity and kin ties (mother and sister), and the gender
empowerment discourse premised on women’s discrimination and marginalization (as citizens)
from political decision-making processes.
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Women in Sierra Leone, for example, conceived of themselves as natural peacemakers,
while Liberian women represented themselves as mothers and sisters (African Women and Peace
Support Group 2004, 8, 22; Interview, June 24 2009). In Burundi, women based their credibility
and capacity as peace activists on cultural views of mothers as family peacemakers and on the
dual clan/ethnic identity of women as wives (FAS 2001a, 28). They argued that as mothers they
often diffused tension and mediated disputes between siblings. As wives they could act as
brokers between two disputing groups (their husbands’ and their own group). The use of a
culturally assigned brokerage role in society for recognition as credible peace brokers is more
visible in accounts of the Somali women’s campaigns. Here, in the absence of a central
government and structure, the clan structures became the unit of governance and administration.
Within this clan structure, women’s dual kinship identity allowed them to act as brokers, opening
communication lines between their clan and that of their husbands, delivering messages, and
keeping communication open because culturally it is believed that women do not have a single
unquestionable loyalty to one clan. Their network of relations cuts across several clans, unlike
that of their male kin, whose network is limited to the father’s clan, with weak ties to other clans.
They coordinated action aimed at eliciting widespread support from women across clan, class,
and other divides through this network of interpersonal relations. The cultural role of interclan
broker (communication channel and envoy) is familiar to all women. Women peace activists thus
appropriated sociocultural views of women as peacemakers and improvised these sociocultural
identities to gain recognition as credible political actors in peacemaking.
Women peace activists also appropriated international policy discourse on women’s
advancement and empowerment to collectively conceive of themselves as peacemakers. The
discourse emerging from the United Nations International Women’s Decade and the series of
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events and conferences associated with it is particularly important. Participation in these
processes permitted the diffusion and emulation of thinking and performances of women
peacemakers from other countries. The question of women and peace in Africa was first
addressed at the 1993 Regional Conference on Women and Peace (Kampala, Uganda), which
produced the Kampala Action Plan on Women and Peace. This was followed by a series of
regional meetings and conferences convened by the United Nations Development Fund for
Women/African Women in Crisis Umbrella Program (UNIFEM/AFWIC), the United Nations
Economic Commission/African Centre for Women (UNECA/ACW), and the Organization of
African Unity, and by regional networks of African women NGOs. It seems like the most
influential conferences in shaping African women’s identity as peace agents and connecting this
identity to their political participation in democratization process was the 5th African Regional
Conference on Women in 1994 (Dakar, Senegal), which produced a common position on the
advancement of women (the 1994 African Platform for Action), and the 1995 UN Women’s
Conference (Beijing, China), where the African Women’s common position was presented.
In Sierra Leone, the question of women’s involvement in ending the war and its link to
discussions on women’s participation in democratization was first posed at a meeting convened
by different women’s organizations to prepare for the 1995 UN Women’s Conference in Beijing.
Also through the brokerage of the United States Information Center, women contacted
counterparts from other parts of the world and learned from what they were doing (Jusu-Sheriff
2000, 47). Women from Sierra Leone, Somalia, Burundi, and Liberia attended the 1994 Dakar
and the 1995 Beijing conferences. They met each other for the first time, shared experiences,
built contacts, and got new ideas on how to mobilize and work to end the war. For Zahra Ugas
Farah, the 1994 Dakar conference was a good opportunity to meet other African women in
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similar situations of war, share experiences, and access a regional network that facilitated her
attendance at the 1995 Women’s Conference in Beijing. She also discovered new ideas for
working with women to support peace (Dyck 2003, 13). Thus the series of regional events and
conferences convened by the United Nations and NGOs and the UN Women’s Conference in
Beijing were important sites of diffusion and emulation of ideas, learning, and peace
mobilization strategies for African women peace activists. They appropriated and improvised on
these ideas and practices to campaign for peace in their specific contexts.
The new thinking and policy debate on women’s participation in the peace process
emerged and developed in tandem with thinking and debates on how to resolve the violent
outcomes of the 1990s movements for democracy in sub-Saharan Africa. Women peace
activists’ understanding of their role in all peace processes evolved through their participation in
these two processes and their campaigns for an end to war. Although accounts of the campaigns
refer to the 1994 Dakar and 1995 Beijing conferences as significant in advancing their work for
peace, the use of women’s empowerment discourse to frame their self-definitions as
peacemakers was less explicit in this phase of their campaign. Perhaps this has to do with the
tensions arising from reconciling the cultural definitions of their political agency in matters to do
with security with those emerging from the international feminist discourses of the UN
policymaking processes. The reliance on international feminist discourse is more evident in the
second phase—women’s campaigns to participate in formal negotiations that gained prominence
from the late 1990s. I analyze this further in Chapter 7.
Accounts provide few details of how women peace activists elicited widespread support
for the shared story about the threats the war posed to women and their children and the political
opportunity for women to collectively end the fighting and violence. Nevertheless I piece these
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fragments of evidence to show that this was achieved through cognitive mobilization, creation of
emotional energy, and alliance formation. It also involved improvisation. Women learned what
to do next while on the job. They adjusted their interaction with conflicting parties, members of
the public, and international stakeholders according to the responses of these three groups. The
reconstruction of this collective attribution process I present here is retrospective and premised
on the idea of creative interaction (Tilly 2002, 211). Women peace activists convened and
facilitated meetings, workshops, consultations, and trainings on peace and reconciliation for
women. At these meetings they offered new interpretations of the war as a threat to women’s
dignity, the family, and society, the attribution of these threats to the dehumanizing behavior of
the combatants and actions women could take collectively to end the war. Discussions of these
new interpretations of war at meetings, such as the mass meeting Mary Brownell and a few
Liberian women convened to reach out to women, the day of reflection Burundi women peace
activists held to discuss women’s contribution to restoring peace, the Women’s Forum and the
Sierra Leone Women’s Peace Initiative, and the training in women and conflict transformation
conducted by the Women in Peace Building Network (WIPNET–Liberia) changed the way
women thought about the war and their role in ending it. They produced a shared story that
emphasized war’s specific impact on women and children and women’s central role in ending
this suffering.
Leymah Gbowee describes the content of the training she received from the West Africa
Network for Peace/Women in Peace Building Network (WIPNET) and that she in turn offered to
Liberian women through the Liberian chapter of the network (WIPNET–Liberia). Training
combined learning about nonviolence, building skills in communication, negotiation, and
mediation skills, understanding gender roles through use of participants’ experiences, and
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exercises that built self-confidence. A session she considers particularly powerful, and that
highlights the role of demobilizing and mobilizing emotions (Gamson 2011, 261), is one where
women shared their painful experience of being abused so as to “shed the weight of this
experience.” The training helped Leymah connect the process of facilitating emotional release to
political action by overcoming the debilitating emotional pain to access the strength required for
action. According to her:
You cannot negotiate lasting peace without bringing women into the effort, but women
can’t become peace makers without releasing the pain that keeps them from feeling their
own strength. Emotional release isn’t enough in itself to create change, but WIPNET
channeled that new energy into political action. This was a way to do it all. (Gbowee
2011, 114, 117–118)
She used her trauma healing experience as a social worker to help women overcome
demobilizing emotions resulting from their trauma. The WIPNET training allowed her to
connect a gendered analysis of war to this experience. This gave her insights into how to
mobilize women traumatized by the war by helping them overcome debilitating emotions and
recover the strength and self-confidence required for political action.
While this training is not exactly representative of what happened in meetings across the
women’s campaigns I examined, it sheds some light on the cognitive and emotional mechanisms
of eliciting women’s participation in the campaign to end war and the importance of strategic
action. Mobilization involved appealing to the injustices women experienced, expression of
demobilizing emotions (despair, hopelessness, shame, and lack of confidence), building their
self-confidence and sense of dignity, and tapping into their moral outrage to mobilize for
political action. A group of women from this training, eager to act on what they had learned,
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proposed a Peace Outreach Program and became WIPNET–Liberia’s core organizers. They went
out to ordinary Liberian women, disseminating their shared story and eliciting their participation
in the campaign to end the second Liberian war. Over several weeks, they built a strong
grassroots base for the women’s mass action campaign.
The women’s meetings brought together women from diverse backgrounds. They led to
formation of alliances across ethnic and religious divides, development of a common vision, and
creation of new vehicles for collective action. The Christian Women’s Peace Initiative and the
Muslim Women for Peace together launched the WIPNET–Liberia mass action campaign. Sierra
Leone Christian and Muslim women came together to demonstrate for peace. Women in Burundi
from across ethnic and political divides formed the Women for Peace and later the Collectif des
Assocations Féminines et ONG du Burundi (CAFOB) organizations, whose aim was to promote
peace and reconciliation at the local level. Somali women from different clans worked together
to stop the clan fighting in different autonomous regions.
Eliciting widespread support of women for the campaign for peace was a difficult
process. Many women felt that matters to do with war were a male preserve and feared direct
political action. For instance, in Burundi women feared being seen as opposing their husbands.
Some thought it better to prevent conflict from within the family sphere (FAS 2001a, 28, 32).
This example shows that not all women enthusiastically embraced the story of war as an injustice
to women and the idea of women as peace brokers. This story and engaging political actors
directly were quite new for some of the women. Jusu-Sheriff, a peace activist, notes in her
account of the Sierra Leone women’s peace movement, that “many of the women’s groups were
not comfortable in the spotlight” (2000, 49).
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A second difficultly had to do with religious, ethnic, generation, and political divisions.
Christian women in Liberia objected to joint action with Muslim women. They felt that praying
with Muslims would dilute their faith and blamed the Muslims for prolonging the war because
members of the new rebel group that had just launched attacks against President Charles Taylor’s
government, the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), were mostly
Muslims (Gbowee 2011, 128; Koenders 2010, 34–36). Burundian women peace activists
confronted political and ethnic divisions among some of the women in order to forge a common
front. Similarly in Sierra Leone and Liberia women activists faced competition from those who
held strongly to positions of their party, armed groups, or ethnic communities. The Liberian
women’s peace campaign shows evidence of generational/class tensions between some members
of the older Liberian Women’s Initiative and the younger WIPNET–Liberian mass movement
(Gbowee 2011, 156). Nevertheless, the formation of new vehicles to launch and coordinate
campaigns and joint action with other civic groups in society suggests that women tried to put
aside their unresolved differences and pursue the common goal of ending war.
6.3 Women’s Campaign for Peace—Social Appropriation, Creation of New Vehicles
Women activists appropriated existing organizations or created new campaign vehicles to
coordinate campaigns targeting the public, conflicting parties, and international actors. Women
in Liberia mobilized from within the churches and the mosque before creating new vehicles. In
the first Liberian civil war, the Liberia Women’s Initiative was created to lead the women’s
campaign for peace and disarmament. It was part of the broader campaign for disarmament that
the Inter-Faith Mediation Committee launched. During the second Liberian war, the Christian
Women’s Initiative used the Lutheran church and the Muslim Women for Peace used the
mosques as bases for coordinating prayers for peace before the formation of a new vehicle, the
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Women in Peace Building Network (WIPNET)–Liberia, to coordinate the outreach program and
mass action for peace. Members of the Liberian Women’s Initiative joined with women from
Sierra Leone and Guinea-Conakry to form the Mano River Women’s Peace Network
(MARWOPNET) to coordinate campaigns for peace at the regional level.
The Women’s Forum in Sierra Leone served as the organizational base for the Women’s
Movement for Peace in Sierra Leone and later the Sierra Leone chapter of the international NGO
Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom. Burundi women peace activists created
new vehicles, the Women for Peace and CAFOB, an umbrella organization that linked member
organizations with international allies in addition to coordinating activities of member
associations aimed at ending the fighting and the economic sanctions that had a debilitating
effect on the lives of ordinary Burundians, especially women and children. In Somalia, women’s
organizations providing humanitarian social services were the organizational base for the peace
campaigns. Accounts of Somali women’s campaigns mention a variety of organizations
mobilizing for peace in the autonomous northern region (e.g., Somaliland Women’s
Development Association) and South Somalia (e.g., IIDA,4 Coalition of Grassroots Women, and
Save Somali Women and Children). Most accounts describe women from different clans coming
together, sometimes under the umbrella of an organization, to call for an end to clan fighting.
Overall, the CAFOB, the WIPNET–Liberia, and Somaliland women’s organizations
acted autonomously, unlike the Sierra Leone Women’s Peace Movement, which was under the
umbrella of a national women’s movement. The women also allied with other groups in society.
The Sierra Leone Women’s Peace Movement participated in the broader civic movement for
democracy. Women’s organizations in South Somalia (especially Mogadishu) allied with other
4

Women’s Development Organization.
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civic groups to demand an end to war. The Liberian Women’s Initiative, for instance, was part of
the civic campaign for disarmament led by the Inter-Faith Mediation Committee (IFMC). They
also participated in the All Liberian National Council meetings to find ways out of the political
crisis. The WIPNET–Liberia mass action campaign received the support of the religious leaders
who came to the sit-in venue. Women’s groups in Mogadishu organized under the Coalition for
Grassroots Women’s Organization (COGWO) also mobilized other civic groups under another
umbrella organization, the Peace and Human Rights Network (PHRN) to coordinate
peacemaking activities (United Nations Security Council 2000; Saferworld 2008). Somali
women also built alliances with clan elders, moderate Islamists, and members of the business
community sympathetic to their cause.
Through the religious and civic organization bases they appropriated, the new vehicles
they created, and alliances with other civic and political actors in society, women launched peace
campaigns that diffused a shared story about the war, calling on the public, conflicting parties,
and international actors to think and respond differently to the war. They offered an alternative
interpretation of the violent conflict as a threat to social peace, especially to the lives and
livelihoods of ordinary people, safety and dignity of women and children, and peaceful relations
between different groups. They called for peaceful dialogue, a return to democratic civilian rule
through free and fair elections, and peace and reconciliation in society as alternative ways of
settling political conflict instead of violence and the pursuit of military victory. Where formal
negotiations failed to end the war, like in Liberia, women attributed this to the failure of the
mediating agents and international community to secure a ceasefire agreement from conflicting
parties and ensure that they disarmed and demobilized troops before installing a transitional
government. Through a variety of performances and mechanisms of mobilization, they
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persuaded the public, conflicting parties, and international actors that peaceful resolution of war
through dialogue was an opportunity for all to be agents of peace instead of agents of war.
Evidence shows that women peace activists deployed emotional energy creating activities
that enabled the collective action of other women and solidarity building based on their new
understanding of war’s injustice to them and their children and that was aimed at changing
thinking and behavior of conflicting parties and other political leaders. Public demonstrations in
Burundi, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Somalia tapped into women’s outrage, frustration, and
despair at combatants’ refusal to end the war. In the four campaigns examined, women sang
songs, carried placards, and chanted slogans calling for peace during the peace protests. Women
who participated in the WIPNET–Liberia mass action dressed in white T-shirts as an expression
of solidarity while in Somaliland, women tied white headscarves to symbolize their sorrow.
These cultural symbols were visual expressions of solidarity with the cause of peace and of
sorrow, grief, and anger (Gardner and el Bushra 2004, 143; Gbowee 2011, 136; Associated
Press, 2003).
News reports of public demonstrations in Burundi, Sierra Leonean, and South Somali
campaigns were sporadic yet show evidence of nonviolent protests. For instance, reports of the
Burundi women peace activities mention a demonstration for the restoration of peace in
December 1993 (Ndikumana 1995) and another in 1995 (Radio France Internationale [Paris], 9
December 1995). A number of news agencies report that Sierra Leone Women’s Peace
Movement staged demonstrations between February 1995 and April 1996 (Agence France Presse
15 February 1995; Gberie 1996; Hecht 1996). A United Press International news wire reports
that mainly women and children demonstrated against war in Mogadishu and other regions in
South Somalia (1 April 2004). The sporadic reporting by international media yields evidence that
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is not detailed enough to establish the frequency of public demonstrations. However, I infer from
the prevailing violent conditions that in Burundi and South Somalia staging public
demonstrations may have placed women in grave danger because of the highly tense political
atmosphere, outbreak of violence, and threat of intimidation by incumbent government forces,
opposing armed forces, and youth militia. The violent interactions between extremists from both
sides of the conflict in Bujumbura (Burundi) dominated the political crisis between 1993 and
December 1995 and so closed opportunities for staging public demonstrations without threat of
attack. In South Somalia, civil society organizations and their members lived in fear of attack
from armed factions who interpreted their activities as politically threatening. In 1992, troops
loyal to one United Somali Congress faction opened fire on a peace demonstration in
Mogadishu, staged by Somali youth organized as United Somali Salvation Youth (Human Rights
Watch 1993). In Mudug, women demonstrated publicly in 1994 to protest a likely outbreak of
fighting after a peace accord was threatened when one of the main signatories, the SSDF, split
into two rival wings. However, the 1993 Mudug accord lasted until 1997, when tensions between
factions surfaced and threatened the peace (Bryden and Steiner 1998, 56). The rapidly shifting
structure of opportunity, especially the swing between highly tense and cordial relations with the
armed groups, made regular staging of demonstrations difficult and dangerous. The war’s
fragmentation of society geographically confined most public demonstrations to the city and
constrained their diffusion nationwide. In Chapter 4, I examined these constraints as part of the
political opportunity structure that limited the possible expansion of campaigns.
Yet, in Somaliland and Liberia (second civil war), women staged public demonstrations
protesting an escalation in fighting after ceasefire agreements that continued until the conflicting
parties negotiated an end to the war and a return to peace. Here women combined demonstrations
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with the use of more confrontational performances such as venue occupation and sit-ins,
especially when previous performances were ignored and failed to get the fighting groups to
settle peacefully. For example, women peace activists in Somaliland refused to leave the
presidency and parliamentary building after presenting their declaration to end war to the
National Council of Elders. They remained until a reconciliation committee was formed to
develop a final peace proposal. When this committee failed to act immediately the women
organized a demonstration and threatened to force the doors of the meeting hall open and stone
the members of the reconciliation committee if they did not agree on a date and pace for the
reconciliation meeting (Gardner and el Bushra 2004, p146-147).
The women’s mass action campaign organized by the WIPNET–Liberia bypassed
President Taylor’s ban on street marches by resorting to the performances of assembling,
occupation of important public places, and sit-ins (Associated Press [Monrovia], 11 April 2003,
Jarkloh 2003a, 2003b; The News (Nigeria), 29 May 2003; Paye-Layleh, 2003). They coordinated
these activities through use of private independent media. For the first assembly action, the
women broadcast a public announcement through the Catholic Radio Veritas calling on residents
to assemble on the steps of the Monrovia City Hall, early in the morning and to wear white.
Hundreds of women, some religious leaders, Taylor’s soldiers and supporters, and local media
turned up. The women assembled gave President Taylor three days to respond to their demands
to negotiate an end to the war. They staged a sit-in at a field near the fish market and along
Tubman Boulevard, where the president passed daily on his way to and from Capital Hill. On his
way to work, women protesters walked to the road and faced the presidential convoy at the risk
of being shot. When Taylor did not respond to their demands within the three days they gave
him, the women assembled outside Parliament. They returned to the field when he did not
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acknowledge them and issued a second ultimatum to respond to their demands in three days.
After the three days, the women occupied the Parliament parking lot blocking anyone entering or
exiting until the Speaker came out to talk to them. They gave the president a third ultimatum and
returned to the field, after which the president agreed to meet with them (Gbowee 2011, 137–
139). The WIPNET–Liberia campaign went even further with dramatic performances such as the
women’s sex strike to send a strong message to the public that they were serious about ending
the war (Gbowee 2011, 147; O’Reilly 2011; Reticker 2008).
Women appropriated and improvised traditional, Islamic, and Christian religious
practices of prayers, vigils, songs, traditional poetry, and personal testimonies, using them to
express their suffering from the war and to communicate their desire for peace. The improvised
appropriation of these practices also deployed emotional energy that built solidarity, elicited
support of potential participants from the public, and also aimed at changing the thinking and
behavior of political leaders and armed groups about the war. Although some of these practices,
especially songs and prayers, were performed during public demonstrations, evidence of the
Liberian, Sierra Leonean, and Somali women’s campaigns for peace show that they were held as
stand alone performances. Christian and Muslim women in Sierra Leone and Liberia held joint
prayers. Liberian women held prayers services, prayer chains, fasting, and praying during the
first civil war (Caesar 1994, 6). The strong reliance on prayer continued during the second
Liberian civil war, as illustrated by the Christian and Muslim women who met three times a
week for several months at a Lutheran church. These prayers preceded and continued throughout
the Outreach Program and mass action phases of the WIPNET–Liberia campaign. In northern
Somalia (Somaliland), young men participated in the Allabiri (traditional Islamic prayer) recitals
women held to express their desire for peace. The use of prayers shows the great value women
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had for appropriating and improvising on religious practices and beliefs to compel changes in
thinking and action on women participants in collective action, elicit support of the public to the
women’s cause, and express their desperate need for an end to the fighting.
The Somali women also appropriated and improvised the Buraanbuur, a long and wellknown tradition of using poetry as a medium of social criticism to express their suffering, pain,
and grief from wars that did not make any sense. The Buraanbuur performances deployed these
emotions to compel a change in the thinking and behavior of the public, clan militia, and clan
elders. Warsame states that the poems women composed were “intended to raise the
consciousness of the masses” (Warsame 2002, 44). One account shows how the emotive power
of the Buraanbuur moved the armed militia to stop fighting. The wailing and crying poems
women sang as they ran between two fighting clans made the men throw down their weapons
(Gardner and el Bushra 2004, 144). Also, during the WIPNET–Liberia campaign, the emotional
public personal testimonies women told of how they were affected by war provoked public
sympathy and support for their cause.
Women peace activists in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Somaliland often read petitions,
statements, communiqués, and declarations presenting women’s positions, especially the war’s
adverse effects on women and children and the need for peace at the end of a protest march,
published them in the local papers, or had them broadcast by radio and television. These
communicated women’s analysis of the war, their position, and demands for peace in the form of
proposals. Together with the public demonstrations and other performances, these aimed to
communicate an alternative understanding of war and its resolution to that of the conflicting
parties. Women activists in Somaliland petitioned the new government to end the clan fighting
(Bradbury 1994, 72). During the first Liberian war, the Liberian Women Initiative presented
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petitions and position papers to the representatives of the United Nations, Organization of
African Unity, Economic Community of West African States. They also picketed outside the US
Embassy, government offices, faction headquarters, UN offices, and embassies of the ECOWAS
countries. During the second Liberian war, WIPNET–Liberia presented their position statement
to the International Contact Group of Liberia. When armed groups refused to adhere to the
negotiated agreement, the Liberian women in particular demanded international intervention to
enforce peace and save the population from further suffering. The Liberian Women’s Initiative
called for the deployment of African peacekeeping troops throughout Liberia and international
enforcement of the 1992 UN arms embargo on the country (Xinhua News Agency 18 May
1995). During the second war, representatives of women’s groups in Liberia (Coalition of
Women in Political Parties, Women in Peace Building Network–Liberia, and Mano River
Women’s Peace Network) called for an immediate deployment of a UN or US peacekeeping
force to monitor the ceasefire, disarm and demobilize combatants, facilitate safe passage of
people trapped between fighting lines, and allow for the distribution of relief aid (Associated
Press 2003, The News [Nigeria] 2003; GBC Radio 1, 2003).
In all the campaigns women used media to coordinate action among members of the
public. They used radio and television to broadcast messages of peace and reconciliation
throughout the country (Anderlini 2007, 34; Dini 2009, 35). This mediated diffusion of their
shared story of peace and demand for an end to war allowed women to provoke public debate on
their alternative solution to peace and reconciliation. Also, women worked with selected groups
in society, specifically women affected by violence and male youths, to change attitudes toward
the war and social relations in society. Women’s interactions with these two groups show they
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experimented with promoting new identities and institutions through modeling the idea of people
as peace agents.
Meetings with women from both sides of the conflict divide were aimed at raising
women’s consciousness about the war and its adverse impact on women, the importance of
peace, women’s agency in stopping the war, and bringing about peace. These meetings were also
aimed at reducing tension in the community by helping women victims develop community
projects that allowed them to cope with difficult conditions. These projects focused on providing
humanitarian assistance, vocational training, income generation, and trauma healing. They
promoted peace by helping women find ways of working together on common issues.
Women activists’ attempts at demobilizing, disarming, and reintegrating teenage boys
active in the different militia or armed groups show they experimented with promoting new
identities and institutions by offering teenage boys the opportunity to be agents of peace and
security and by encouraging them into peaceful occupations. Burundi women talked to the youth
in Bujumbura to dissuade them from engaging in armed militia. Somali women in Mogadishu
mobilized funds from local businessmen and used these to convince teenage boys serving in
militia to hand over their guns and attend school. They later mobilized the boys to be security
guards in parts of the capital so as to keep it safe. Liberian women used radio to appeal to
combatants to disarm and return home after the 1994 Agreements that formed the Liberian
Transitional National Government. They also launched programs to purchase guns from
combatants, rehabilitation of female combatants, and vocational training (Anderlini 2007, 34;
Caesar 1996, 6; Dyck 2003, 11; Interview July 2009; Menkhaus 1998, 223).
The coordination of action at sites beyond the initial site of contention varied
geographically in the campaigns. The Burundi women’s mostly reconciliation and humanitarian
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assistance activities were carried out in displaced camps across the country. The Sierra Leone
women’s campaign was largely confined in Freetown, the capital city, due to the increasing
insecurity in the countryside forcing people to flee to the city. The Liberia Women’s Initiative
campaign was also limited to the capital city of Monrovia because of high insecurity. However,
during the second Liberian war, the WIPNET–Liberia mass action coordinated sit-ins at nine
counties. In Somalia, the women’s campaign remained fragmented. Coordination of activities did
not extend beyond the autonomous regions, cities, or towns where activities took place.
Among the women’s campaigns examined, the Liberian women’s campaign to end war is
the only one that coordinated direct action at the subregional level. During the second Liberian
war, the Liberian Women’s Initiative joined together with women peace activists in Sierra Leone
and Guinea-Conakry to form the Mano River Women’s Peace Network (MARWOPNET). This
was possible with the brokerage of Femmes Africa Solidarité (FAS). They relied on
interpersonal networks of Guinean and Sierra Leonean members of the network to get audience
with Presidents of Guinea-Conakry and Sierra Leone and present their case for a peaceful
resolution to the conflict. They also met with President Taylor and persuaded him to work with
the presidents of Sierra Leone and Guinea-Conakry to end war in the region. Once President
Charles Taylor and the LURD agreed to talks in April 2003, some of the women initiators of the
WIPNET–Liberia mass action campaign traveled to Freetown (Sierra Leone), where the Liberian
Council of Churches was meeting with leaders of the LURD movement to resolve the issue of an
appropriate negotiating venue. The WIPNET–Liberian activists mobilized women from a
Liberian refugee camp to picket at the meeting and call on the LURD leaders to go to Ghana for
talks. They traveled to Accra (Ghana) ahead of the scheduled talks between President Taylor and
the LURD to mobilize women refugees there. WIPNET members from northern Ghana joined
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their sit-in and picketed at the negotiation’s venue. When the talks dragged on and fighting
escalated in Monrovia, the women sat outside the entrance to the meeting room where
negotiations were taking place and refused to leave until the parties agreed to settle. The women
even threatened to strip naked, a traditional practice women in several African societies use to
communicate complete outrage, when security officers attempted to remove them from the hall.
It took the intervention of the mediator, General Abubakar, to stop the two women leaders from
stripping and together find a way out. While the threat did not deliver immediate results, it
marked a turning point in the negotiation process. The women’s action generated a lot of local,
regional, and international attention and sent a message to the conflicting parties that they could
not ignore the women’s demands. President Taylor resigned and went into exile, the talks
resumed, the LURD and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) ended their siege of
Monrovia, and a peace agreement was signed a month after the women’s threat (Chanda 2003;
Dalieh and Fahngon 2003; Deutsche Presse-Agentur 2003; GBC Radio 1, 2003; Gbowee 2011,
143, 161–62; Koenders 2010, 40–42).
6.4 Conclusion
In Chapters 5 and 6 I sought to account for why and how religious leaders and women’s
networks mobilized for an end to war in politically risky conditions of violent political
transitions. I suggested that they mobilize collectively for an end to war when they interpreted
certain transformative events in society caused by the war as a threat to their interests and those
of society. I proposed a sketch of the process of attribution based on evidence from accounts
written by religious leaders and women involved, organizations supporting them, position
statements, pastoral letters, and news reports. Regarding how the religious leaders and women’s
networks mobilized for an end to war, I initially argued that they did so by diffusing the shared
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story to conflicting parties and the public with the aim of changing the thinking and behavior of
these two groups toward war. They diffused their alternative theory of the war in nonviolent
ways. I showed this through a reconstruction of the mobilization process highlighting the key
mechanisms of mobilization.
Across the ten campaigns, evidence shows that religious leaders and women’s networks
mobilized for an end to war for three reasons. First, they saw in the adverse conditions of war an
opportunity to do something to end it. Specifically, civilian outrage at atrocious acts committed
by combatants and political elite disregard for the electoral process and for the suffering and
trauma caused by war provided the occasion for a few individuals, religious clerics and women
leaders, to do something to end the violence once and for all. Although unprecedented violent
events served as the occasion to do something about the war, compared to the religious leaders’
efforts, the women’s campaigns are concerned with the gendered and generational nature of the
violence. Specifically, women were concerned about the combatants’ deliberate targeting of
women as part of their war strategy, the plight of children and youths and the cycles of revenge
and counter revenge that destroyed family and community relationships. Mass rape, sexual
abuse, and other forms of violence against women reveal a breach of customary norms of war
and that women lacked protection in the private (family) and public sphere. Also, women were
disturbed by the plight of children (dying) and the recruitment of large numbers of youth into the
war.
Second, they perceived the war as a threat to society and the humanitarian assistance they
provided at the time as a temporary and not permanent relief to war’s impact on the populations
they assisted. Also, the war made it increasingly difficult for the religious leaders and women to
carry out their social and humanitarian roles. The religious leaders and women’s networks saw
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war as a threat to human dignity, social, moral, and economic wellbeing of the people and a
threat to the humanitarian relief they provided the population. However, the women emphasized
the threat war posed to their dignity as women, to the survival of their children, and to their
family and community relationships. The women’s interpretations thus highlighted the suffering
war caused at the personal and family level. The spiritual and material support religious leaders
provided affected populations, and the women’s care of the sick and the elderly, in addition to
providing for the family, all seemed incapable of addressing the consequences of the
unprecedented violence. This compelled them to do something more about the deteriorating
social conditions, something more relevant and lasting than the humanitarian responses they
undertook.
Third, doing something more, that is, acting to end the war peacefully, gave the religious
leaders and women’s networks the opportunity to be credible agents of peace and to contribute to
the transformation of the value basis of political relations (changing thinking and behavior). The
religious leaders framed their peace agent role in terms of the biblical models of the reconciler
and prophet. The women, on the other hand, drew on international feminist discourse on equality
of women and on cultural conceptions of mothers and wives as social peacemakers and clan
envoys/connectors. As peace agents both actors sought to change thinking and behavior of
conflicting parties and the population by developing relationships that facilitated dialogue as a
means to settle war. The women went further and saw in this an opportunity to gain political
recognition in the democratization process.
In answer to how religious leaders and women mobilized to end war, evidence shows
they did so by diffusing an alternative understanding of the war aimed at changing thinking and
behavior of conflicting parties, congregants, and the population. Diffusion occurred mainly
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through encounters and conversations, brokerage, the media, activation of new identities and
institutions, and scale shift. Brokerage was the most recurrent of diffusion mechanisms in all ten
campaigns. Campaign initiators combined brokerage with personal networks of relations to
disseminate their alternative understandings of war and its resolution to conflicting parties,
influential members of society, and influential international actors. They also broadcast the new
story of war and peace mainly through radio and print media.
The diffusion of the shared story through encounters and conversations was more
common within social bases as the religious leaders and women who were campaign initiators
promoted the alternative theory so as to gain support of members. Although the spread and
adoption of the shared story may have been confined within churches, women movements, and
spaces created by both groups, these spaces were open, also, to individuals and groups other than
just congregants or women members. For instance, young men participated in the prayer recitals
and vigils organized by women in Somaliland, and members of the public and religious leaders
expressed solidarity with the Liberian women’s campaigns. Similarly, much as the activation of
new identities and institutions among specific social groups (i.e., women, youth, and
congregants) indicates that the diffusion of the message was confined to these groups, the South
Sudan local peace campaigns in Wunlit and Liir shows that other groups such as traditional
religious and political leaders participated. In my view, the activation of new identities and
institutions reveals an attempt by peace activists to promote models of new thinking and
behavior required of peace agents.
Evidence shows the relative absence of scale shift from the national level to local levels
nationwide because of the structure of war and violence, especially its geographical constraints
on space and places and demographic upheavals, pushing large numbers of population outside
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and within the country. The diffusion of the shared story remained localized in the capital city or
main towns. However, transnational diffusion of the story occurred through brokerage of
campaign initiators, in particular their encounters and conversations with influential international
actors whose support they wanted. The women’s campaigns included encounters and
conversations with women in refugee camps in neighboring countries.
My arguments on why and how religious leaders and women’s groups mobilized to end
war are based on evidence that varies in terms of detail and event focus across campaigns.
Nevertheless, the cases show that civic groups will mobilize when there are individuals who
choose to do something about the suffering caused by the war, when the benefits of addressing
the root causes of suffering seem more promising than those derived from addressing the
symptoms and when the cost of taking action to address the root causes is no more than the cost
of inaction. Campaign initiators will mobilize the support of others by proposing and
disseminating an alternative understanding of the war and its resolution based on a common
experience of war as suffering and of peace as possible through the agency of all (conflicting
parties and the public). The cases show that disseminating this understanding across lines of
divisions in society depended a great deal on the brokerage of campaign initiators and
supporters, creative appropriation and improvisation of cultural resources common to all social
groups, and the use of the media. Although the campaigns did not yield peace directly, a major
outcome is that they opened public debate on a political issue that governments considered their
responsibility and that ordinary citizens avoided because of the political risks involved.
The findings show that instead of merely protesting or criticizing the conflicting parties,
campaign leaders and supporters offered a solution that expanded on who was responsible for a
peaceful resolution to the war. Although the solution emphasized the responsibility of conflicting
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parties, the idea of peace agent was extended to the broader society. In other words, conflicting
parties may be the primary agents in promoting peace, but they are not the only actors. Citizens
were just as responsible and capable of being agents of peace instead of promoters and pawns of
war. This raises the question of what kind of power the religious leaders and women brought to
bear in a political arena dominated by actors with military and economic power and keen to
protect their control of this power.

124

Chapter 7. MOBILIZATION TO PARTICIPATE IN NEGOTIATIONS
Much as the women and religious leaders’ campaigns endorsed the use of dialogue to
peacefully settle the conflict, peace activists soon became disillusioned by the conflicting parties’
inability to secure a lasting peace through formal negotiations. For some of the actors this led to
a new phase in their mobilization for peace in which they engaged directly with the formal talks
as participants. Why and how they did this is the focus of this chapter. Evidence from accounts
of the religious leaders and women’s campaigns shows that while religious leaders’ and
women’s motivations for engaging directly with the formal negotiation are similar, they differ in
how they become participants. With the exception of Angola where the government rejected the
religious leaders’ demand for dialogue, religious leaders’ communication, and peace brokerage
opened the way for their participation in negotiations to end war in Mozambique, Liberia, Sierra
Leone, and Sudan. The women’s direct engagement came by way of collective action that
pressured mediating agents, key regional and international stakeholders and international allies to
include them as official participants. Thus women were uninvited guests at the negotiating table
unlike the religious leaders.
Along the same lines of analysis in Chapters 5 and 6, I begin by examining why women
mobilized to participate in formal negotiations. I use evidence from accounts of the women’s
peace campaigns in Burundi, Liberia, Somalia, Sudan, and South Sudan to identify the key
moments that make the women consider participating in formal negotiations. These moments are
related to developments in the formal negotiation processes and an emerging international
discourse on women and peace building during the 1990s. I show how they interpreted these key
moments as threats and opportunities, developed a shared story of the need for their participation
in formal negotiations and diffused this story to elicit support for their participation in the
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negotiations. I argue that women demanded participation in formal negotiations because a) they
wanted a peace agreement that reflected the needs of the suffering population, b) they wanted to
ensure conflicting parties committed to ending the war. In some instances, women seem to
promote the agenda of conflicting parties they affiliate with.
In the second part of the chapter, I analyze how women mobilized to participate in the
formal negotiations and the outcomes of their mobilization. I outline the process of mobilization
based on the argument that women up-scaled their coordination of action to the regional and
international arena to gain entry into formal negotiations. At these levels, women interacted with
mediating agents, regional and international actors, at negotiation venues in neighboring
countries. To ensure an inclusive negotiation, they coordinated activities between the negotiation
venue and in country by reporting back to women’s network members, other women mobilized
for peace at local levels and general public.
My analysis shifts to the religious leaders’ engagement with the formal negotiations to
end war in Mozambique, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Sudan. I leave out the Angolan religious
leaders because they did not participate in formal negotiations and the government rejected their
attempts to broker communication between it and UNITA leaders. Since my aim is to show the
difference between the two groups’ engagement with the negotiations, I end with a comparison
of the women’s and religious leader’s direct engagement of the formal negotiation in terms of
how they came to directly participate in formal negotiations.
7.1 Women’s Mobilization to Participate in Formal Negotiations
7.1.1 Motivation for Collective Action. The motivation to campaign for participation in
negotiations stems from a number of developments related to the formal negotiations and the
emergence of an international discourse on women and peace building. In their campaigns to end
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war, women pressured conflicting parties to negotiate an end to the war. However, the twelve
peace agreements and ceasefires by Somali fighting factions (1991-1999), the 1995 powersharing agreement and 1996 Mwanza peace talks involving Burundian political parties, the
formation of a Reconciliation Committee to end clan fighting in northern Somalia, the numerous
mediations and the ceasefires and agreements to end war by Liberian fighting factions between
1989 and 1994 did not end the fighting. This created the impression in society including women
peace activists that conflicting parties did not take the matter of ending war as seriously. This
awareness may have led to women peace activists to reconsider whether the nature of their
engagement with formal negotiations needed to change in order to achieve their demands for
peace. The negotiations had failed to remove the threats that war posed to society and to women
in particular.
The women interpreted the conflicting parties’ lack of concern for their interests and
those of the wider population as a threat to lasting peace. My examination of claims women
made shows three main threats women attributed to the failure of formal negotiations to secure a
lasting peace. These are the intransigent positions of the conflicting parties, the dominance of
armed and mostly male participants concerned with their own interests and the lack of
mechanisms to enforce the disarmament and demobilization of armed groups before establishing
new governments. The conflicting parties’ intransigent position of parties was a major source of
frustration not only for women peace activists but also religious leaders and the wider society.
Women in Burundi blamed the negotiating parties refusal to focus on common problems on this
is attitude. It is also evident in the Reconciliation Committee’s tardiness in convening peace talks
in Somaliland, the South Sudanese factions’ refusal to negotiate peace with each other and
militia affiliated with the Government of Khartoum, the failure of the Somali warlords to secure
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a peace agreement and the numerous breaches of ceasefires and agreements by the Liberian
armed factions. The delays and breaches turned formal negotiations into a long drawn out
process that stretched the people’s patience. This was most evident in Liberia where the
breakdown of the Accra negotiations (January 12, 1995) between conflicting parties in the first
Liberian civil war provoked mass protests in the capital city Monrovia (Mcall 1995). Angry
residents sealed off the airport and almost lynched armed faction leaders returning to the country
from the negotiations (Agence France Presse 1995). During the Accra negotiations (July 2003)
between Taylor and the LURD armed group, the Deutsche Presse-Agentur reported that twenty
women members of the Women in Peace Building Network–Liberia chapter:
laid seige to a room where their compatriots were trying to fine tune a comprehensive
peace plan' to end the war. Women sat outside room and blocked negotiators from
coming out of the room. Only the mediator Gen Abubakar would be allowed out.
Coordinator Leymah Gbowee threatened to strip naked to protest the effects of the war on
them (22 July 2003).
Women in northern Somalia (Somaliland) threatened to force open the meeting hall doors
and pelt members of a Reconciliation Committee of government representatives and members of
two fighting clans if they did not agree on a meeting date for talks on a final peace proposal.
They demanded that the Reconciliation Committee agree on a date and place of meeting and
carry out its activities immediately (Gardner and el Bushra 2004, 147).
The Somaliland women’s realization that the exclusively male participation in the
negotiations cast doubt on whether women’s specific concerns would be given serious attention
in the deliberations and spurred their intention to participate in the talks. This awareness of male
delegates’ tendency to neglecting or ignoring women’s concerns also underlies the Liberian
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Women’s Initiative’s insistence on presenting their perspective and position on the war to the
ECOWAS Heads of State Summit in 1995, the Burundian women’s lobbying President Yoweri
Museveni and Mwalimu Nyerere for room to present their views, and the lobbying by South
Somali women for official status in the Djibouti and Kenyan negotiations so as to voice women’s
concerns (Xinhua News Agency, 18 May 1995; Africa Women and Peace Support Group 2004,
26-27; Burke, Klot and Bunting 2001, 7-9; Tongeren et al. 2005, 118-119).
The continued presence of armed groups in society with a history of indiscipline, sexual
abuse and violence directed at women children and elderly by armed groups did not guarantee
the safety of women and other vulnerable groups in society especially when no other recourse to
justice at the local and national levels existed since courts, police and traditional mechanisms
were ineffective, weak or destroyed during the war. The Liberian women’s demand to participate
in the negotiations, for example, stems from the absence of a strong mechanism for disarming,
demobilizing and reintegrating combatants in the post-agreement phase of the peace processes.
Women wanted to focus attention on the urgent need to protect them and the children (Africa
Women and Peace Support Group 2004, 19). In Chapter 6, I showed how women elicited public
support by calling on groups in society to be agents of peace and also created new local
institutions aimed at promoting this new identity. I showed how women in Liberia, Somaliland,
and Burundi appealed to young men to be agents of peace by creating new institutions to
dissuade teenage boys in the community from joining the militia. However these community
efforts at building a constituency for peace were unsustainable without political leaders
committed to disarming, demobilizing and reintegrating combatants into civilian life and
restoring order in society.
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The second development that caused women to consider direct participation in formal
negotiations is the international discourse on women’s participation in politics and decisionmaking processes. The Fourth UN World Conference on Women in Beijing (1995) and the
subregional and regional preparatory processes preceding it were particularly influential
encounters for women peace activists who attended. Through conversations, presentations, and
discussions, women peace activists learned from the experience of women peace activists from
other countries within and outside the continent. They also gained knowledge of subregional,
regional, and international policy instruments acknowledging the important role of women in
peacemaking and endorsing the right of women to participate in all level of decision-making
including peace negotiations. Additionally, women contributed to the development of a common
for agenda for action for the Africa region ahead of the 1995 Beijing Conference. With this new
awareness, women made connections between their concerns for peace, women’s rights and
social and economic welfare.
The women’s exposure to international discourse on women and peace building and their
participation at subregional and regional meetings on women and peace building made them
aware of new openings for their participation, new spaces for organizing and support, new
possibilities of engaging the formal negotiations. They became more conscious of a new political
role. Like the South Sudanese Women’s Voice for Peace, the conferences also provided
opportunities for visibility and international support for their domestic campaigns for peace in
the form of training, funding and invitations to meetings where they presented their work for
peace (Hilhorst and van Leeuwen 2005, 547). The United Nations Security Council Resolution
1325, passed on October 2000, opened the way further for women’s participation in formal
negotiations. It gave women an important tool for justifying their participation in formal
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negotiations as part of international commitment to empower women’s participation in decisionmaking.
7.1.2 Why Women Should Participate in Formal Negotiations—The Shared Story of
Inclusive and Gender Sensitive Participation. Women’s shared story of participation in formal
negotiations and its potential for guaranteeing a lasting peace originated from the same collective
attribution processes that launched their campaigns for peace. The story developed in the course
of mobilization to end war (see Chapter 6) and the participation of some of the activists in
subregional, regional and international women’ conferences. I characterize the collective
attribution process that yielded the shared story of their participation in formal negotiations as
one involving the following mechanisms: a) re-interpretation of their continued adverse
conditions based on an assessment of their expectations of the conflicting parties’ ability to
deliver on peace and of whether their mobilization was yielding the kind of results they desired;
and b) the adoption of ideas of women as peace agents at regional and international conferences.
The story’s composition involved the same women peace activists who initiated the campaign
for peace (initiators) and the same organizations with the exception of Sudan. In the latter
country, the development of the shared story did not build on a national campaign for peace
jointly coordinated by women from the north and south. This happened through the intervention
of an international actor, the Netherlands Embassy and so its mobilization involved brokerage of
an external actor. Unlike their counterparts in northern Sudan, South Sudanese women peace
activists were actively involved in a grassroots peace process led by the church within Southern
Sudan.
The continued violence despite numerous attempts at negotiating an end to war made
women aware of the futility of expecting conflicting parties and mediating agents to understand
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the unbearable psychological, social and economic toll of the violence on women and children.
Women blamed the continued violent brutalization of their bodies, the forceful recruitment of
children, their economic deprivation from violent disruption of lives and livelihoods, and the
disruption of humanitarian and social service provision on the failure of the mostly male political
leaders and leaders of armed factions to bring about the order and security needed for a normal
life. In a speech delivered at the Boroma Grand Conference in 1993, on behalf of women in
Somaliland, Zeynab Mohamed argued that that the reason women were compelled to do the
“traditionally unthinkable,” that is speak out in a male forum, was because the men had failed in
their traditional responsibility of protecting women and children and abandoned them to all kinds
of social, economic and environmental hazards (Gardner and el Bushra 2004, 149). This
realization that “men could not protect them anymore” is implied in the Burundi women’s
attribution of women’s economic deprivation resulting from the damage to the economy,
agriculture and social service to their political leaders’ refusal to negotiate an end to war. It is
also implicit in the connections Liberian women made between continued sexual abuse and
widespread violence, and the Liberian armed factions’ refusal to disarm and demobilize; in the
connections between the rape, abduction, economic deprivation, forceful recruitment of children
and continued fighting between Southern Sudanese factions despite attempts to unite them; and
in the connections between constant disruption of women’s attempts to resettle and rebuild their
lives and livelihoods and the refusal of failure of warlord centered negotiations to secure peace.
In the women’s view, the problem lay not with negotiations as a tool to end war but with the
mainly armed groups’ use of it to pursue their own interests rather than the interests of the
people. In Liberia, the women also attributed the problem with the negotiated agreements to the
international community’s reluctance in enforcing peace. The resulting frustration,
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disappointment and disillusionment at the continued violence compelled women to collectively
demand their participation in the formal negotiations.
Women considered participation crucial to ensuring that their concerns and those of the
wider society received the serious attention they merited from mediating agents and conflicting
parties. First, as the Liberian and Burundian women actions show, participation offered women
an opportunity to present their experience and understanding of the war. They offered an
alternative and gendered understanding of the war to that of the conflicting parties. Secondly,
participation would provide an opening for women to focus attention on issues that concerned
them. More importantly, participation would allow them to have their ideas and concerns
incorporated in the contents of the negotiation agenda and agreements. Women in Burundi
demanded that their rights and the priorities of both men and women incorporated in the content
of the peace agreement (Burke, et. al 2001, 5.13). Similarly, the Sudanese women hoped to have
their ideas and concerns incorporated in the negotiation agenda. They also wanted compliance of
the armed groups to human rights and a culture of peace. The Liberian Women’s Initiative also
saw their participation as an occasion to argue for disarmament of all armed groups before
assuming positions in a new government (Hassan 2009, 3; El-Amin 1999; Kamil 2000, 23;
Anderlini 2000, 20). The Burundi women’s demand that the principles of drafting the new
constitution reflect their priorities and the Somali’s women’s demands that women be included
in future political institutions shows participation offered the chance for the incorporation of
women’s rights in legal instruments establishing a new state and secure a leadership role for
women in future political institutions established by the peace agreements.
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Third, the South Somali women’s demand to be included in the Somali negotiations
mediated by the Kenya government (2002–5) show that participation was important for women
to secure gains made in previous negotiations. The Somali women wanted to protect gains they
made at the Arta (Djibouti) negotiations mediated by the Djibouti government in 2000 and
secure more commitments to women’s participation in political leadership. Fourth, participation
also gave women the chance to gain official recognition as peacemakers at the national level. In
Chapter 6 I showed how the women saw their collective action to end war as an opportunity to
gain public recognition as agents of peace. The outcomes show that public recognition did not
necessarily mean official recognition. The campaign to participate in formal negotiations thus
provided an occasion for official recognition of their contribution to peace. As the Somali
women claimed, participation gave women a chance to create a new and enhanced role in politics
(Tongeren, et. al. 2005, 119). For Burundi and Liberian women peace activists, direct
participation meant breaking or correcting the practice of exclusion and marginalization of
women and a chance to raise women’s consciousness of their role in reconstructing the lives and
livelihoods of all (Burke, et. al. 2001, 5, 13; Anderlini 2000, 36).
This was the first time the women peace activists interacted directly with the formal
negotiation process. The idea of women participating in formal peace processes was new and so
for the women peace activists involved, the campaign was an opportunity to inaugurate a new
role for women as active participants in decisions about future political institutions and the
reconstruction of the country. In Chapter 6, I show that women’s self-constitution as credible
peacemakers was premised on the view of women as natural peacemakers and as cultural
brokers, by way of marriage, connecting different families, clans or ethnic groups. Like the
Burundi women who saw their participation in negotiation as an opportunity to hold the society
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together, women peace activists applied these same culturally premised self-definitions to justify
their demand for participation in formal negotiations (Burke et. al. 2001, 5). Yet, they also drew
on the emerging international discourse on women and peace building to frame their
participation in negotiations as women’s right to participate in all areas of political life on equal
basis with men. As with the campaign to end war, women framed their peacemaker identity in
terms of sociocultural and international policy views of them as social actors. However,
international policy discourse on women in peace processes played a greater role in framing
justifications for their participation in formal negotiations. This may have to do with the fact that
formal negotiations, except for those in Somaliland, were convened at the international level,
involved international actors and drew on international intervention policy.
7.1.3 Diffusion of the Shared Story among Women. The generation and diffusion of the
shared story about women’s participation in negotiations occurred as part of their efforts to end
war. Women used the same organizational bases to mobilize and sustain support of other women
for their participation. In Liberia, Burundi, and north Somalia (Somaliland) the same women
who initiated the campaigns for peace at the national also initiated the campaign for participation
in negotiation. In Sudan new groups of women became initiators. Also campaign initiators faced
the same ethnic, religious, and political divisions similar to what they encountered when building
support for the campaign to end war. However, evidence from accounts of women’s campaign
for negotiations in Burundi, Sudan, and South Somali shows that these divisions became more
pronounced in the campaign to participate in negotiations. Women’s demands for participation
raised the question of whether they should participate as an autonomous group or through party
affiliation. This question touches on the political identity women preferred as the basis of their
participation in negotiations. Also unlike the broader campaign for peace, few women could
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participate in negotiations because of the way these are structured. They had to agree on who
would represent them and whether they represented the diverse backgrounds of women in
society. Competition emerged, also, in the process of developing a common agenda. Political
party interests, clan leaders’ attempts to undermine women’s campaign and religious, ethnic and
political divisions existing in society posed a challenge to addressing these three questions.
This competition played out in different ways. In Burundi, the campaign for participation
was led by the group of 7 women who also were responsible for initiating the broader campaign
for peace. Competition emerged when the 7 women who spearheaded the campaign for peace
went to the negotiation venue, uninvited, and sought the support of the mediator, Mwalimu
Nyerere, for women’s participation in negotiations. Despite his intervention on their behalf, the
heads of delegations rejected the women’s participation as an autonomous group and suggested
that the women do so as members of political parties, civil society and the church as provided by
the rules of participation. The Burundi 7 were unable to rally strong enough domestic support of
women for a change in the rules to allow autonomous participation. They faced resistance from
women aligned with the parties’ position, and from women who feared directly confronting male
politicians. The second competition was over building support for a common agenda and finding
a way to have this agenda incorporated in the negotiations agenda and agreement. The Burundi 7
did this through meetings with women inside the country, where they reported back on the
negotiation process and planned what to do next (Klot et. al. 2001, 28). Accounts do not mention
competition with women they reported back to in the city and countryside. However, the Burundi
women peace activists lacked strong support of women members of political parties because the
latter were not united on issues of common concern to women. The turning point in efforts to
build a common agenda came through the collaborative brokerage of the UNIFEM and Mwalimu
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Nyerere Foundation, the mediating agent in the Burundi talks. They convened the All Party
Burundi Women’s Peace Conference in July 2000, the first time women from different parties
met together with the Burundi 7 women, women representing refugees, diaspora, professions and
civil society to discuss a common agenda. At this meeting, women addressed issues of concern
to them in the draft peace agreement and made recommendations that were incorporated in the
final agreement. The meeting relied on the Convention on Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women and the 1995 UN Women Conference Beijing Platform of Action
to guide discussions and recommendations.
Strong political party positions fueled competition between women in the north and south
Sudan and prevented them from building a strong national women’s constituency for peace that
women could use to leverage their demand for participation in the negotiations. As a result,
women’s peace campaigns were fragmented within and between the north and south. The
Netherlands Embassy in Khartoum and Nairobi intervened in 1997 through the launch of the
Sudanese Women’s Initiative (also referred to as the Dutch Initiative). Through this national
level series of encounters, held between 1997 and 2000, the Netherlands Embassy connected
Northern and Southern women from all political groups in the conflict to build a common vision
for peace (El-Amin 1999, 35). The women formed working committees of members drawn from
different parties in the civil war and women’s organizations. The committees were tasked with
generating a local understanding of the conflict and women’s possible contribution to
peacemaking through meetings with constituents and male leaders. At the same time women
members of the Initiative received training in conflict resolution facilitated by the ACCORD.
This included a study tour of the Parliament and civil society organizations in South Africa
(Kamil 2000, 23-24; ACCORD 2007, 26). The external brokerage of the Netherlands embassy
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was crucial in eliciting widespread support for a shared story of the Sudanese women’s
participation by guiding women through its interpretation and grounding it in local
understandings of constituents, through what was expected of participants in negotiations
(conflict resolution skills) and in future political institutions (leadership skills). The aim was to
move away from issues that divided them to focusing those common to them as women. Yet, the
process was not without its difficulties. Two participants in the process observed that bringing
women together was very hard because of the complexity of issues involving strong political
actors: members of government, political opposition (NDA, SPLM/A and Nuba mountain
groups), and civil society organizations). The women “were all aggressive and quarreling,” they
“shouted and screamed at each other” even though they proposed the inclusion of women in the
negotiations between the Khartoum government and the SPLM/A (Omang and Darvich-Kodjouri
2007 9; Majteny 2003).
The Somali women overcame clan differences at the the Somali National Peace
Conference in Arta, Djibouti (March–October 2000) and united under an autonomous group, the
Sixth clan, to leverage their voting power in the negotiations. However, the Sixth clan coalition
seems to have demobilized after the Arta talks. In later talks, South Somali women mobilized
under separate initiatives to build a common agenda and participate in the next Somali
Reconciliation Conference convened in October 2002 by the IGAD and mediated by the Kenya
government. The Save Somali Women and Children, one of the groups that formed the Sixth
clan, organized a workshop in August 2002, facilitated by the Nairobi Peace Initiative-Africa to
develop a common agenda and build the kind of momentum that resulted in the Sixth clan
coalition at the 2000 Arta conference in Djibouti. Another women’s organization that was part of
the Sixth clan, IIDA convened a separate meeting of women representatives from five regions in
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South Somalia to prepare a common platform for action. The meeting was supported by the
United Nations (Timmons 2004, 16). These separate yet similar initiatives show that women
peace activists were unable to sustain the Sixth clan coalition and leverage their influences at the
Kenyan talks as they did in Arta 2000. In sum, competition among women over the forging of an
agenda and the nature of their representation at the talks resulted in the external brokerage of a
common agenda by international allies. This allowed some unity among women, despite the
different divisions, and some leverage to pursue their campaign for participation.
The campaigns to participate in negotiations were part of women’s broader national
campaigns to end war through dialogue. Consequently, women used the same vehicles for
coordinating the campaign against war to coordinate collective action aimed at mediating agents,
conflicting parties and regional and international actors supporting the negotiation process. They
also used new vehicles created to coordinate activities at the regional level, like the Liberian
women’s use of the MARWOPENT and Women in Peace Building Network during the second
civil war. They relied on external brokers such as UNIFEM and the Dutch Embassy in Sudan for
assistance with this coordination.
7.1.4. Uninvited Guests at the Table: Collective Demands for Participation. Civil society
participation in formal negotiations depended on the openness of rules providing for who
participates. These varied from the mediator’s provision for participation of civil society
organizations in the negotiations that the women in Burundi, Sudan, South Somalia and Liberia
(second civil war) targeted to mediator exclusion of civil society organizations as participants in
the negotiations that ended the First Liberian war and the northern Somali Reconciliation
conferences. I examine the negotiation structure of opportunity in Chapter 4. The point I want to
emphasize here is that although civil society organizations could participate in some of the
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negotiations, no provision was made for the participation of women as an autonomous group
alongside conflicting parties and other civil society organizations. Women could participate as
members of civil society organizations or as members of political parties. Furthermore civil
society organizations had observer status. This allowed them to attend plenary sessions and listen
to deliberation. They had no right to vote nor contribute to deliberations.
Women campaigned for official recognition as delegates with full participation, voting
rights and as an autonomous group. Like the Liberian and Burundian women, autonomy allowed
them to be neutral and not supporters of either side of the war. They began with requests for their
inclusion in the negotiations like the Liberian Women’s Initiative peace activists who wrote to
the ECOWAS seeking invitations to the Accra Clarifications Talks in December 1994. They
sought the support of influential negotiating parties, regional heads of state, and international
allies who advocated on their behalf. The women’s campaigns in Burundi, Liberia, Sudan, and
South Somalia show this use of influential domestic and external stakeholders as advocates of
their inclusion in the negotiations. The Burundi 7 approached President Buyoya and requested
his support for the inclusion of women in the ongoing Arusha negotiations. He in turn consulted
with the FRODEBU leadership and the government and FRODEBU agreed to appoint three
women each to attend the negotiations as observers. Also, through interpersonal networks the
Burundi women approached Dr. Specioza Kazibwe, then Vice President of Uganda and also the
President of the OAU Women’s Committee on Peace, and the Minister of Gender Affairs in
Rwanda. They communicate their concerns with adverse effects of the economic embargo on the
population and requested the support of the two senior political leaders in lobbying for its
removal and for the participation of Burundi women in the Arusha negotiations. The Ugandan
Vice-President convened a peace conference, in Kampala, sponsored by the OAU Women’s
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Committee on Peace. This conference provided the occasion for the women to meet with
President Museveni whom they asked to lift the economic sanctions and also intervene on their
behalf regarding their inclusion in the talks. By accepting to communicate the women’s demands
to the facilitator of the Arusha negotiations, Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, President Yoweri
Museveni acted as their advocate. The conference is an example of the use of strategic
scheduling of meetings by external brokers to facilitate an audience with influential political
actors (Interview, August 2010).
Women invited themselves to the talks, since they were not recognized as delegates.
Having arrived at the negotiation venue by imposition, women proceeded to coordinate action
there. They sought audience with regional heads of state, international actors supporting the
negotiations and with mediating agents so as to make their case for participation and the
incorporation of their concerns in the negotiation agenda and protocols of the agreement. When
the ECOWAS did not respond to the Liberian Women’s Initiative request to be invited to the
Accra Clarification Conference (December, 1994), the organization mobilized funds from local
benefactors, purchased tickets and sent six women to the conference. Once they arrived the
women lobbied factional ECOWAS, factional leaders and international actors to give them a
hearing at the talks. At the Abuja summit (May 1995), the women sent three women and
requested to be placed on the agenda. Their request was denied by the ECOWAS secretariat.
Through interpersonal networks they met with the ECOWAS secretary, the President of Gambia,
the special assistant to President Rawlings, Nigerian Ambassador to Liberia, and the Nigerian
Foreign Minister to plead for an opportunity to present their views at the assembly (African
Women and Peace Support Group 2004, 68, 76). Somali women in Somaliland petitioned the
committee convening the Boroma conference to include their participation. When clans excluded
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South Somali women from their official delegations to the Somali National Reconciliation
Conference (Arta, May 2000), the women activists approached Djibouti President Omer Guelleh,
who was the mediating agent and persuaded him to secure a position for them at the talks (Jama
2010, 64).
Women diffused their demands through the media and through joint coordination of
action with international organizations keen to support the inclusion of women in the negotiation
process. When representatives of the Liberian Women Initiative realized that delegates and the
mediating agent were unwilling to give them a hearing at the Accra talks (1994), one of the
women used her personal and professional network of media colleagues to access the Ghanian
media and international press. They deployed the media to publicize their concerns and exclusion
from the talks. The ECOWAS granted the women temporary observer status as a result of the
international publicity (African Women and Peace Support Group 2004, 24). Somali women
established a Women’s Resource Center at the Somali National Reconciliation Conference,
Mbagathi Kenya (2002-2004) with the support of the IGAD and the UNIFEM. The Center
served as a working area for women delegates and a communication hub. The UNIFEM
provided two support staff, electronic equipment, and internet services. Through email, women
reported to Somalis at home and in the diaspora on the negotiations. They also used the centre to
research, access negotiation documents, conduct research, and hold their own meetings. Political
leaders also used the centre for informal negotiations with women and among themselves (IGAD
2005, 34–36).
Women partnered with African nongovernmental organizations like Femmes Africa
Solidarité (FAS), international organization agencies like the United Nations Fund for Women
(UNIFEM), and subregional organizations the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
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(IGAD) Women’s Desk. Through the external brokerage of the Femme Africa Solidarité (FAS),
Burundi women met with Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, the facilitator of the Arusha talks. He in turn
convened a meeting with leaders of the political parties’ delegations to talks where the women
presented their case for participation. From then on, he persuaded the negotiating parties to
include women in the talks despite the political parties’ refusal and so acted as an advocate of the
women’s cause. The Nairobi Peace Initiative-Africa, an African peace resource NGO brokered
the Sixth Clan including the Save Somali Women and Children and the Kenyan mediating agent
by requesting that the mediator include women in the Somali National Reconciliation
Conference (2002–5), presenting their case for official recognition and endorsing the
organization’s demand for the incorporation of women’s issues in the agreement.5 The UNIFEM
and IGAD women’s desk also advocated for the inclusion of Sudanese women in the Naivasha
talks.
Women used their own strategies and appropriated those developed by external allies to
demand that negotiating parties and mediating agents incorporate their concerns in the
negotiation protocol. Like the Somaliland women at the Boroma conference and the Liberia
Women Initiative at the Abuja talks (1995), the women petitioned for space on the agenda to
present their views to delegates at negotiations. They lobbied delegates individually at the
conference venue and distributed statements expressing their position and recommendations like
the Burundi women, South Sudan women, and the Liberian Women Initiative. South Somali
women delegates to the Somali National Peace Conference in Arta, Djibouti (2000) borrowed
and improvised on the clan identity when they organized as the Sixth clan coalition. In the
5

NPI-A letter to the Chairman of the IGAD Technical Committee, 28 February 2003, seeking observer status for the 12

women members of the Save Somali Women and Children (SSWC) organization.
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absence of a central government, clans (community level units) served as the basis for
participation in the negotiations (Abdullah 2007, 73). Women realized that they could exercise
greater influence if they united their efforts and voted as a bloc and not from within their clans.
In this way, women leveraged their numbers, autonomy and unity to pressure male delegates to
work towards peace and include women’s concerns in the discussions and agreements. One of
the demands women made was for a 10% women’s quota in the future Transitional National
Assembly. According to one account of the South Somali women’s campaign (Abdullah 2007,
27), they deployed religious traditions supportive of women by arguing for their right to political
participation from within Islam, kept to Islamic codes of conduct and dress and allied with
intellectual groups, other civil society activists and the Al-Islah, a moderate Islamic movement
that had strong influence at the Arta talks (IGAD 2005, 29). Women used the emotional power of
buraanbur (traditional poetry) expressing the suffering women and children experienced from
war to get male delegates to pay serious attention to negotiating peace (Dyck 2003, 17; Timmons
2004, 18; Tongeren, et. al. 2005, 119).
Most accounts of the campaigns show that women leveraged their partnership with
external allies gave them to get their demands incorporated in the negotiations discussions and
agreement. The Burundi campaign illustrates the important role of external brokerage in
enhancing women’s advantage by giving greater weight to their demands and helping them work
with the constraints negotiation rules placed on their participation. In their account of the
women’s peace campaign, Klot, Burke, and Bunting (2001, 16) refer to the use of strategic
scheduling of meetings by the Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation and the UNIFEM. Some of these,
like the All Party Women’s Conference mentioned earlier, served the double purpose of building
support among women divided along ethnic and political party interests and of persuading the
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delegates to incorporate women’s concerns into the negotiation agenda and agreement. Strategic
scheduling of meetings involved convening meetings ahead of key negotiation committee
meetings. These pre-negotiation meetings addressed women’s concerns regarding their
participation, negotiation agenda and final agreement. They were aimed at the 19 delegations of
the negotiating parties. Discussion of these concerns fed into the actual negotiation committee
meetings and so influenced the incorporation of gender concerns in the agreement.
At one such meeting, a high level briefing on how women’s rights could be incorporated
into the formal accord (June, 2000), women experts from Eritrea, Guatemala, South Africa and
Uganda briefed the heads of the 19 delegations, facilitation team, envoys of international and
regional organizations, donor agencies, and countries with special ties to Burundi. These women
experts drew on their experience of political participation in countries emerging from violent
conflict. This briefing took place before the establishment of Committee V on Guarantees on
Implementation of Agreements Emanating from the Peace Negotiations and before the
Committee II on Democracy and Governance made final amendments. The Committee IV on
Reconstruction and Development also held gender sensitive workshops that were open to the
participation of the Burundi women peace activists. At a third meeting, the All-Party Women’s
conference (July 2000), women representatives from political parties, refugee communities,
diaspora, professions, civil society, and women’s peace campaigns discussed gender issues in the
protocols of the peace accords. They used the Convention on Elimination of All forms of
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and the Beijing Platform for Action (1995) to guide
their recommendations. Finally, the MNF and UNIFEM facilitated closed door sessions with the
mediator, former South African President Nelson Mandela where women presented their
recommendations for a gender sensitive peace accord.
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The UNIFEM and IGAD Women’s desk also made strategic use of meetings that helped
South Somali women have their demands included in the final agreement of the Somali National
Reconciliation Conference (2002–4). One such meeting, a Consultative meeting supported by
UNIFEM, reviewed the progress made by women from opposing sides of the conflict had made
(IGAD 2005, 32). The IGAD Women’s Desk, UNIFEM, and UNDP also organized a workshop
to review draft reports produced by the technical committees (IGAD News March-April 2003,
6). Strategic meetings, such as those convened by UNIFEM and MNF in Burundi and by
UNIFEM and FAS for the Somali women delegates, helped women assess whether their
demands were being incorporated in the agenda, agree on action required to get neglected
demands adopted and make recommendations for changes in the drafted documents that reflected
women’s concerns. Strategic meetings were also learning opportunities for women delegates
who were engaging for the very first time with a political process of this kind. In the Burundi and
South Somali meetings experts addressed women on topics addressed in the committee sessions,
such as federalism, disarmament, and demobilization, women’s role in conflict resolution and
reconciliation and proposals for a women’s quota in parliament and regional government
positions (IGAD 2005, 31). These presentations help them understand what was involved and
expected of them as delegates. Women also learned about international policy documents on
women’s rights and women and peace that they used to frame their demands for inclusion and
also for a gender sensitive agenda.
In conclusion, women mobilized support for their demands through use of interpersonal
networks at the national, subregional, and regional level and the external brokerage of
international allies. The interpersonal networks and external brokerage allowed them direct
interaction with mediating agents, conflicting parties and international actors. The external
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brokerage also made it possible for women to produce a common agenda despite the difficulties
of overcoming political and other differences. They also relied on local and international media
to diffuse their demands for participation, for the inclusion of their concerns in the negotiation
and to express dissatisfaction with their exclusion by mediating agents, their position on the war
and recommendations. The attention this drew put pressure on the mediating agent to include
them in the process as in Liberia or in the post-implementation process like in the Sudan.
7.2 Religious Leaders’ Participation in the Negotiations
In the previous chapter I showed how the Contact Group (Mozambique), Inter-Faith
Mediation Committee (Liberia), Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone, and the New Sudan
Council of Churches established contact with fighting groups to persuade them to negotiate an
end to war and later initiated face-to-face talks. These initiatives opened the way for formal
negotiations between the parties in Mozambique, Liberia, and South Sudan, and the resumption
of talks that had failed like in Sierra Leone. Campaign accounts and reports show the religious
leaders’ participation in formal negotiations came by way of the credibility they had gained
brokering communication between disputing parties. The Contact Group’s brokering of
FRELIMO government and RENAMO agreement to talk led to Archbishop Gonçalves’
participation in the mediation team at the Rome talks. The ECOWAS Standing Committee on
Mediation called on the Inter-Faith Mediation Committee of Liberia to participate in formal
negotiations it convened for the Liberian armed groups. The ECOWAS and UN also requested
the Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone to participate in the Lome talks. Conflicting parties
developed trust in religious leaders and saw them as nonpartisan. Also, international actors
convening the mediations, like the ECOWAS, invited them to participate in the formal
negotiations because of their brokerage skills.
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Participating in formal negotiations allowed religious leaders to be credible agents of
peace within the official process by engaging directly with the armed groups and persuading
them to commit to the process. Religious leaders’ participation at the talks did not vary much.
Except for Archbishop Gonçalves who participated as a mediator in the Mozambican talks, the
religious leaders continued with their brokerage role within the negotiations to end war in
Mozambique, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. In the north-south Sudan talks, the religious leaders had
an observer status with no voting rights. Mediating agents relied on them to break deadlocks by
pressuring parties to return to the table and continue with the talks. For example, when the
RENAMO leader Alphonse Dhlakama refused to continue negotiations with the FRELIMO
government, the Churches’ Contact Group travelled to Nairobi (March 1992) to persuade him to
return to the talks. During the meeting with him, they pointed out the need to show mercy to the
Mozambican people who were suffering from the drought and famine affecting country at the
time (Sengulane and Gonçalves 1998, 28–33). They also rallied the support of influential heads
of state in the region, to pressure parties to continue with negotiations they had abandoned. Also,
the Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone brokered communication between the Revolutionary
United Front (RUF), Charles Taylor (who supported the RUF), and the President of Guinea
Conakry (PR Newsire [New York], 15 April 1999) with the aim of persuading the leaders of the
two countries to resolve their differences and move the Sierra Leone peace process forward. At
the end of a meeting with Charles Taylor, where RUF representatives were present, he expressed
to the religious leaders his commitment to helping find a solution to the war in Sierra Leone
(Sierra Leone News, 16 and 17 April 1999).
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Participation in formal negotiations did not prevent the religious leaders from making
public calls for peace. They continued issuing statements, appeals for peace and pastoral letters
commenting on the progress of the negotiations. Although religious leaders were careful to
remain nonpartisan and avoid making statements that would jeopardize the negotiations, some
like the late Archbishop Michael Francis expressed their criticism publicly. Woods observes that
during the Cotonou negotiations, the Inter-Faith Mediation Committee (IFMC) disagreed sharply
with the direction of the negotiations (August-September 1994). The Roman Catholic
Archbishop Michael Francis, in particular, argued that the Cotonou agreement was an
“appeasement” because it “rewarded crime, thus perpetuating the vicious cycle of violence, and
rendering genuine national reconciliation difficult, if not impossible.” The Bishop opposed it on
“legal, moral and religious grounds” (Woods 1996, 29–30). This did not endear him to the armed
groups and he was a target of their intimidation. Nevertheless, the religious leaders’ overall
concern was for a process that included all parties to the conflict and an agenda and agreement
that reflected the needs of the suffering population, especially the respect for their human rights.
7.3 Conclusion
This chapter focused on a particular phase of the women and religious leaders’
campaigns to end war—their direct engagement with formal talks as participants. I sought to
account for why and how religious leaders and women’s networks mobilized to participate in the
negotiations. However, my account focuses on the women’s campaigns to participate in the
negotiations. Unlike the women, religious leaders’ participated in formal negotiations largely by
invitation and because of the credibility gained as communication brokers. Women, on the other
hand, were uninvited and had to mobilize collectively to gain entry. Thus my account of the
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campaign to engage directly with formal negotiations focuses on the women’s campaigns and
briefly mentions religious leaders’ path to engaging directly with the formal negotiations.
In answer to why women mobilized to directly engage with the formal negotiations, I
initially argued that: a) they wanted an inclusive peace agreement, b) they wanted to ensure
conflicting parties committed to ending the war, and c) in some instances, women seem to
promote the agenda of conflicting parties they affiliated with. Similar to what I did in my
account of the campaign to end war in Chapters 5 and 6, I proposed a sketch of the process
leading to the choice to engage directly with formal negotiations, beginning with the key
moments that compel women to consider their participation in formal negotiations. As for how
the women collectively acted to engage directly with the formal negotiations, I argued that they
did so by scaling their coordination of action to the regional and international arenas where the
formal negotiations occurred. Also, they down-scaled action at the regional and international
levels to the national level through report-back activities aimed at women and the public.
According to the evidence, frustration with the conflicting parties’ refusal to compromise
and to commit to implementing peace accords, and continued violence and insensitivity to the
suffering endured by the population compelled the religious leaders and women groups to
engage directly with the negotiations. However, three main factors led to the women’s
reconsideration of the nature of their engagement with formal negotiations. First, the conflicting
parties lack of credible commitment to negotiating an end to war and to implementing the
accords ensured continued threats to their physical integrity, such as sexual abuse, and to their
economic and welfare activities. Second, women saw in the conflicting parties’ and mediating
agents’ apparent lack of concern for their issues, especially their abuse by combatants and their
economic deprivation, the need to present their own concerns instead of depending on male
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delegates to do so. Third, women saw in the increasing international discourse on women’s
empowerment in political decision-making processes a justification for their full participation in
formal negotiations. Thus, women saw participation as crucial to ensuring their concerns
received the serious attention they deserved from conflicting parties and the mediating agents.
They also saw in participation an opportunity to be gain official recognition as peacemakers and
so participate in political decision-making on equal terms with male delegates. The women
framed their participation role in terms of women’s right to participate in political decision
making processes. To break through cultural constraints excluding their participation on gender
identity, they appealed to failure of male leaders to fulfill cultural obligations of protecting
women, children, and elderly. In pursuing official recognition, women sought to change thinking
and behavior of conflicting parties and the public on who participates in decisions regarding the
termination of war and on what issues inform the final settlement. Like in the campaign to end
war, the women saw their participation as an opportunity to gain recognition as key political
actors in the democratization process.
Evidence shows that women mobilized to gain entry into the negotiations by diffusing
their alternative theory of inclusive participation in formal negotiations to elicit support of other
women, conflicting parties, mediating agents, and regional actors with a stake in the conflict. In
reconstructing the diffusion of this story I showed that across the women’s campaigns this
occurred mainly through encounters and conversations, the media, brokerage of external actors,
and upscaling of coordination as the main mechanisms. The construction of the women’s
alternative theory of participation—the gender agenda—built on their alternative theory of war
and its resolution and extended it to include the need for women’s representation and equal
participation, incorporation of women’s concerns in the negotiation agenda and their rights in
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future political institutions including a new constitution. Even though campaign activists built on
the support base comprising women’s organizations operating at the grassroots level, the nature
of encounters and conversations seemed to limit participation to elite women given that they took
place in capital cities, international venues not accessible to nonelite women, and involved
deliberations with participants such as international experts that nonelite women would find easy
to participate in. This contrasts with the campaigns to end war where processes of forging an
alternative theory seemed open to the participation of ordinary women as demonstrated in the
WIPNET–Liberia mass campaign for peace and the Somali women’s peace movement.
Also in contrast to the compaign to end war, external brokers played a prominent role in
composing the gender agenda. Accounts of meetings to develop the gender agenda are few.
However those describing the processes in Burundi, South Somalia, and Sudan peace campaigns
show that ethnic divisions, political party interests and fear of breaching cultural requirements
informed the competition over the formulation of the gender agenda thus making it difficult to
build on women’s shared experience of the war. In these particular campaigns, external brokers
also took on the role of facilitating the composition of the alternative theory of inclusive
participation by shifting the basis of the gender agenda from subjective experience of war to the
objective norms of international women’s rights that applied to all regardless of race, class, and
identity.
Although encounters and conversations women had with their support base, conflicting
parties, mediating agents and influential regional actors are main diffusion mechanisms, the
brokerage of external allies and advocates was crucial to securing adoption of some of the
women’s concerns in the final accords, some form of participation in the negotiations and in
future political institutions created by the accords. External brokers achieved this through
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strategic scheduling of meetings to influence deliberations on the protocols of the accord and
also through lobbying mediating agents to allow for participation of women. This indicates the
encounters and conversations initiated by women campaign initiators were not sufficient on their
own. It was necessary for external brokerage to elicit support for the women’s alternative theory
of participation from mediating agents and conflicting parties.
Women’s diffusion of the shared story at regional and international venues of the formal
negotiations scaled coordination of their campaign for peace from the national level up to the
transnational level. Their report back activities down-scaled action at the regional to level to the
national one. Upscaling the coordination of activities to the regional and international level
remained a challenge for women who had few if any resources to do so. Again the brokerage of
international allies like the Femmes Africa Solidarité and UNIFEM was crucial in mobilizing the
required resources for travel to the international venues of formal negotiations. The use of media
to diffuse the shared story varies across campaigns. The women made greater use of print and
electronic media (radio and television) to publish demands for their inclusive participation and
communicate the women’s gender agenda. However, the evidence shows an ad hoc instead of
strategic use of the media to diffuse their story to the general public. In only one case, the South
Somali women’s participation in the Mbagathi (Kenya) negotiations (2003), did women make
use of internet service to communicate progress on developments at the talks to the public in
Somalia. The Burundi women relied on encounters and conversations with women in the
countryside to report back developments at the talks.
Similar to the campaign to end war, the evidence I used to make my arguments varies in
detailed descriptions of the processes leading to women’s mobilization to participate in the
formal negotiations. However, the women’s campaigns show that civic groups will mobilize to
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participate in formal negotiations when these fail to create the conditions the people require for
survival, i.e., recover their livelihoods and lead a normal life. Specifically when conflicting
parties refuse to compromise and to demonstrate credible commitment to implementing
negotiated settlements by ending violence and restoring order, and instead pursue their own
power interests to the exclusion of socioeconomic concerns of the population, civic groups will
collectively act for a change in thinking and behavior of conflicting parties and mediating agents,
and in the conduct of the negotiations. In answer to how civic groups mobilize to engage directly
with the formal negotiations, the women’s campaigns show that they will do so by proposing an
alternative understanding that expands on who participates in the negotiations and on the terms
of the negotiation by demanding an inclusive agenda and participation. They will depend on
imposition, lobbying, the media, and the strategic use of encounters and conversations in which
the external brokerage of influential international allies plays a key role. Unlike the campaign to
end war, creative appropriation and improvisation of cultural identity is prominent in one case—
the Somali women’s campaigns.
The religious leaders’ path shows that in some instances, civic group engagement may
come by way of credibility gained through previous communication brokerage roles and success
in getting conflicting parties to the negotiating table. Thus, collective mobilization to participate
in formal negotiations is not the only way that civic groups may engage with negotiations
directly. Similar to the campaigns for peace, the women’s campaign to participate in formal
negotiations did not alter the thinking and behavior of conflicting parties. The conflicting parties
resisted women’s direct engagement as autonomous actors with the right to make decisions.
Negotiating parties sought to exclude women or at best limit their participation to affiliation with
political parties, civil society organizations, or within cultural constraints. Nevertheless, through
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the influence of external allies, conflicting parties agreed to include gender formulations in some
of the peace accords.
The women’s mobilization to participate in formal negotiations and the religious leaders
involvement in formal negotiations shows that civic groups were not frustrated with the formal
negotiations per se but with the failure of conflicting parties to compromise, commit to ending
war and work together to implement negotiated settlements. This frustration indicates civic
groups’ lack of trust in the capacity of conflicting parties to represent them as leaders, to go
beyond their own interests and address those of the suffering population. It also indicates their
concern with offering an alternative way of negotiating and implementing accords to the highly
polarized, uncompromising, and intransigent one conflicting parties pursued. The women used
the social power I described in Chapter 5, to access formal negotiations that are largely exclusive
and male dominated, especially since they had neither the political and economic power to
fundamentally change the rules of the game. At this level, they faced strong resistance from
conflicting parties who were suspicious of protecting their chances of gaining power.
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Chapter 8. CONCLUSION
This study examined an aspect of peace activism by noncombatant groups: social actors’
engagement with formal negotiations. The study focused on religious leader- and women-led
networks. A number of these groups collectively acted to end war in Angola, Burundi, Liberia,
Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Sudan. Some went further and pursued their peace
objectives in formal negotiations despite politically adverse conditions. They faced the
possibility of being seen as political threats to incumbent governments and armed groups
determined to pursue a military option. Compared to conflicting parties, they did not have the
military or political leverage to alter the situation for peace. The study sought to find out what
about the context and conditions made it possible for them to pursue their peace objectives at
negotiations. What specific conditions in the broader political context and among the civic
groups accounts for this? How did the civic groups go about engaging with the formal
negotiations?
In answer to these questions, two arguments were made. First, certain opportunities
existed within the risky political conditions of war and in the formal negotiation processes that
civic groups used to directly engage with the formal negotiations. These had to do with
conditions related to social actors, such as humanitarian resources, that allowed them to play an
important role locally and among affected populations. Other conditions are external to social
actors, such as the international community’s frustration with spoiler strategies conflicting
parties used to delay, derail, or abandon talks. These made it possible for social actors to act in
support of advancing the negotiation process. Second, social actors’ understandings of the
violent internal conflict as “suffering” and “not the voice of the people” motivated their demand
for an end to war and its peaceful resolution. More importantly, the frustration ordinary people
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felt at conflicting parties’ failure to end war—“people’s suffering”—led civic groups to pursue
their objectives for peace by directly engaging with the formal negotiations. This argument
focused attention on conditions in the broader political environment, conditions specific to the
formal negotiation process and conditions specific to social actors’ experiences and
understandings of war—that is, cognitive factors.
Peace movement studies do not fully address the question of social actors’ engagement
with formal negotiations. However, they do suggest answers to what makes peace movements
possible. These studies emphasized factors in the external environment that are favorable to
peace action, such as liberal political systems, the free market economy, and Protestant
Christianity, or factors that constrained peace movement actors, such as restrictive political
conditions. Scholars also suggested factors to do with social actors, such as the unjust nature of
wars. Similar to this study’s initial argument, the literature emphasized features of the domestic
and international political environment and of social actors. They are close to the arguments that
appear in political process theories regarding what makes peace action possible—political
opportunity structures, mobilizing structures, and cultural frames.
Insights from the peace movement literature and the political process were useful for
answering the “what” part of my question. However, they did not provide an adequate answer to
the “how” part of the question. This focused attention on a process leading to social actors’
engagement in formal negotiations. In other words, my argument focused on identifying what
factors made engagement possible and suggests this engagement as a result of a process. This
required conceptual tools that would allow for a reconstruction of the sequence of events linking
the conditions to social actors’ engagement in formal negotiations. The dynamics of contention
(DOC) framework, a political process model, provided the conceptual tools that helped achieve
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this task. The overall interest in understanding social actors’ peace actions from their perspective
and the study’s focus on what happened and how led to the use of a particularizing strategy of
specific history. This allows for a reconstruction of events that account for what happened and
also for how it happened using this specific inquiry’s intrinsic and extrinsic narrative analysis.
With regard to what happened to make social actors engage with formal negotiations, the
findings can be summarized in the following argument: conflicting parties’ war strategies
destabilized economic and social life, creating complex humanitarian crises. The population’s
inability to cope with these conditions, and humanitarian actors’ inability to mitigate the
humanitarian crises, leads them to reconsider their role. This results in a process of attribution,
where civic groups “theorize” an alternative understanding of war as suffering and their role as
peace agents. Social actors appropriate social resources—social bases, networks of kin, family
and other personal relations, humanitarian resources, cultural and religious resources,
international networks of influential contacts, international discourse favoring inclusion of
women, and civil society actors in peace and other political processes— and use them to
disseminate their alternative understandings of war to the public, conflicting parties, and
international actors.
Social actors also create new vehicles to coordinate peace action in public sites and
among conflicting parties. They engage in contentious interaction—communication brokerage,
strategic use of meetings, lobbying, petitions, shaming strategies, emotional displays, prayers,
and pastoral letters—targeting conflicting parties, members of the public, and international
actors. The failure of conflicting parties to negotiate an end to war and restore order leads to their
engagement with formal negotiations. The particular paths to engagement, however, differ across
some cases. Religious leaders are invited to negotiations. Some are excluded. Some actors lobby
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and demand to be included. Others pursue contentious interaction at negotiation venues aimed at
shaming conflicting parties into negotiating an agreement. In other instances, mediating agents
provide for the participation of civic groups. In conclusion, a combination of conditions having
to do with structure and agency accounts for social actors’ engagement with negotiations. Their
engagement points to an opening—the lack of moderate political leaders and a politically
moderate space—that peace activists fill. However, their ability to act effectively depends on
social resources they have and political agility in using these resources to engage in formal
negotiations.
Theoretical Contributions
This study’s findings are particular to the specific actors and time period in which they
operated. Nevertheless the findings highlight the following contributions to theory.
The study tests the DOC framework on a set of non-Western cases of peace activism.
The study contributes to an understanding of formal negotiations from the perspective of
social actors.
The study raises two themes for further consideration. First, peacemaking needs to
reconsider the question of legitimacy and not just focus on power and political representation
concerns of conflicting parties. The problem is not just one of power or wealth sharing (political
and economic power); it is also one of legitimacy (people’s consent to be ruled by conflicting
parties). The legitimacy question turns on the degree of commitment conflicting parties or
political leaders have in society. Second, it raises the question of creating and expanding a
politically moderate space. The findings show that peace activists acted as political moderates in
contexts where politics were dominated by political elites with extreme positions. Studies of
peacemaking seem to neglect the challenge of expanding politically moderate spaces to counter
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the dominance of an extremist political elite, yet moderates are crucial to altering the situation
for peace. Local peacebuilding interventions are creating moderate spaces below. Creation of
moderate spaces above needs to happen alongside these.
Studies of peacemaking in postcolonial Africa focus on the contributions made by
external mediating agents. They ignore the difficult groundbreaking work by domestic actors that
facilitates formal negotiations. This involves breaking the culture of silence and fear, mobilizing
public opinion for an alternative peaceful end to war, developing constituencies for peace, and all
this without a critical mass of politically moderate elites willing to do the same at the political
level. This groundbreaking activity needs to be accounted for in mediation analyses.
Policy and Practice Contributions
The findings of this study show that:
Mediation interventions should be informed by social reality and not just the political and
economic state of affairs. Concerns regarding political power and wealth sharing are important.
Addressing them well leads to greater political stability and an environment conducive for longterm economic development. However, these should be balanced with social concerns resulting
from war’s destructive consequences on people’s lives and livelihoods.
Mediation agents, their sponsors, or guarantors of the peace process should consider,
seriously, the value domestic actors bring to the negotiation process instead of being preoccupied
with the integrity of a process designed originally for interstate and not intrastate wars. Analysts
of mediation and negotiations have recommended the need to redesign the process so that what it
addresses and how it is consistent with social, political, and economic reality and closer to
people’s aspirations for peace. A redesigned mediation process may need to include social actors
as direct participants in some way. Unless negotiation agreements secure a lasting peace, social

160

actors are likely to make demands for inclusion. Mediators may have to draw on their knowledge
and expertise.
Domestic peace activists and practitioners need to be prepared for the level of political
sophistication required to engage directly with peace negotiations. This allows them to gain
credibility and sustain action. Problems mediators face, for instance, stalling and delaying tactics
and intransigence would best be addressed by politically astute domestic actors at this level.
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Appendix 1. PEACE CAMPAIGNS AND KEY ACTORS IN AFRICA: 1990-2005
Peace Campaigns
The campaign for peace and reconciliation in
Mozambique
The campaign for peace in Liberia I

The campaign for peace in Northern Somalia
(Somaliland)
The campaign for peace in Sierra Leone I

The campaign for peace in Burundi
The campaign for peace in Sierra Leone II
The movement for peace in Angola

The campaign for peace in South Sudan

The campaign for peace in Liberia II
The campaign for peace in South Somalia

Key Actor(s) and Members
Mozambican Churches Task Force/Contact Group (Commission on Peace and
Reconciliation of the Mozambican Council of Churches, Catholic Episcopal Conference)
Inter-Faith Mediation Committee (Roman Catholic Church, Liberian Council of
Churches, National Moslem Council of Liberia)
Liberia Women’s Peace Initiative (Various women’s organizations and individuals)
Women’s organizations and individuals in Somaliland
Women’s Movement for Peace; Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom
Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone (Protestant, Evangelical, Catholic and Muslim
councils of churches).
The Collectif des Assocations Féminines et ONG du Burundi (CAFOB) and Group of Six
Women leaders
Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone
Conferençia Episcopal de Angola e Sao Tomé–Movimento Pro Pace (Conference of
Angolan Catholic Bishops Movement for Peace); Council of Churches of Angola;
Alliance of Evangelicals of Angola
Comité Inter Ecclésial para Paz em Angola–Rede de Paz (the Inter-Ecclesiastical
Committee for Peace in Angola Peace Network) – (CEAST, AEA and CICA, Civic
organizations, Traditional authority figures);
New Sudan Council of Churches (Southern Sudanese Protestant and Evangelical
Churches, Roman Catholic church); Sudan Ecumenical Forum (Sudan churches and their
International Partners e.g., WCC, AACC, Caritas Network).
Sudan Women’s Peace Initiative; Southern Women Group (Sudan Women Voice for
Peace, Sudanese Women Association).
Mano River Women’s Peace Network (MARWOPNET); Women in Peace building
Network–Liberia
Save Somali Women and Children – Sixth Clan; IIDA; COGWO; Family Economy and
Rehabilitation Organization (FERO);
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Appendix 2. FORMAL PEACE NEGOTIATIONS TARGETED BY THE NONCOMBATANT PEACE
CAMPAIGNS
Formal Peace Negotiation

Duration

Conflicting Parties

Mediator (s)

Mozambican Peace
Negotiations

1989–1992

FRELIMO Govt and
RENAMO

Liberian Peace
Negotiations

1990–2003

Doe Govt, TNG and
NPFL; TNG and armed
factions; Taylor
Government and LURD

Sant’ Egidio,
Mugabe–Zimbabwe,
Moi-Kenya
ECOWAS/ECOMOG

Somaliland National
Reconciliation Conferences

1992–1993

Sierra Leone Peace
Negotiations

1994–2000

Burundi Peace
Negotiations

1998–2000

Regional Government of Somali Clan Elders
Somaliland and Clan
militia
Sierra Leone
OAU,
Government and RUF
Commonwealth, U.K,
USA,
ECOWAS/ECOMOG
Buyoya government and Regional Heads of
13 political parties
Government–Nyerere
(including armed wings) (MNF) and Mandela
(MNF) as mediators

Engagement
Type
Support and
Participation

Engagement

Support and
Participation
(mediator)

Pre-negotiations and
Freetown talks,
1990; All Liberia
National
Conference, 1991;
Accra,1994 ;
Abuja,1995-96;
Accra, 2003.
Talks in 1992;
Boroma Grand
Conference 1993;
Unclear???

Support

Support and
Participation

Support and
Participation

Pre-negotiations and
Rome talks

Regional Heads of
Government
initiative.
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Formal Peace Negotiation

Duration

Conflicting Parties

Mediator (s)

Angola Peace Negotiations

1993–2002

UN/UNAVEM

Sudan Peace Negotiations
– Machakos and Naivasha
talks
South Somali Peace
Negotiations

2002–2005

MPLA government and
UNITA
Government of Sudan
and SPLM/A

Kenya-IGAD

Support/No
participation

Transitional National
Government, SRRC,
armed groups, clan
leaders, civil society
groups, representatives
of Somali diaspora

Djibouti and IGAD
(technical committee:
Djibouti, Ethiopia and
Kenya, later
facilitation committee
with members of all
IGAD states
represented) –
Kiplagat.

Support and
Participation

2000–2005

Engagement
Type
Support

Engagement
Lusaka accords
implementation
Machakos and
Naivasha talks
Arta, Djibouti and
the Kenya (Eldoret,
Nairobi) talks (14th
round of talks, and
15th
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Appendix 3. GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS
AEA
AFELL
AFL
ALSAA
AJPD
AU
CAFOB
CCM
CEAST
CICA
CNDD
COGWO
COIEPA
CWI
ECGLC
ECOWAS
ECOMOG
FAA
FAAT
FAS
FDD
FLN
FONGA
FRODEBU
FROLINA
FRELIMO
GARP
IGAD
IGNU
IIDA
LURD
LWI
MARWOPNET

Associação de evangélicos de Angola (Angolan Evangelical
Alliance)
Association of Female Lawyers of Liberia (AFELL)
Armed Forces of Liberia
Associação Lenoardo Sikufundo – Shalom – Angola association
that advocates for peasants’ land rights.
Associação Justiça, Paz e Democracia Association for Justice,
Peace and Democracy.
Africa Union
Collectif des Assocations Féminines et ONG du Burundi
Christian Council of Mozambique
Conferência Episcopal de Angola e São Tomé (Episcopal
Conference of Angola and São Tomé)
Conselho de Igrejas Cristãs em Angola—Council of Christian
Churches in Angola
National Council for the Defence of Democracy
Coalition for Grassroots Women Organization
Comité Inter Ecclésial para Paz em Angola (The Inter-Church
Committee for Peace in Angola)
Christian Women’s Initiative
Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries
Economic Community of West African States
Economic Community Monitoring Group
Forças Armadas de Angolanas Armed Forces of Angola
Forum das autoridades tradicionais Forum for traditional
authorities
Femmes Africa Solidarité
Forces for the Defence of Democracy
National Liberation Front
Forum das ONGs de Angola
Front for Democracy in Burundi
Front for National Liberiation
Front for the Liberation of Mozambique
Grupo Angolano de reflexão para a paz—Angolan Group for the
Reflection of Peace
Intergovernmental Authority on Development
Interim Government of National Unity
IIDA Women’s Development Organization
Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
Liberia Women’s Initiative
Mano River Women’s Peace Network
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MODEL
MPLA
MRU
NPFL
NPRC
OAU
PALIPEHUTU
PHRN
RENAMO
RRA
RUF/SL
SDA
SDM - Mayo
SDM-Aliyou
SPLM/A
SPM - Noor
SPM - Jess
SSDF
SSWC
SNF
SNM
SNU
SWDA
SWO
ULIMO
UNAMSIL
UNHCR
UNITA
UNOMIL
UNOMSIL
UPRONA
USC - Aideed
USC - Mahdi
USF
USP
WIPNET–Liberia

Movement for Democracy in Liberia
Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (Popular Movement
for the Liberation of Angola)
Mano River Union
National Patriotic Front of Liberia
National Provisional Ruling Council
Organization of African Unity
Party for the Liberation of Hutu People
Peace and Human Rights Network
Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Mozambique National
Resistance)
Rahawein Resistance Army
Revolutionary United Front/Sierra Leone
Somali Democratic Alliance (Gadabursi)
Somali Democratic Movement (Digil/Rahanweyn)
Somali Democratic Movement (Aliyou)
Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement/Army
Somali Patriotic Movement (Ogadeni)
Somali Patriotic Movement (Jess)
Somali Salvation Democratic Front (Merjertein clan)
Save Somali Women and Children
Somali National Front (Siad Barre - Marehan)
Somali National Movement (Issaq)
Somali National Union
Somaliland Women’s Development Association
Somaliland Women’s Organization
United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia
United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
United Nations High Commission for Refugees
União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (Union for
the Total Independence of Angola)
United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia
United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone
Union Pour le Progrès National (Union for National Progress)
United Somali Congress – Aideed faction (Hawiye/Habar Gidir)
United Somali Congress – Mahdi faction (Hawiye/Abgal)
United Somali Front
United Somali Party
Women in Peace Building Network–Liberia
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